Suchergebnisse

The article analyzes the involvement of Southeast European historians in unesco's History of Humanity: Scientific and Cultural Development, the second attempt of the organization at drafting a world history. It is a case study of a successful epistemic internationalization of regional and national narratives from the Balkans on a global stage. It is argued that this story is premised on the activity of the International Association of Southeast European Studies (aiesee—created in 1963 with unesco sponsorship), which functioned as the preexistent international milieu of conceptual, institutional, and personnel alignments. However, regional academic cooperation was dependent on the political context in the Balkans since the end of the seventies. Individual regimes employed scholars as experts representing these countries in this unesco project. In addition, the analysis also emphasizes the similarities and cross-fertilizations between Global South and Southeast European historians' self-affirmations in the context of shifting narratives about humanity, cultures, and civilizations within unesco. However, while the "Third World" wanted to shatter Eurocentrism as the South challenged the North, the Southeast wished to affirm its Europeanness by breaking the Western and Soviet perceived monopoly on Europe-talk. Balkan historians' anti-hegemonic association with Global South peers targeted de-marginalization within the confines of Europe. The article underlines that a full account of local narratives and phenomena should be examined in the context of the intersecting stories of the Cold War, decolonization, and globalization.

Abstract
The article is a reassessment of the aftermaths of the events of 1989 in (South-) Eastern Europe. It supplements the well-worn debate pitting civil vs. uncivil society with examinations of the role nationalism has played in the formerly socialist bloc and of the (self-) identification practices within the region's societies. Here I map the various postcommunist legacies that have affected the region's countries. Grand explanations of the upheaval of 1989 tend to obscure and simplify the continuities that have extended beyond this threshold year. Common trends within the region, which often remain hidden in the long shadow of 1989, may explain contemporary tensions between the revival of civic mobilization and the rise of populism. I conclude that only by clearing history's debris — from before and after 1989 — will we understand the nature and identity of the 'we' who claim, contest, or (increasingly seldom) celebrate this annus mirabilis.