Past research on affiliative social tuning has shown that individuals who experience affiliative motivation toward another person come to exhibit implicit prejudice consistent with the apparent beliefs of that person. The present research seeks to elucidate the mechanism by which such malleability occurs. Is it interpersonally cued cognitive control, consistent with dual-process models of prejudice regulation, or a contextual change in automatic associations, consistent with shared reality theory? QUAD modeling of participants' responses revealed that affiliative social tuning of implicit prejudice was solely a function of changing associations (Studies 1–3). Furthermore, instructions to try to inhibit prejudice within a particular interpersonal context did not yield implicit attitude change (Study 2).
We examined majority group members' collective action on behalf of a minority group, focusing on the role of outgroup perspective taking and group-based guilt. As expected, outgroup perspective taking was positively associated with heterosexuals' collective action in response to hate crimes against non-heterosexuals and Whites' action in response to hate crimes against Blacks (Studies 1 and 2). This association was partially mediated by group-based guilt (Studies 2 and 3). We also examined the role of group-based anger; although it directly related to collective action, it did not mediate the association between perspective taking and collective action. Finally, we manipulated outgroup perspective taking to demonstrate its causal role in the subsequent outcomes (Study 3).
We examined majority group members' collective action on behalf of a minority group, focusing on the role of outgroup perspective taking and group-based guilt. As expected, outgroup perspective taking was positively associated with heterosexuals' collective action in response to hate crimes against non-heterosexuals and Whites' action in response to hate crimes against Blacks (Studies 1 and 2). This association was partially mediated by group-based guilt (Studies 2 and 3). We also examined the role of group-based anger; although it directly related to collective action, it did not mediate the association between perspective taking and collective action. Finally, we manipulated outgroup perspective taking to demonstrate its causal role in the subsequent outcomes (Study 3).
Although replication is a central tenet of science, direct replications are rare in psychology. This research tested variation in the replicability of 13 classic and contemporary effects across 36 independent samples totaling 6,344 participants. In the aggregate, 10 effects replicated consistently. One effect – imagined contact reducing prejudice – showed weak support for replicability. And two effects – flag priming influencing conservatism and currency priming influencing system justification – did not replicate. We compared whether the conditions such as lab versus online or US versus international sample predicted effect magnitudes. By and large they did not. The results of this small sample of effects suggest that replicability is more dependent on the effect itself than on the sample and setting used to investigate the effect.
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We conducted preregistered replications of 28 classic and contemporary published findings, with protocols that were peer reviewed in advance, to examine variation in effect magnitudes across samples and settings. Each protocol was administered to approximately half of 125 samples that comprised 15,305 participants from 36 countries and territories. Using the conventional criterion of statistical significance (p < .05), we found that 15 (54%) of the replications provided evidence of a statistically significant effect in the same direction as the original finding. With a strict significance criterion (p < .0001), 14 (50%) of the replications still provided such evidence, a reflection of the extremely high-powered design. Seven (25%) of the replications yielded effect sizes larger than the original ones, and 21 (75%) yielded effect sizes smaller than the original ones. The median comparable Cohen's ds were 0.60 for the original findings and 0.15 for the replications. The effect sizes were small (< 0.20) in 16 of the replications (57%), and 9 effects (32%) were in the direction opposite the direction of the original effect. Across settings, the Q statistic indicated significant heterogeneity in 11 (39%) of the replication effects, and most of those were among the findings with the largest overall effect sizes; only 1 effect that was near zero in the aggregate showed significant heterogeneity according to this measure. Only 1 effect had a tau value greater than .20, an indication of moderate heterogeneity. Eight others had tau values near or slightly above .10, an indication of slight heterogeneity. Moderation tests indicated that very little heterogeneity was attributable to the order in which the tasks were performed or whether the tasks were administered in lab versus online. Exploratory comparisons revealed little heterogeneity between Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) cultures and less WEIRD cultures (i.e., cultures with relatively high and low WEIRDness scores, respectively). Cumulatively, variability in the observed effect sizes was attributable more to the effect being studied than to the sample or setting in which it was studied.