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The Costa Rican talk of crime is fundamentally based on the assumption that a formerly explicitly nonviolent nation has been transformed into a battleground for social violence - that is, on the belief that an alarming "crime wave" is occurring today while there was no crime at all in the past. On the basis of this assumption, the fear of crime and the call for zero tolerance and drastic law enforcement actions have been increasing. In this paper I discuss the Costa Rican talk of crime from a historical perspective to demonstrate that crime has always been a topic that has generated pervasive feelings of insecurity and social pessimism. I argue that social changes in Costa Rican society and the paradigmatic shift in economic and social-welfare politics since the 1980s have been essential in the transformation of the talk of crime. As part of this transformation, the politicization of crime since the 1990s has been one of the most powerful changes in the dominant discourse. -- Costa Rica ; violence ; crime ; social order ; public discourse ; social change

It has become common to state that criminal violence has superseded political violence in Central America. This paper presents the first results of a research project which analyses the social construction of violent realities in Costa Rica, El Salvador and Nicaragua. The authors describe the print media landscape in Central America and examine both the quality of leading newspapers and the main clusters of topics constituting the news discourse on violence. The analysis of the macro-structure of topic management in Central American newspapers allows to differentiate the "talk of crime": it is more heterogeneous than often thought. There are signs that the problem of juvenile delinquency is emerging as the center of a cross-country discourse on "ordinary violence". On the other hand, the talk of crime is centered around few topic clusters, with sexual violence and border-related discourse on violence being of key importance. Finally, the paper points to a heterogeneous array of discourse events that is connected to political developments and power-relations. -- Central America ; violence ; discourse analysis ; media

In all Central American countries we witness a struggle to define, interpret and classify types of violence, delinquency, crime and (in)security. Although this struggle has highly relevant political and social implications, it has not been analyzed systematically. This article evaluates the state of the art and, based on methodological considerations, emphasizes the contribution of qualitative research on the local level in contrast to quantitative studies on the national or regional level. In a second step, using the discourse on Central American youth gangs as an example, the authors show that moral panic and repressive criminal policies are not direct consequences of the violence phenomena per se. Rather, the perception of and the reactions to insecurity and violence are based on social discourses about these phenomena. -- Central America ; violence ; delinquency ; insecurity ; discourse analysis

National Socialism, the Second World War, Stalinism, the expansion of the Soviet Union, and other political crises in Europe led to millions of people fleeing or being abducted in the 1930s and 1940s. The 'European refugee problem' led to the establishment of several international organizations. With the founding of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) in 1946, the concept of refugees changed. For the first time, those that had previously been inevitably labelled refugees – whether as groups or individuals – now had to apply for this status. I argue that refugee status was not simply granted or denied by the IRO, but rather negotiated between IRO officers and applicants, often via a protracted, multistage process. These negotiations were based on the applicants' portrayal of their own personal history and not (only) an objective history itself. However, the question is not only whether people told the 'truth' or not; rather, the applicants' individual 'negotiation skills' and individual perceptions of the IRO officers also played a decisive role. Whilst most current research looks at the actions and strategies of ethnic, religious, national, or social groups, I expand this perspective with a focus on individual negotiations of being recognized as a refugee or Displaced Person by the IRO.

AbstractBetween 1947 and early 1952, the International Refugee Organization (IRO), which was established within the framework of the United Nations to "solve" the so-called European refugee problem after the end of the Second World War, resettled one million European refugees—victims of Nazism as well as East European refugees who escaped the Red Army—all over the world. The IRO's resettlement project is regarded as a blueprint for the establishment of the postwar international migration regime, and it was the predecessor of later initiatives such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).In this article I argue that the IRO's history as well as the history of the migration regime after the Second World War has, thus far, mainly been written from the perspective of U.S. American and European history. Northern nations are considered agents in this history, while southern countries are considered as passive "destinations." In the case of Venezuela, the article argues that the Global South's active role in the migration regime must be taken into consideration to understand postwar migration. From the perspective of a connective approach to global history, it shows how Venezuela, as a political agent, was involved in shaping the migration regime; how it perceived itself as an agent within that regime; and how it intervened on a small scale to shape its form and function.

After the end of World War II, millions of people were uprooted all over Europe. After realizing that many of those people did not want to return to their former places of origin, the United Nations founded the International Refugee Organization (IRO) to repatriate those displaced persons (DPs) who wanted to return home and to resettle refugees who did not in other countries. Venezuela was neither actively involved in World War II nor (at that time) in the approaching Cold War. Nevertheless, this "third world" country became involved both in the political discussion about the international resettlement program and as the receiving country of 17,000 DPs. In this context, the paper asks who was resettled in Venezuela and in what way those people were able to influence and negotiate their resettlement in Venezuela. The paper thus focusses on the agency of DPs and the IRO's decision-making processes in their European field offices.

After the end of World War II, millions of people were uprooted all over Europe. After realizing that many of those people did not want to return to their former places of origin, the United Nations founded the International Refugee Organization (IRO) to repatriate those displaced persons (DPs) who wanted to return home and to resettle refugees who did not in other countries. Venezuela was neither actively involved in World War II nor (at that time) in the approaching Cold War. Nevertheless, this "third world" country became involved both in the political discussion about the international resettlement program and as the receiving country of 17,000 DPs. In this context, the paper asks who was resettled in Venezuela and in what way those people were able to influence and negotiate their resettlement in Venezuela. The paper thus focusses on the agency of DPs and the IRO's decision-making processes in their European field offices.

Centroamérica tiene la fama de ser una región muy violenta en la que las altas tasas de criminalidad, las agresivas pandillas juveniles, el tráfico de drogas y la inseguridad ciudadana determinan el diario vivir. Los políticos, los medios de comunicación así como también los observadores políticos dentro y fuera de la región, afirman con frecuencia que la población valora la situación de la misma manera sin objeción y que aboga además por más ley y orden. Este artículo analiza tanto la percepción social de la violencia y la criminalidad en Costa Rica, El Salvador y Nicaragua, como también las ideas para sus posibles soluciones. Tomando como base las entrevistas y las redacciones de los colegiales, este artículo examina qué contenidos de enunciados públicos se reflejan en la población. Las fuentes confirman que circulan los discursos hegemónicos sobre violencia, criminalidad e inseguridad, los que, constituyen el saber valedero y construyen la realidad. Simultáneamente la mayoría de la población está, al parecer, en contra de los métodos políticamente represivos como solución. ; Central America has the reputation of being a violent region with high crime rates, youth gangs, drug traffic, and ubiquitous insecurity. Politicians, the media, and social scientists in and outside the region often claim that the societies are in complete agreement with their judgment of the situation and that all society members are calling for law and order and social segregation. Focusing on Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, the paper analyzes the social perception of violence and crime. On the basis of essays written by secondary school students and interviews with citizens from all walks of life in the three countries, the paper points out how elite arguments on violence and crime are translated into everyday life, and what society members suggest be done to deal with these problems. The sources prove that there are noticeable hegemonic discourses on violence and crime in Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. Simultaneously, a majority of the respondents call for social and integrative solutions rather than the so-called "iron fist." The repressive trend in Central American policies therefore does not necessarily receive the presumed affirmation asserted by many authorities on and in the region.

Kaum ein anderes soziales Thema beherrscht heute die öffentlichen Debatten in Costa Rica so sehr wie Kriminalität. Der dominante öffentliche Diskurs stützt sich dabei elementar auf die Prämisse, dass sich die ehemals "friedvolle Nation" in ein Schlachtfeld alltäglicher Kriminalität verwandelt habe. Auf der Basis dieser Prämisse wachsen die gesellschaftliche Angst und der Ruf nach der harten Hand des Staates und es entsteht ein zunehmendes Einverständnis über drastischere staatliche und private Maßnahmen der Kriminalitätsbekämpfung. Wegen der Vorstellung über eine spezifische nationale Identität der Costaricaner wird Kriminalität in der Öffentlichkeit hierbei zunehmend als ein die Gesellschaft von Außen angreifendes Problem interpretiert. Das Werk geht vor diesem Hintergrund den Fragen nach, wie das Thema Kriminalität im öffentlichen Diskurs als eines der größten Probleme des Landes konzipiert wird, wie sich dieser Diskurs historisch gewandelt hat, wie sich das gesellschaftliche Handeln auf der Grundlage dieses Diskurses verändert hat und wie dieses Handeln in der Gegenwart schließlich auf die gesellschaftliche Konzeption von Kriminalität als einem Problem zurückwirkt

Crime, violence, and insecurity are perceived as society's biggest problems in contemporary Costa Rica. This degree of priority is especially remarkable because the country has always been considered the peaceful exception in the violent Central American region. In this paper I analyze four cornerstones of the nonviolent national self-perception in the 1940s and 1980s as the fundamental basis for the current talk of crime: the civil war, the abolition of the military, the proclamation of neutrality, and the peace plan for Central America and the subsequent granting of the Nobel Peace Prize. The result of the analysis is the determination that these historical cornerstones were not publicly discussed as expressions of the nonviolent identity for which they are today cited as evidence. ; Gewalt und Kriminalität werden in der costaricanischen Öffentlichkeit heute als die größte gesellschaftliche Bedrohung wahrgenommen. Diese Prioritätensetzung ist nicht zuletzt deshalb bemerkenswert, weil Costa Rica seit langem als die friedvolle Ausnahme in der gewalttätigen zentralamerikanischen Region gilt. Dieser Beitrag untersucht vier Säulen der gewaltlosen Selbstwahrnehmung in den 1940er und 1980er Jahren: den Bürgerkrieg, die Abschaffung des Militärs, die Neutralitätserklärung und den Friedensplan für Zentralamerika, für den Oscar Arias mit dem Friedensnobelpreis ausgezeichnet wurde. Der Beitrag zeigt, dass diese historischen Momente in den 1940er und 1980er Jahren öffentlich nicht unter dem Gesichtspunkt von Gewaltlosigkeit debattiert und wahrgenommen wurden und dass sich die damaligen Debatten nicht mit ihrer heutigen Interpretation als Belege einer gewaltlosen nationalen Identität decken.

The Costa Rican talk of crime is fundamentally based on the assumption that a formerly explicitly nonviolent nation has been transformed into a battleground for social violence - that is, on the belief that an alarming 'crime wave' is occurring today while there was no crime at all in the past. On the basis of this assumption, the fear of crime and the call for zero tolerance and drastic law enforcement actions have been increasing. In this paper I discuss the Costa Rican talk of crime from a historical perspective to demonstrate that crime has always been a topic that has generated pervasive feelings of insecurity and social pessimism. I argue that social changes in Costa Rican society and the paradigmatic shift in economic and social-welfare politics since the 1980s have been essential in the transformation of the talk of crime. As part of this transformation, the politicization of crime since the 1990s has been one of the most powerful changes in the dominant discourse. ; Kultur der Angst und Kontrolle in Costa Rica (II): Der Diskurs über Gewalt und sozialer Wandel. Der costaricanische öffentliche Diskurs über Gewalt und Kriminalität stützt sich vor allem auf die Prämisse, dass sich die ehemals gewaltlose Nation in ein Schlachtfeld alltäglicher Gewalt verwandelt hat, das heißt, dass heute in Costa Rica eine Besorgnis erregende 'Welle der Gewalt' zu beobachten ist, während es in der Vergangenheit quasi keine Kriminalität gegeben hat. Auf der Grundlage dieser Prämisse wachsen in der Bevölkerung die gesellschaftliche Angst einerseits sowie der Ruf nach der harten Hand. Andererseits werden immer drastischere staatliche und private Maßnahmen der Kriminalitätsbekämpfung legitimiert. Dieser Beitrag untersucht zunächst den costaricanischen Diskurs über alltägliche Kriminalität in historischer Perspektive. Darauf aufbauend wird argumentiert, dass einschneidende gesellschaftliche Veränderungen und ein Paradigmenwechsel in Sozial- und Wirtschaftspolitik seit den 1980er Jahren ausschlaggebend dafür sind, dass sich der Diskurs über Gewalt und Kriminalität gewandelt hat. Eine der wichtigsten Veränderungen liegt dabei in der Politisierung alltäglicher Kriminalität.