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A comment on Robin Theobald's essay, 'Can the State Deliver?,' contends that the current discourse of good governance, which renews attention on the state & promotes the efficiency of governmental agencies, is an enormous improvement over the 'state bashing' of Reaganism & Thatcherism. However, expressing the need for an effective state is much simpler than creating one, & Theobald offers an excellent critique of failed efforts, especially how New Public Management serves to undermine institutional continuity & stability. However, his dismal view of anti-corruption prospects in less developed countries is too severe. The huge differences in the character of postcolonial states suggest some have a much stronger basis than others to promote institutionalized patterns of administration. The historical complexities of reform are discussed, along with the neoliberal tendency to minimize the need to build stronger political institutions through the glorification of civil society; corrupt elements of civil society; & situations in which civil society might play an anti-corruption role. J. Lindroth

"Across more than four decades, the conflict between the national government and Muslim liberation forces in the southern Philippines has killed tens of thousands and displaced millions. Two landmark agreements under the presidency of Benigno S Aquino III — the first in 2012 and the second in 2014 — raised high hopes that peace might finally be on the way. But the peace process stalled, and has yet to regain momentum, after a botched counterterrorism operation in early 2015. This volume provides both in-depth examination of the latest stage of a still-ongoing peace process as well as richly textured analysis of the historical, political, and economic context underlying one of the most enduring conflicts in the world. It is thus an extremely important foundational resource in the continuing quest for peace and prosperity in Mindanao."--

Explores whether offering bribes, corruption, & clientelism are beneficial or detrimental to Third World nations' development. A review of contemporary literature on offering bribes, corruption, & clientelism is presented to develop a theoretical framework for analyzing the economic effects of these practices. Seven factors that must be considered to resolve the issue are identified: calculability of corrupt actions; the need to determine which resources are wasted; receipt & subsequent investment of bribes; effects of corruption & clientelism on competition & market functioning; the influence of corrupt action on the state's role in developing the national economy; the impact of these processes on the institutionalization of state agencies & political parties; existence of other methods of economic & political development & their ability to counterbalance the effects of corruption & clientelism. Several recommendations for future research are also offered. J. W. Parker

Analyzes complexities of administrative and political centralization/decentralization, strategies and politics, and central-local government ties; policy implications; international in scope.

Throughout the world, diverse countries are implementing programs of decentralization as a means of promoting both democratic and developmental objectives. Unfortunately, however, scholarship has yet to offer a comprehensive framework within which to assess and reform central‐local relations. This article seeks to overcome the "division of labor" that has long separated analyses of administrative and political structures, and to provide stronger conceptual vocabulary for describing and analyzing the complexities of centralization and decentralization in both administration and politics. After developing two distinct continua of administrative and political centralization/decentralization, the paper then combines them in a single matrix able to highlight the wide range of strategies and outcomes that emerge from the complex interplay of the two spheres. Depending on where a country lies within the matrix, it is argued, strategies of decentralization may do more harm than good. Strategies of devolution are especially problematic in settings with strong local bosses, and should never be attempted without careful analysis of the preexisting character of central‐local ties.

The effects of the interactions among three disassociated phenomena -- clientelism, political corruption, & rent-seeking -- on the development of Third World nations are investigated. Theoretical & practical problems & advantages associated with contemporary theories of rent-seeking (eg, significant ideological bias), corruption (eg, explanations for corruption integrating market & nonmarket determinants), & clientelism (eg, inadequate analysis of the influence of coercion in the pursuit of particularistic advantage) are discussed. An eclectic framework designed to calculate the impact of political corruption on economic development is presented. Specifically, the framework attempts to resolve questions concerning the variability or calculability of corruption; the allocation of particularistic advantages; the investment of economic gains; the effects of corruption on the functioning of markets & states' execution of developmental projects; the institutionalization/disintegration of government agencies & political parties; & the presence of certain factors that assist states in combating corruption. Future research should examine how various kinds of corruption interact in governmental systems & ascertain the conditions that limit corruption's spread. J. W. Parker