"Cover" -- "Title" -- "Copyright" -- "CONTENTS" -- "Acknowledgments" -- "1 Introduction" -- "2 Rule of Law, Domestic and International" -- "3 How to Do Things with International Law" -- "4 The Permissive Power of the Ban on War" -- "5 The Rule of No Law: Nukes, Drones, and the Horror Vacui" -- "6 Torture: Legitimation and Legality" -- "7 The Empire of International Legalism" -- "Notes
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AbstractThe ban on inter-state war in the UN Charter is widely identified as central to the modern international order–Michael Byers calls it 'one of the twentieth century's greatest achievements'. Even if it is only imperfectly observed, it is often seen as a constraint on state autonomy and an improvement on the pre-legal, unregulated world before 1945. In response to this conventional view, this article shows that the laws on war in the Charter are better seen as permissive rather than constraining. I make two points. First, by creating a legal category around 'self-defence', the laws on war authorise, and thus legitimate, wars that are motivated by the security needs of the state, while forbidding other motives for wars. Second, state practice since 1945 has expanded the scope of this authorisation, extending it in both time and space beyond the black-letter text of the Charter. The permissive effect of law on war has therefore been getting larger. These two effects suggest that international law is a resource that increases state power, at least for powerful states, and this relation between international law and power politics is missed by both realists and liberal internationalists.
AbstractScholars and activists commonly see international law in a privileged normative and political position in world politics, where international legal institutions are assumed to advance important goals such as international stability, human justice and even global order as a whole. I explore this attitude toward international law, which I call an 'enchanted' view, and contrast it to the 'disenchanted' alternative. Where the enchanted attitude presumes the normative valence and political wisdom of following international law, the disenchanted approach treats these as open questions for inquiry and discussion. The disenchanted approach is more empirically minded, and more politically open, than the enchanted, and leads to a distinct research program on legalization in international affairs – one that is attentive to the politics of law, the connections between law and power, the ambiguity that exists between legality and policy wisdom.
AbstractA surge in academic interest in the interaction of international law with international politics has recently raised the profile of the rule of law in global politics. The idea of an 'international rule of law' is central to many accounts of international order, and to both political science and legal scholarship. Despite its popularity, the concept is rarely defined or examined. This article considers the theory and practice of the international rule of law. It shows first that the international rule of law cannot be deduced from the conventional Anglo-American version of the rule of law in domestic legal theory, as sketched by Joseph Raz and others. It then considers two competing versions of a distinctly international concept of the rule of law, one based on a positivist theory of compliance and the other on a structurationist theory of practice. The former is more common in legal and political scholarship but the latter accounts better for the political power of international law in relation to states.
In: The Global Context: How Politics, Investment and Institutions Impact European Businesses. Edited by Javier Solana and Angel Saz-Carranza, ESADE Barcelona. Forthcoming