Suchergebnisse

Abstract

Objectives
This study investigates the effects of social isolation and loneliness on cognitive function, distinguishing between the effects of transitioning into and out of these states.


Methods
This study analyzed data from 6,663 adults aged 65 or older collected over the course of 7 waves (12 years) of the Korean Longitudinal Study of Aging from 2006 to 2018. A novel asymmetric fixed effects model was utilized to separately estimate the effects of transitions into and out of social isolation or loneliness.


Results
The association of transitions into social isolation due to a lack of informal social contact or loneliness with cognitive function (b = −1.387, p < .001 and b = −0.601, p < .001, respectively) was stronger than the association of transitions out of these states (b = 0.345, p < .05 and b = 0.353, p < .001, respectively). The magnitude of the negative and positive coefficients was statistically different (F-statistic = 45.29, p < .001 and F-statistic = 5.12, p < .05, respectively). In contrast, no such asymmetric effects were observed for social isolation due to a lack of formal activity (F-statistic = 0.06, p = .800).


Discussion
The detrimental effects of transitioning into social isolation due to a lack of informal social contact (but not formal activity) or loneliness on cognitive function outweigh the beneficial effects of transitioning out of these states. Preventing the onset of social disconnection should be prioritized as an intervention to improve the cognitive function of older adults.

AbstractThe COVID‐19 pandemic was accompanied by social and economic changes previously associated with fertility delay and reduction, sparking widespread discussion of a "baby bust" in the United States. We examine fertility trends using restricted vital statistics data from California, a diverse population of 40 million, contributing 12 percent of U.S. births. Using time series models that account for longer‐run fertility trends, we observe modest, short‐term reductions in births from mid‐2020 through early 2021. Birth counts in subsequent months matched or even eased the pace of fertility decline since the 2008 recession and are unlikely a function of the pandemic alone. Responses to the pandemic were heterogeneous. Fertility declined markedly among the foreign‐born population, largely driven by changes in net migration. Among the U.S.‐born population, the short‐term pandemic‐attributable reductions were largest among older, highly educated people, suggesting mechanisms of fertility reduction disparately accessible to those with the most resources. We find no evidence of a strong population fertility response to the pandemic's accompanying employment shock, providing additional evidence of a growing divide between macroeconomic conditions and fertility patterns in the United States.