Applying Jacksons Methodological Ideal-Types: Problems of Differentiation and Classification
In: Millennium: journal of international studies, Band 41, Heft 2, S. 290-308
ISSN: 0305-8298
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In: Millennium: journal of international studies, Band 41, Heft 2, S. 290-308
ISSN: 0305-8298
In: Millennium: journal of international studies, Band 41, Heft 2, S. 290-308
ISSN: 1477-9021
In The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, Patrick Jackson situates methodologies in International Relations in relation to their underlying philosophical assumptions. One of his aims is to map International Relations debates in a way that 'capture[s] current controversies' (p. 40). This ambition is overstated: whilst Jackson's typology is useful as a clarificatory tool, (re)classifying existing scholarship in International Relations is more problematic. One problem with Jackson's approach is that he tends to run together the philosophical assumptions which decisively differentiate his methodologies (by stipulating a distinctive warrant for knowledge claims) and the explanatory strategies that are employed to generate such knowledge claims, suggesting that the latter are entailed by the former. In fact, the explanatory strategies which Jackson associates with each methodology reflect conventional practice in International Relations just as much as they reflect philosophical assumptions. This makes it more difficult to identify each methodology at work than Jackson implies. I illustrate this point through a critical analysis of Jackson's controversial reclassification of Waltz as an analyticist, showing that whilst Jackson's typology helps to expose inconsistencies in Waltz's approach, it does not fully support the proposed reclassification. The conventional aspect of methodologies in International Relations also raises questions about the limits of Jackson's 'engaged pluralism'.
In: European journal of international relations, Band 17, Heft 2, S. 257-277
ISSN: 1460-3713
Explanatory theorists increasingly insist that their theories are useful even though they cannot be deductively applied. But if so, then how do such theories contribute to our understanding of international relations? I argue that explanatory theories are typically heuristically applied: theorists' accounts of specific empirical episodes are shaped by their theories' thematic content, but are not inferred from putative causal generalizations or covering laws. These accounts therefore gain no weight from their purely rhetorical association with theories' quasi-deductive arguments: they must be judged on the plausibility of their empirical claims. Moreover, the quasi-deductive form in which explanatory theories are typically presented obscures their actual explanatory role, which is to indicate what sort of explanation may be required, to provide conceptual categories, and to suggest an empirical focus. This account of how theoretical explanations are constructed subverts the nomothetic-idiographic distinction that is often used to distinguish International Relations from History. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Sage Publications Ltd. & ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research.]
In: European journal of international relations, Band 17, Heft 2, S. 257-277
ISSN: 1354-0661
World Affairs Online
In: European journal of international relations, Band 17, Heft 2, S. 257-277
ISSN: 1460-3713
Explanatory theorists increasingly insist that their theories are useful even though they cannot be deductively applied. But if so, then how do such theories contribute to our understanding of international relations? I argue that explanatory theories are typically heuristically applied: theorists' accounts of specific empirical episodes are shaped by their theories' thematic content, but are not inferred from putative causal generalizations or covering laws. These accounts therefore gain no weight from their purely rhetorical association with theories' quasi-deductive arguments: they must be judged on the plausibility of their empirical claims. Moreover, the quasi-deductive form in which explanatory theories are typically presented obscures their actual explanatory role, which is to indicate what sort of explanation may be required, to provide conceptual categories, and to suggest an empirical focus. This account of how theoretical explanations are constructed subverts the nomothetic–idiographic distinction that is often used to distinguish International Relations from History.
In: Millennium: journal of international studies, Band 36, Heft 2, S. 370-372
ISSN: 1477-9021
In: Millennium: journal of international studies, Band 36, Heft 2, S. 180-181
ISSN: 0305-8298