Suchergebnisse

Using panel data of individual firms drawn from French surveys, a structural analysis is developed to study the formation of production plans and the rationality of expectations. The production decision of a firm is defined as the optimal solution of a dynamic stochastic optimization problem. The empirical work amounts to recovering the structural parameters characterizing the model of the firm from estimates of the derived decision rule. The preceding analysis of production plans is based on the assumption that firms are rational. To justify this assumption, direct tests offer evidence that the Rational Expectations Hypothesis may not be rejected for quantity variables

We consider a framework of contractual interactions between public transport authorities and transport operators. We estimate simultaneously the contract choice by the authorities and the effect of regulation on the cost-reducing activity of the operators. We test whether the current regulatory schemes are the observable items of a complex menu of contracts, as proposed by Laffont and Tirole. We suggest that the generation process of the data we have in hand is better explained by a regulatory framework where an unsophisticated regulator is politically motivated. We show how these political preferences shape the contract choice and we shed light on how operating costs are affected. On average, operators' costs are 12.1% lower under fixed-plus regimes, compared to the cost-plus cases.

We consider a framework of contractual interactions between public transport authorities and transport operators. We estimate simultaneously the contract choice by the authorities and the effect of regulation on the cost-reducing activity of the operators. We test whether the current regulatory schemes are the observable items of a complex menu of contracts, as proposed by Laffont and Tirole. We suggest that the generation process of the data we have in hand is better explained by a regulatory framework where an unsophisticated regulator is politically motivated. We show how these political preferences shape the contract choice and we shed light on how operating costs are affected. On average, operators' costs are 12.1% lower under fixed-plus regimes, compared to the cost-plus cases.

We consider a framework of contractual interactions between public transport authorities and transport operators. We estimate simultaneously the contract choice by the authorities and the effect of regulation on the cost-reducing activity of the operators. We test whether the current regulatory schemes are the observable items of a complex menu of contracts, as proposed by Laffont and Tirole. We suggest that the generation process of the data we have in hand is better explained by a regulatory framework where an unsophisticated regulator is politically motivated. We show how these political preferences shape the contract choice and we shed light on how operating costs are affected. On average, operators' costs are 12.1% lower under fixed-plus regimes, compared to the cost-plus cases.

We consider a framework of contractual interactions between urban transport authorities and transport operators. We estimate simultaneously the choice of contract by the authorities and the effect of regulation on the cost reducing activity of the operators. We test whether regulatory schemes currently implemented in the industry are the observable items of a more general menu of second best contracts. We suggest that the generation process of the data we have in hand is better explained by the political aspects of regulation. Moreover, the cost reducing effort of the operators is greater under fixed-price regimes, compared to the cost-plus case.

Résumé L'étude des marchés produits différenciés est devenue un domaine impor tant de économie industrielle appliquée Cet article présente les diverses appro ches méthodologiques utilisées Il souligne les avantages et les inconvénients elles impliquent selon les données dont on dispose et les caractéristiques du marché que on étudie Une base de travail est proposée dans optique un trai tement structurel un modèle équilibre statique estimé partir de données indi viduelles relatives la demande et de données de marché relatives offre Une application est faite au marché des téléphones grand public en France