Majority rule outcomes and the choice of germaneness rules
In: Public choice, Band 75, Heft 4, S. 301-316
ISSN: 1573-7101
12 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Public choice, Band 75, Heft 4, S. 301-316
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Public choice, Band 75, Heft 4, S. 301-316
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Public choice, Band 64, Heft 3, S. 229-238
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Public choice, Band 64, Heft 3, S. 229
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Legislative studies quarterly, Band 14, Heft 1, S. 135
ISSN: 1939-9162
In: Analytical perspectives on politics
Includes bibliographical references (p. 169-176) and index. ; Mode of access: Internet.
BASE
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 60, Heft 2, S. 558-559
ISSN: 0022-3816
In: International interactions: empirical and theoretical research in international relations, Band 22, Heft 3, S. 279-294
ISSN: 1547-7444
In: Legislative studies quarterly, Band 14, Heft 1, S. 107, 129,
ISSN: 0362-9805
In: American political science review, Band 82, Heft 2, S. 445-466
ISSN: 1537-5943
We develop and explicate a game-theoretic model in which repeated play, incomplete information, and reputation are major elements. A significant advance of this model is the way it represents cooperation under incomplete information among rational actors of different sizes. The model is used to formalize certain aspects of the "theory of hegemonic stability." It shows that the "dilemma" or "limits" of hegemonic stability look like natural attributes of games where reputation is involved, unifying both "benevolent" and "coercive" strands of hegemony theory. An example, drawn from recent developments in the Organization of Petroleum-exporting Countries, shows how our model of reputation guides the study of hegemonic regime construction. We conclude by comparing the nature of cooperative behavior under conditions of complete and incomplete information.
In: American political science review, Band 82, Heft 2, S. 445
ISSN: 0003-0554