Labour Standards through International Organisations
In: The journal of corporate citizenship, Band 2003, Heft 11, S. 99-111
ISSN: 2051-4700
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In: The journal of corporate citizenship, Band 2003, Heft 11, S. 99-111
ISSN: 2051-4700
In: Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, Band 5, Heft 1, S. 69-75
A fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the UN Security Council has led to the criticism following the most recent Iraq-US war, which describes the UN opposition as irrelevant & unable to act or effect change. Rather than seeing the Council in moralistic & legal terms, the Council must be viewed in realistic political terms within its historical framework. The Council was primarily established for maintaining peace & avoiding conflict among the Great Powers rather than for protection of the weak from the strong. Thus the veto guarantees inaction precisely when tension is greatest between the Great Powers. The Council has sufficient legitimacy in international politics that its approval was sought by Washington prior to the Iraq War, that countries such as Canada & Turkey followed the UN signals as to whether to support the mission, & that denial of approval realized the more modest set of UN goals & powers in that it reinforced the legal principles of the Charter & raised the costs of unilateralism to a Great Power. This is important because it influences how US foreign policy makers assess US interests in world politics. L. Kehl
In: Foreign affairs: an American quarterly review, Band 82, Heft 4, S. 204
ISSN: 2327-7793
In: Global governance: a review of multilateralism and international organizations, Band 8, Heft 1, S. 35-51
ISSN: 1942-6720
In: Global governance: a review of multilateralism and international organizations, Band 8, Heft 1, S. 35-51
ISSN: 2468-0958, 1075-2846
An examination of the nature of the UN Security Council's power notes that the UN Charter grants the Security Council vast formal powers but not the mechanisms to enact them. Therefore, the Council's power is contingent upon the legitimacy conferred upon it by relevant actors, & the esteem in which it is held by member states. A theory of legitimacy & symbolic power for international organizations is considered in light of three areas in which states compete for symbolic rewards: the agenda, membership, & peacekeeping. It is pointed out that legitimacy & authority are always contested, & the Security Council's symbolic capital is especially vital in the absence of unanimity. International actors fight over the deployment of symbols to further their political interests, & it is important to recognize that efforts to legitimize an institution invariably spawn counter efforts to de-legitimize it. Recent discussions about reforming the Council are examined to stress the significance of symbolic politics & the need for international organizations to consistently cultivate their legitimacy in order not to lose it. If the Security Council lost its legitimacy it would be forced to depend on coercion to wield power which would ultimately bring about its demise. J. Lindroth
In: Global governance: a review of multilateralism and international organizations, Band 8, Heft 1, S. 35-52
ISSN: 2468-0958, 1075-2846
In: Canadian journal of political science: CJPS = Revue canadienne de science politique : RCSP, Band 33, Heft 4, S. 839-840
ISSN: 0008-4239
In: International organization, Band 53, Heft 2, S. 379-408
ISSN: 0020-8183
Internationale Organisationen und ihre Rolle in der Struktur des internationalen Systems hängen davon ab, wie sehr sie als legitim empfunden werden. Legitimität ist neben Eigennutz und Zwang der Hauptanreiz von Staaten den Regeln und Normen internationaler Organisationen zu folgen bzw. diese durchzusetzen. Der Autor erläutert den Begriff der Legitimität im Zusammenhang der internationalen Beziehungen am Beispiel von Nichteinmischungund staatlicher Souveränität. (SWP-PLB)
World Affairs Online
In: International organization, Band 53, Heft 2, S. 379-408
ISSN: 1531-5088
What motivates states to follow international norms, rules, and commitments? All social systems must confront what we might call the problem of social control—that is, how to get actors to comply with society's rules—but the problem is particularly acute for international relations, because the international social system does not possess an overarching center of political power to enforce rules. Yet, taken in balance with other values, a measure of order is a valued good. Some take this absence of centralized power to mean that the international system is like a Hobbesian state of nature, where only material power matters; others see it as evidence that international rules have force only when they are in the self-interest of each state. I show that these two conclusions are premature because of their shallow reading of international society and misinterpretation of the ways in which authority works in domestic society.
In: International organization, Band 53, Heft 2, S. 379-408
ISSN: 0020-8183
In: Foreign affairs, Band 82, Heft 4, S. 201-205
ISSN: 0015-7120
Comments on Michael J. Glennon's 'Why the Security Council Failed' (Foreign Policy, 2003, May/June).
In: Foreign affairs, Band 82, Heft 4, S. 201-205
ISSN: 0015-7120