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▪ Abstract  The utility of military threats as a means to deter international crises and war has been a central topic of international relations research. Rational choice models have provided the foundation for theorizing about the conditions under which conventional deterrence is likely to succeed or fail. Rational deterrence theorists have focused on four sets of variables: the balance of military forces, costly signaling and bargaining behavior, reputations, and interests at stake. Over the past two decades, scholars have tested propositions from rational deterrence theory utilizing both statistical and comparative case study methods. Although the empirical results from these tests have supported a number of hypotheses derived from the theoretical literature, they have also challenged some theoretical arguments and have sparked vigorous debates about both theory and research designs for conducting empirical research.

The utility of military threats as a means to deter international crises & war has been a central topic of international relations research. Rational choice models have provided the foundation for theorizing about the conditions under which conventional deterrence is likely to succeed or fail. Rational deterrence theorists have focused on four sets of variables: the balance of military forces, costly signaling & bargaining behavior, reputations, & interests at stake. Over the past two decades, scholars have tested propositions from rational deterrence theory utilizing both statistical & comparative case study methods. Although the empirical results from these tests have supported a number of hypotheses derived from the theoretical literature, they have also challenged some theoretical arguments & have sparked vigorous debates about both theory & research designs for conducting empirical research. 86 References. Adapted from the source document.

The author tests a set of hypotheses about the conditions under which major powers intervene with military support for states that are threatened in a crisis. The hypotheses are derived from a general theoretical approach that integrates a realist framework with recent works that focus on the domestic political determinants of foreign policy. Seven of the eight hypotheses tested are supported by the results of logit analysis on major power interventions in 272 international crises from 1918 to 1988. The broad theoretical implication is that scholars drawing on realist approaches to studying international politics should think rigorously about the role of domestic politics in foreign policy decisions.

In this paper a set of hypotheses about the conditions under which territorial disputes evolve into enduring rivalries are tested against a dataset of 129 territorial disputes in the international system from 1950-1990. During this period only 36 territorial disputes developed into enduring rivalries. The central theoretical question I address is what conditions cause foreign policy leaders to adopt non-violent and more flexible diplomatic policies over disputed territory and, conversely, when will leaders pursue territorial claims in a more aggressive and confrontational manner? To answer this question I utilize a modified realist approach which posits that foreign policy choices are shaped by the domestic political goal of state leaders to retain their position of political power. From this theoretical approach a series of hypotheses focusing on the issues at stake in control of disputed territory, the domestic political context, and the international political-military environment of challenger states are formulated. Empirical results, based on statistical tests, are then presented and provide considerable evidence of the interplay of domestic and international level variables in the decisions of state leaders whether to pursue territorial goals by means of diplomatic and military pressure over an extended period of time.

Three questions are addressed in this study: (1) Does a nuclear retaliatory capability contribute to extended deterrence against a nonnuclear power? (2) If so, is the deterrent value of nuclear weapons contingent upon the prior credible threat of conventional armed engagement by the defender? (3) Or, is the deterrent impact of nuclear weapons so potent that the conventional balance of forces has little deterrent impact? Competing hypotheses are formulated and then tested by probit analysis. The empirical findings indicate that (a) nuclear weapons do contribute to extended deterrence success, but (b) that effect is not contingent upon the prior threat of conventional armed conflict, and (c) there is an inverse relationship between the conventional balance of forces and the extended deterrent role of nuclear weapons.

Successful deterrence, it is argued, requires a combination of military capabilities and bargaining behavior that enhances a defender's credibility without provoking a potential attacker. Hypotheses on the political and military conditions under which extended-immediate deterrence is likely to succeed or fail are formulated and tested by probit analysis on fifty-eight historical cases. The empirical results indicate that (1) the military capability of the defender to deny the potential attacker a quick and decisive victory on the battlefield enhances deterrence; (2) a policy of reciprocity in diplomacy and military actions by the defender contributes strongly to deterrence success; and (3) a past record of backing down under pressure or intransigence in confrontations with the potential attacker increases the likelihood of deterrence failure.