Suchergebnisse

This article proposes reforms to securities fraud compensation. It draws on the law in China, the US and the UK. A key problem with the current position in the US and the UK is that that it does not fully define fundamental compensatory principles: the date when loss arises, and the rules of causation, remoteness, and mitigation. China has addressed securities fraud compensation and has implicitly defined the operation of compensatory principles. Thus, I use experiences in China, the US and the UK to: (1 ) show that developed markets can learn from the law in emerging markets, and (2) propose reforms to securities fraud compensation that address the key compensatory principles. These principles provide a basis for a globally harmonized approach to market manipulation by false statements.

This paper examines the relationship between acquirer size, sovereign governance, and value-creation in acquisitions. Prior literature indicates that larger acquirers' acquisitions create less shareholder wealth in developed markets, arising primarily from agency and entrenchment problems. However, in weak governance environments, size might have off-setting benefits, including increased market power and political connections. We use a sample of 17,647 takeovers from 45 countries to examine the acquirer size effect around the world. We find that the acquirer size effect exists internationally, but is smaller in magnitude in weak governance markets. Compared with larger acquirers in strong governance countries, large acquirers in weak governance countries do takeovers that generate higher stock-returns and increase post-takeover operating performance. Their deals are also more likely to be friendly, and take less time to complete. We also find that the benefits of larger acquirer size increase with the importance of political connections in the acquirer's country. The results suggest that country-governance can moderate the impact of corporate characteristics, such as corporate size.