Suchergebnisse

The purpose of this Article is to analyse evolutionary trends in the interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). To achieve this goal, a wide range of general philosophical methods were used. The Article submits that the ECHR has shown a growing commitment to the evolutionary method of interpretation, using the doctrine of a "living instrument", the ECHR, which is particularly important for Member States with specific problems, although this method limits the scope in the discretion of the State. It is concluded that the interpretative methodology used by the ECHR involves the use of its methods, including increasingly developing methods of consensus, efficiency, judicial activism, comparison, innovative interpretation, autonomous method, and "balance" method. This demonstrates, inter alia, the unlimited potential to improve the ECHR's interpretation of conventional standards. In the context of modern transformations in the direction of proactive international justice, judicial activism objectively departs from a formal application of legal norms and reflects the ECHR's desire to protect the fundamental human rights of individuals and communicatethem.

The purpose of the article is a comprehensive analysis of the issue of the judge's interpretive activity from the standpoint of the judge's cognition in such a process of unchangeable dualism of the factual circumstances of the case and the norm of the law. To achieve this goal, such methods as dialectic, comparative, formal-logical, communicative and phenomenological was used. The article deals with the approach according to which the judge's interpretive activity during professional occupation is a necessary method of specifying the content of abstract, relatively defined legal norms; and these norms become applicable in solving certain debatable questions. It is concluded that the judge creates the search for the best solution of a particular legal position. Reconciling the uniqueness of the law case and the formality of the legislative provisions resolving case is impossible without interpretive activity. One of the peculiarities of the dynamics of the interpretive activity of the European Court of Human Rights is its intellectual and creative nature; mechanical transformation of the norms of law into individual acts and "stereotype" application of previous court decisions are not admissible. The judge's interpretive activity combines rational-technical and existential-semantic levels, which necessitates a high level of personal and professional maturity of the judge. The problem of interpretation is not only technical skills in legislative provisions; it covers an important "standpoint" of the reality based on the professional experience and legal consciousness.