Suchergebnisse

Draws upon an article by philosophers Valerie & Richard Routley that appeared in the Australian Quarterly 30 years ago to examine present-day proposals of a method for valuing community assets. The Routley's argued that public assets, in that case pine forests, were being valued according to a criteria based on a flawed ideology that ignored non-commodity values. It is contended that the current government continues to consider value as synonymous with use by attempting to measure the value of cultural institutions by volume of use. Using that criterion, the National Library has less value than a popular Canberra bar. Objections to the "value as use" account include its failure to consider potential users, & the societal benefits of use by a few, as in the case of persons who use cultural institutions to broaden their understanding of history, which in turn influences their input into policy or good governance. It is concluded that a naive conception of value must not be the basis for the levels of government support offered to cultural institutions. J. Lindroth

Intro -- Editors' Preface -- Contents -- Contributors -- Introduction: Some Personal Reflections - Priest -- ORIGINAL MATERIAL -- First Edition Front Matter [Abridged] -- Acknowledgements -- Exploring Meinong's jungle and beyond. II. Existence and identity when times change -- Existence is existence now -- Enlarging on some of the chronological inadequacies of classical logic and its metaphysical basis, the Reference Theory -- Change and identity over time -- Heracleitean and Parmenidean problems for chronological logics -- Developing a nonmetrical neutral chronological logic -- Further corollaries of noneism for the philosophy of time -- Reality questions: the reality of time? -- Against the subjectivity of time: initial points -- The future is not real -- Alleged relativistic difficulties about the present time and as to tense -- Time, change and alternative worlds -- Limitations on statements about the future, especially as to naming objects and making predictions? -- Fatalism and alternative futures -- On what there isn't -- Further objections to the theory of items disarmed -- The theory of objects is inconsistent, absurd -- Carnap's objections, and Hinton's case against Meinongianism -- The attack on nonexistent objects, and alleged puzzles about what such objects could be -- The accusation of platonism -- being, types of existence, and the condition on existence -- Subsistence objections -- The defects of nonentities -- the problem of relations, and indeterminacy -- Nonentities are mere shadows, facades, verbal simulacra -- appeal to the formal mode -- Tooley's objection that the claim that there are nonexistent objects answering to objects of thought leads to contradictions -- Williams' argument that fatal difficulties beset Meinongian pure objects -- Further objections based on quantification and on features of truth-definitions.