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This article analyzes informational manipulation by the Russian Federation authorities which are used for getting away with criminal activity in Ukraine; the strengthening of the Kremlin`s authority on the international stage and the solution of foreign-policy tasks. Factual materials, which were studied while preparing this publication, gives reason to consider that Russian propaganda is destabilizing democracies and it constitutes a threat to the European continent. The article analyzes Russian manipulation connected with the use of such words as "neo-Nazi", "ultranationalists" and "Banderists" in relation to the new Ukrainian government authorities. The paper highlights the role of the Russian Federation and military in the process of the annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the war in Donbass. ; W artykule przeanalizowano manipulacje Federacji Rosyjskiej o charakterze informacyjnym, które są wykorzystywane do usprawiedliwienia działalności przestępczej na Ukrainie, wzmacniania autorytetu Kremla na arenie międzynarodowej, uprawiania polityki zagranicznej. Analizowany w trakcie przygotowania artykułu materiał faktologiczny daje podstawy do wniosku, że propaganda rosyjska jest obecnie istotnym czynnikiem destabilizującym, stwarzającym zagrożenie dla kontynentu europejskiego. Przeanalizowano przykłady manipulacji rosyjskiej, związane z używaniem przez nowe kierownictwo państwa ukraińskiego określeń: "neonazista", "skrajny nacjonalista" i "banderowiec", odzwierciedlono rolę przywództwa Rosji i rosyjskich żołnierzy w zajęciu terytorium Autonomicznej Republiki Krym i w czasie agresji na Donbasie. ; В статье проанализированы манипуляции руководства Российской Федерации ин- формационного характера, которые используются для оправдания преступной деятельности на Украине, усиление авторитета Кремля на международной арене, решения внешнеполитиче- ских задач. Фактологический материал, исследуемый в процессе подготовки публикации, дает основания для выводов, что российская пропаганда в настоящее время является существен- ным дестабилизирующим фактором, представляющим угрозу для европейского континента. Осуществлен анализ российских манипуляций, связанных с использованием в отношении нового украинского руководства терминов "неонацисты", "крайние националисты" и "банде- ровцы", освещена роль руководства РФ и российских военных в процессе захвата территории Автономной республики Крым и агрессии на Донбассе.

Publikacja recenzowana / Peer-reviewed publication ; Poland has repeatedly acted as a reliable ally in promoting Ukraine's activity on the international stage and during internal political turmoil. Polish leadership played the exceptional role during the Revolution of dignity. Having regard to the aggravation of confrontation, especially Poland's activity enabled to approve a common position of the EU concerning the events on the Maidan and force Yanukovych to sign the Agreement on settlement of political crisis in Ukraine. From the beginning of Russian aggression on the territory of Ukraine, Poland stressed the inviolability of Ukrainian borders and encourage to the implementation of sanctions against Russia at the various international forums. Since a Poland's representative has not been involved at the negotiating group on normalization of the situation in Ukraine, intensity of Ukrainian-Polish dialogue on the highest level slightly reduced during 2014–2015. Direct contacts of Ukraine's leadership with the leaders of Germany and France, which having signifi cant impact on making decisions within the EU and being eligible as partners in the negotiations for Russia, have positive effects. However, they have not allowed to fully using great potential of Ukrainian-Polish strategic partnership.

Zwycięstwo w wyborach prezydenckich Wiktora Janukowycza sprzyjało normalizacji stosunków między oficjalnym Kijowem a Moskwą. Jednak wiele strategicznych zagadnień w stosunkach dwustronnych nie zostało rozwiązanych. Przywódcy Ukrainy byli niezadowoleni ze sztywnego stanowiska Rosji w sektorze energetycznym. Rosyjskim przywódcom, w przeciwieństwie do tego, nie odpowiadał realny postęp Ukrainy w dziedzinie integracji europejskiej. Na przełomie lata–jesieni 2013 roku Federacja Rosyjska faktycznie całkowicie zablokowała na jakiś czas wymianę gospodarczą między dwoma państwami, zmuszając oficjalny Kijów do tego, aby odmówił podpisania Umowy Stowarzyszeniowej między Ukrainą a UE. Rosnąca presja rosyjska początkowo spowodowała opór ze strony Wiktora Janukowycza. Inicjowane przez prezydenta kroki wskazywały, że proeuropejskie deklaracje ukraińskiego kierownictwa mogą zostać zrealizowane w praktyce. Jednak wzmocnienie i dywersyfikacja presji ze strony Rosji, a do pewnego stopnia niechęć przywódców UE do przyznania skorumpowanym władzom ukraińskim gwarancji znacznej pomocy finansowej, popchnęły Janukowycza do odejścia od kierunku europejskiego.

The victory of Viktor Yanukovych in the presidential election seemed to have normalized the relations between official Kyiv and Moscow. Yet, a number of strategic issues in bilateral relations were not solved. The Ukrainian leaders were deeply concerned about the Russia's rigid position in the energy sector. The Russian leadership made little concession in Ukraine's moving toward European integration. Moreover, at the turn of the summer and autumn of 2013, the Russian Federation totally blocked the movement of goods between the two countries for an uncertain period of time, thus forcing official Kyiv to refuse to sign the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU. The growing Russian pressure initially provoked resistance from Viktor Yanukovych. The steps he took proved that the pro-European statements of the Ukrainian leadership were about to be carried out. However, the aggravating tension and increasing pressure from Russia and, to some extent, the reluctance of EU leaders to provide financial guarantees to the corrupt Ukrainian leadership, pushed Yanukovych to abandon the European integration altogether. ; Zwycięstwo w wyborach prezydenckich Wiktora Janukowycza sprzyjało normalizacji stosunków między oficjalnym Kijowem a Moskwą. Jednak wiele strategicznych zagadnień w stosunkach dwustronnych nie zostało rozwiązanych. Przywódcy Ukrainy byli niezadowoleni ze sztywnego stanowiska Rosji w sektorze energetycznym. Rosyjskim przywódcom, w przeciwieństwie do tego, nie odpowiadał realny postęp Ukrainy w dziedzinie integracji europejskiej.Na przełomie lata–jesieni 2013 roku Federacja Rosyjska faktycznie całkowicie zablokowała na jakiś czas wymianę gospodarczą między dwoma państwami, zmuszając oficjalny Kijów do tego, aby odmówił podpisania Umowy Stowarzyszeniowej między Ukrainą a UE. Rosnąca presja rosyjska początkowo spowodowała opór ze strony Wiktora Janukowycza. Inicjowane przez prezydenta kroki wskazywały, że proeuropejskie deklaracje ukraińskiego kierownictwa mogą zostać zrealizowane w praktyce. Jednak wzmocnienie i dywersyfikacja presji ze strony Rosji, a do pewnego stopnia niechęć przywódców UE do przyznania skorumpowanym władzom ukraińskim gwarancji znacznej pomocy finansowej, popchnęły Janukowycza do odejścia od kierunku europejskiego.

The article is a continuation of the publication from the previous issue of the journal. In the previous part, the main focus was on Russia's domestic political and economic transformation during Vladimir Putin's first presidential term, which clearly shows a refusal from Yeltsin's limited democracy and the establishment of an authoritarian regime with Praetorian features. During his first years as president, Vladimir Putin demonstrated that, contrary to the commitments made by Boris Yeltsin's team at the OSCE Istanbul Summit, he did not intend to reduce Russia's military presence in the post-Soviet space. Conversely, the official Kremlin has intensified diplomatic efforts, which have resulted in an increase in the number of its military bases in the countries of the so-called «Near Abroad». At the same time, steps were taken to demonstrate the growing potential and ambitions of the Russian army. The corresponding activity was accompanied by purposeful actions aimed at building a modern Soviet Union around Russia. To achieve this goal, a wide range of tools was used, ranging from official statements to Moscow-initiated integration projects. The practical consequences of the respective aspirations of the new leadership of the Russian Federation were the signing of agreements on the establishment of the EurAsEC, the Common Economic Space, and the reformatting of the Collective Security Treaty into the CSTO. Analysis of internal and external initiatives of the new leadership of Russia in the period outlined in the article, in comparison with the statements of authoritative researchers, provide grounds to conclude that the construction of an authoritarian regime in the Russian Federation was accompanied by pro-Western rhetoric of its leadership due to the internal weakness of the Russian state in the early XXI century. After Russia's significant economic growth, complemented by the introduction of comprehensive control within the country by the Kremlin, Vladimir Putin began to gradually abandon the disguise of the true nature of his regime, which soon was manifested through the prism of both tough statements and aggressive steps in the international arena.

The accession to power of Vladimir Putin was a turning point in the history of Russia. At the beginning of the twentieth century, instead of Yeltsin's peculiar model of democracy, an authoritarian regime with Praetorian features was gradually established. During Vladimir Putin's first presidential term (2000-2004), his official speeches traditionally included pro-Western messages. However, in practice, the Kremlin leadership initiated processes that testified completely opposite trends in development of the state. At this time, thanks to legislative changes favorable for the ruling elite, a significant blow to political pluralism was dealt, and the importance of central authorities was essentially strengthened. These events in Russian distorted realities allowed Putin's team to have more control over federal units than authorities of the democratic unitary states have over parts of their state formations. At the same time, using law enforcement agencies pressure, the state leadership established control over the media. At the same time, in the economic sphere, contrary to Vladimir Putin's assertion that "Monopolies are dangerous things in general; especially state monopolies" there was a systematic renationalization due to the purposeful efforts of law enforcement, judicial, and fiscal structures. It was the most pronounced in the energy sector, where Kremlin-controlled Gazprom and Rosneft fundamentally strengthened their positions. Similar processes took place in the automotive, aviation, metallurgical and other industries. As part of the redistribution of property, there was also pressure on foreign business represented on the Russian market. Some of the world's leading energy corporations have been forced to sell some of their shares to Kremlin-affiliated entities. In other cases, foreign companies were revoked permits to operate in Russia under contrived pretexts. The second part will outline the activities of Vladimir Putin and his team, which aimed to strengthen the position of the Russian Federation at the global level, and to increase the influence of official Moscow on the countries of the so-called "Near Abroad". An attempt will also be made to identify the reasons why, during the first few years of Vladimir Putin's presidency, the trends outlined above were accompanied by pro-Western rhetoric.

The aim of the article is to identify factors influencing the formation of new enterprises, with particular emphasis on the border regions of Eastern Poland, which are among the least developed ones in terms of entrepreneurship. The analysis of enterprises functioning in Eastern Poland in the years 2007—2017 was performed using log-linear (power) model, estimated on the basis of data from the Local Data Bank of Statistics Poland.
The results of the conducted research showed that the development of entrepreneurship in border regions of Eastern Poland is conditioned by different factors than in voivodships with a higher level of entrepreneurship.