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The Biafra war as an event offers a variety of angles from which it could be analysed, though this topic, apart from the dimensions of genocide or humanitarian crises, has never been much in the interest of scholars. On the one hand, it could be related to the lack of real facts as many figures and stories were fabricated during the war; on the other hand, as John K. Wa'Njogu would say, any story from Africa is not interesting if it is not an exceptional and aberrational news level. However, there have been several partly related articles about mass communication, propaganda and public relations during the Biafra war, but most of them have been taking the Western point of view, at the same time misjudging the role of the Biafran leader Ojukwu and his input in forming the propaganda apparatus by using approved propaganda guidelines from the West and adapting it to local realities. According to Scot Macdonald, the Biafra war was a war of images fought in the court of public opinion, which was won by Biafra, though the war was lost in the military and political arena. Ojukwu fairly quickly recognized the importance of controlling information and the power of messages delivered via mass communication channels, while Nigerian officials had never fully grasped the importance of this coverage. Therefore, Ojukwu built a team from local and Western professional propagandists and PR specialists whose main task was to find a proper angle of propaganda that could help to win this asymmetric war. The first attempts to use political emancipation of the oppressed people, religious, pogrom and genocide angles had limited success, but the image of starving and dying children was a very new angle, which, with the help of mass communication, helped to deliver the message to a much broader public arena. [.]

Islamic Revivalism is not a brand-new phenomenon, but, with increasing files of exponents, it promotes a variety of discussions on how and when it started, what is the mainstream ideology, what are the foremost goals of its activists, etc. Summing up all the analysis and propositions, it could be stated that the phenomenon of Islamic Revivalism (which started, the latest, with the Iranian revolution) designates all-out efforts aimed at the wholesale re-islamization of polities through direct political and/or military actions. As the definition suggests, the goal of revivalists (a proper Islamic state with three key elements: Islam, Sharia, Islamic ruling system) is the same but the approach to reaching it might not be indiscrete. Therefore, Sunni Islamic revivalists, who are the main object of the research, are divided into three groups: islamists (the most moderate Muslim revivalists with political goals), fundamentalists (who might radically impose religion on politics, though do not necessarily will claim to have a political project), and radical Muslims (who are committed to violence and seek for their goals on any terms). ; Islamo revaivalizmo tema nėra nauja akademiniame pasaulyje, bet didėjančios šio judėjimo šalininkų gretos skatina mokslininkus atidžiau analizuoti šį fenomeną. Apžvelgus ir apibendrinus įvairių mokslininkų interpretacijas, kaip, kada ir dėl kokių priežasčių prasidėjo islamo revaivalizmas, būtų galima teigti, kad tai sudėtin­gas ir įvairialypis fenomenas, kuris atskleidžia visapusiškas pastangas masiškai reis­lamizuoti valstybes tiesioginiais politiniais ir / ar kariniais veiksmais. Akivaizdu, kad nors šis reiškinys koncentruojasi į reislamizaciją, jis nėra vienalytis, nes revaivalizmo šalininkai (tyrimas telkiasi į sunitų islamą, kaip dominuojančią islamo atšaką) nau­doja skirtingas priemones tikslui pasiekti. Dėl to revaivalistai šiame straipsnyje yra skirstomi į tris atšakas: islamistus, kurie yra nuosaikiausi ir pirmenybę teikia politi­nėms priemonėms, fundamentalistus, kurie siekia islamizacijos politiniais veiksmais ir, jeigu reikia, nevengia smurtinių priemonių, ir radikaliuosius musulmonus, kurių veiksmai iš principo paremti smurtu.Revaivalistai, kurie kviečia musulmonus išgryninti islamą ir sugrįžti prie tikrojo tikėjimo pagrindų, kelia iššūkius nemusulmoniškoms valstybėms ne tik politiniu, bet ir teisiniu lygiu. Jų manymu, sekuliarizmas yra netinkama valdymo forma, iš dalies dėl to, kad tai vakarietiškos politikos padarinys, taip pat dėl to, kad sekuliarizmas paneigia aukščiausios valdžios, kylančios iš Dievo, principą. Dėl to ideali valstybė (anot revaivalistų) yra islamiška valstybė, kuri susideda iš trijų esminių komponentų: islamo, kaip valstybinės religijos, islamo teisės ir islamiškos valdymo santvarkos. Nepaisant skirtumų, visos trys revaivalistų atšakos įvardija šiuos esminius elementus, pabrėždamos šarijos vaidmenį.Tai lėmė darbo tikslą. Straipsnyje siekiama pateikti galimą veiksmų planą, kuriuo naudodamiesi islamo revaivalizmo atstovai siekia įtakos valstybėms, neturinčioms ambicijų tapti islamiškomis. Didžiausias pavojus kyla toms valstybėms, kurios dėl skirtingos piliečių sudėties (pvz., religinių, etninių grupių ir pan.) leidžiasi į kompro­misus dėl vienokios ar kitokios šarijos formos įteisinimo, ne visada suvokdamos, jog tai pirmieji revaivalistų žingsniai islamiškos valstybės link, vis labiau "apleidžiant" esamą sekuliarųjį valdymo pobūdį.

The Biafra war as an event offers a variety of angles from which it could be analysed, though this topic, apart from the dimensions of genocide or humanitarian crises, has never been much in the interest of scholars. On the one hand, it could be related to the lack of real facts as many figures and stories were fabricated during the war; on the other hand, as John K. Wa'Njogu would say, any story from Africa is not interesting if it is not an exceptional and aberrational news level. However, there have been several partly related articles about mass communication, propaganda and public relations during the Biafra war, but most of them have been taking the Western point of view, at the same time misjudging the role of the Biafran leader Ojukwu and his input in forming the propaganda apparatus by using approved propaganda guidelines from the West and adapting it to local realities. According to Scot Macdonald, the Biafra war was a war of images fought in the court of public opinion, which was won by Biafra, though the war was lost in the military and political arena. Ojukwu fairly quickly recognized the importance of controlling information and the power of messages delivered via mass communication channels, while Nigerian officials had never fully grasped the importance of this coverage. Therefore, Ojukwu built a team from local and Western professional propagandists and PR specialists whose main task was to find a proper angle of propaganda that could help to win this asymmetric war. The first attempts to use political emancipation of the oppressed people, religious, pogrom and genocide angles had limited success, but the image of starving and dying children was a very new angle, which, with the help of mass communication, helped to deliver the message to a much broader public arena. [.]

Islamic Revivalism is not a brand- new phenomenon, but, with increasing the files of exponents, it promotes a variety of discussions on how and when it started, its mainstream ideology, the foremost goals of its activists, etc. Summing up all the analysis and propositions, it could be stated that the phenomenon of Islamic Revivalism (which started, the latest, with the Iranian revolution) designates all-out efforts aimed at the wholesale re-islamization of polities through direct political and / or military actions. As the definition suggests, the goal of revivalists (a proper Islamic state with three key elements: Islam, Sharia, Islamic ruling system) is the same, but the approach to reaching it might not be indiscrete. Therefore, Sunni Islamic revivalists, who are the main object of the research, are divided into three groups: islamists (the most moderate Muslim revivalists with political goals), fundamentalists (who might radically impose religion on politics, though do not necessarily will claim to have a political project), and radical Muslims (who are committed to violence and seek for their goals, on any terms).

The Biafra war as an event offers a variety of angles from which it could be analysed, though this topic, apart from the dimensions of genocide or humanitarian crises, has never been much in the interest of scholars. On the one hand, it could be related to the lack of real facts as many figures and stories were fabricated during the war; on the other hand, as John K. Wa'Njogu would say, any story from Africa is not interesting if it is not an exceptional and aberrational news level. However, there have been several partly related articles about mass communication, propaganda and public relations during the Biafra war, but most of them have been taking the Western point of view, at the same time misjudging the role of the Biafran leader Ojukwu and his input in forming the propaganda apparatus by using approved propaganda guidelines from the West and adapting it to local realities. According to Scot Macdonald, the Biafra war was a war of images fought in the court of public opinion, which was won by Biafra, though the war was lost in the military and political arena. Ojukwu fairly quickly recognized the importance of controlling information and the power of messages delivered via mass communication channels, while Nigerian officials had never fully grasped the importance of this coverage. Therefore, Ojukwu built a team from local and Western professional propagandists and PR specialists whose main task was to find a proper angle of propaganda that could help to win this asymmetric war. The first attempts to use political emancipation of the oppressed people, religious, pogrom and genocide angles had limited success, but the image of starving and dying children was a very new angle, which, with the help of mass communication, helped to deliver the message to a much broader public arena. [.]

The Biafra war as an event offers a variety of angles from which it could be analysed, though this topic, apart from the dimensions of genocide or humanitarian crises, has never been much in the interest of scholars. On the one hand, it could be related to the lack of real facts as many figures and stories were fabricated during the war; on the other hand, as John K. Wa'Njogu would say, any story from Africa is not interesting if it is not an exceptional and aberrational news level. However, there have been several partly related articles about mass communication, propaganda and public relations during the Biafra war, but most of them have been taking the Western point of view, at the same time misjudging the role of the Biafran leader Ojukwu and his input in forming the propaganda apparatus by using approved propaganda guidelines from the West and adapting it to local realities. According to Scot Macdonald, the Biafra war was a war of images fought in the court of public opinion, which was won by Biafra, though the war was lost in the military and political arena. Ojukwu fairly quickly recognized the importance of controlling information and the power of messages delivered via mass communication channels, while Nigerian officials had never fully grasped the importance of this coverage. Therefore, Ojukwu built a team from local and Western professional propagandists and PR specialists whose main task was to find a proper angle of propaganda that could help to win this asymmetric war. The first attempts to use political emancipation of the oppressed people, religious, pogrom and genocide angles had limited success, but the image of starving and dying children was a very new angle, which, with the help of mass communication, helped to deliver the message to a much broader public arena. [.]

Islamic Revivalism is not a brand- new phenomenon, but, with increasing the files of exponents, it promotes a variety of discussions on how and when it started, its mainstream ideology, the foremost goals of its activists, etc. Summing up all the analysis and propositions, it could be stated that the phenomenon of Islamic Revivalism (which started, the latest, with the Iranian revolution) designates all-out efforts aimed at the wholesale re-islamization of polities through direct political and / or military actions. As the definition suggests, the goal of revivalists (a proper Islamic state with three key elements: Islam, Sharia, Islamic ruling system) is the same, but the approach to reaching it might not be indiscrete. Therefore, Sunni Islamic revivalists, who are the main object of the research, are divided into three groups: islamists (the most moderate Muslim revivalists with political goals), fundamentalists (who might radically impose religion on politics, though do not necessarily will claim to have a political project), and radical Muslims (who are committed to violence and seek for their goals, on any terms).

The Biafra war as an event offers a variety of angles from which it could be analysed, though this topic, apart from the dimensions of genocide or humanitarian crises, has never been much in the interest of scholars. On the one hand, it could be related to the lack of real facts as many figures and stories were fabricated during the war; on the other hand, as John K. Wa'Njogu would say, any story from Africa is not interesting if it is not an exceptional and aberrational news level. However, there have been several partly related articles about mass communication, propaganda and public relations during the Biafra war, but most of them have been taking the Western point of view, at the same time misjudging the role of the Biafran leader Ojukwu and his input in forming the propaganda apparatus by using approved propaganda guidelines from the West and adapting it to local realities. According to Scot Macdonald, the Biafra war was a war of images fought in the court of public opinion, which was won by Biafra, though the war was lost in the military and political arena. Ojukwu fairly quickly recognized the importance of controlling information and the power of messages delivered via mass communication channels, while Nigerian officials had never fully grasped the importance of this coverage. Therefore, Ojukwu built a team from local and Western professional propagandists and PR specialists whose main task was to find a proper angle of propaganda that could help to win this asymmetric war. The first attempts to use political emancipation of the oppressed people, religious, pogrom and genocide angles had limited success, but the image of starving and dying children was a very new angle, which, with the help of mass communication, helped to deliver the message to a much broader public arena. [.]

Islamic Revivalism is not a brand- new phenomenon, but, with increasing the files of exponents, it promotes a variety of discussions on how and when it started, its mainstream ideology, the foremost goals of its activists, etc. Summing up all the analysis and propositions, it could be stated that the phenomenon of Islamic Revivalism (which started, the latest, with the Iranian revolution) designates all-out efforts aimed at the wholesale re-islamization of polities through direct political and / or military actions. As the definition suggests, the goal of revivalists (a proper Islamic state with three key elements: Islam, Sharia, Islamic ruling system) is the same, but the approach to reaching it might not be indiscrete. Therefore, Sunni Islamic revivalists, who are the main object of the research, are divided into three groups: islamists (the most moderate Muslim revivalists with political goals), fundamentalists (who might radically impose religion on politics, though do not necessarily will claim to have a political project), and radical Muslims (who are committed to violence and seek for their goals, on any terms).

Islamic Revivalism is not a brand- new phenomenon, but, with increasing the files of exponents, it promotes a variety of discussions on how and when it started, its mainstream ideology, the foremost goals of its activists, etc. Summing up all the analysis and propositions, it could be stated that the phenomenon of Islamic Revivalism (which started, the latest, with the Iranian revolution) designates all-out efforts aimed at the wholesale re-islamization of polities through direct political and / or military actions. As the definition suggests, the goal of revivalists (a proper Islamic state with three key elements: Islam, Sharia, Islamic ruling system) is the same, but the approach to reaching it might not be indiscrete. Therefore, Sunni Islamic revivalists, who are the main object of the research, are divided into three groups: islamists (the most moderate Muslim revivalists with political goals), fundamentalists (who might radically impose religion on politics, though do not necessarily will claim to have a political project), and radical Muslims (who are committed to violence and seek for their goals, on any terms).

Islamic Revivalism is not a brand-new phenomenon, but, with increasing files of exponents, it promotes a variety of discussions on how and when it started, what is the mainstream ideology, what are the foremost goals of its activists, etc. Summing up all the analysis and propositions, it could be stated that the phenomenon of Islamic Revivalism (which started, the latest, with the Iranian revolution) designates all-out efforts aimed at the wholesale re-islamization of polities through direct political and/or military actions. As the definition suggests, the goal of revivalists (a proper Islamic state with three key elements: Islam, Sharia, Islamic ruling system) is the same but the approach to reaching it might not be indiscrete. Therefore, Sunni Islamic revivalists, who are the main object of the research, are divided into three groups: islamists (the most moderate Muslim revivalists with political goals), fundamentalists (who might radically impose religion on politics, though do not necessarily will claim to have a political project), and radical Muslims (who are committed to violence and seek for their goals on any terms).