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Abstract
The extensive political science, sociology, and legal literatures on democratic backsliding all tend to approach the issue in the same way: Start with a recent example of democratic decay. Then reason back from that example to generate a more extensive account of backsliding mechanisms or consequences. In contrast, Norwegian political scientist and sociologist Stein Ringen, in a book called How Democracies Live: Power, Statecraft, and Freedom in Modern Societies, offers a diagnosis of democratic backsliding that flips this standard sequence of analysis. Rather than beginning with case studies, Ringen offers an investigation of five "core" concepts of political theory. Those who seek to ameliorate democracy's current woes, he contends, should start with this sort of very general anatomy lesson. Only with the resulting conceptual map of political theory can they develop specific lessons for the task of managing democratic revival today. By negative implication, Ringen suggests, reformers will be led astray by starting with a specific case. The latter approach, he implies, causes them to overlook or misconstrue basic elements of the political order that must be fixed before the democratic ship can be righted. This review considers whether Ringen's anatomy-inspired method yields insights and, further, whether, more generally, an anatomical approach to political concepts can deepen our understanding of democracy and its present travails. It offers reasons for skepticism on both counts. It may well be possible to construct a taxonomy of political concepts to clarify the terms of democratic survival. But the specific taxonomy of core concepts offered in How Democracies Live does not plainly succeed.

This article explores the role of the U.S. Supreme Court in contemporary democratic backsliding. I identify three dynamics that have placed American democracy under strain: (1) the incomplete democratization of national institutions created in 1787; (2) a half century of rising inequalities in wealth, market power, and political influence; and (3) a resurgence of intolerant, authoritarian, white-ethnic identity politics associated with the Republican Party. I argue that the Court has proved itself to be capable of creating linkages between these distinct institutional, economic, and sociocultural domains. In doing so, the Court has enabled the transformation of economic or sociocultural power into durable political power and the transformation of political power into the entrenchment of a "permanent minority" immured from democratic defeat. I describe specific doctrinal mechanisms by which this arbitrage role is performed, showing how the Court can be a vector of democratic backsliding.

Judicial independence seems under siege. President Trump condemns federal courts for their political bias; his erstwhile presidential opponents mull various court-packing plans; and courts, in turn, are lambasted for abandoning a long-held constitutional convention against institutional manipulation. At the same time, across varied lines of jurisprudence, the Roberts Court evinces a deep worry about judicial independence. This preoccupation with threats to judicial independence infuses recent opinions on administrative deference, bankruptcy, patent adjudication, and jurisdiction-stripping. Yet the Court has not offered a single, overarching definition of what it means by the term "judicial independence." Nor has it explained how its disjointed doctrinal interventions add up to a coherent theory of institutional autonomy. And it remains unclear how debates on judicial independence among jurists relate to debates about the same term in the larger public sphere. This Article's first contribution is to analyze how the Roberts Court understands the term judicial independence and how its doctrinal rules fall far short of realizing even the aspirations the Court has for that term. This case study in doctrinal specification illuminates the gap between the Justices' own ethical aspiration toward judicial independence and its institutional realization—a gap that generates confusion, uncertainty, and opportunities for circumvention. This Article then abstracts away from the particulars of the Roberts Court's jurisprudence to explore the origins of this aspiration– implementation gap. To motivate this more general analysis, it first demonstrates that there is a large range of constitutional-design options for a founder seeking to create independent courts. The Framers of Article III embraced certain of these options and rejected others. Specifically, they preferred ex post to ex ante checks on political interference in the judiciary. Subsequent experience, though, has demonstrated that their choice of judicial ...