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This paper considers strategic voters who face an institutional structure in which there are two branches of the government: the executive, elected by plurality rule & the legislature, elected by proportional rule. Policy outcomes are described through a compromise between these two branches. I solve the game by relying only on purely non-cooperative behavior of individual voters. I prove the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the legislative subgame, where the election of the president is known. This equilibrium can be obtained by the process of iterated elimination of dominated strategies. I then solve the whole game by backward induction. The results suggest moderate behavior of voters, due to the desire to balance the plurality of a party in the presidential election by voting for the opposite party in the legislature. Similar results can be obtained in the case of reverse timing of the elections, as well as in the case where elections of the two branches of the government are simultaneous. 10 Figures, 9 References. Adapted from the source document.

Purely non-cooperative principles, as iterated dominance and backward induction, explain divided government.

Purely non-cooperative principles, as iterated dominance and backward induction, explain divided government.

Using the spatial theory of voting, this paper describes an institutional structure where there are two branches of the government: the executive, elected by plurality rule, and the legislative elected by proportional rule. The resulting policy outcome is described through a compromise between these two branches. The parties announce their position on a policy issue and then voters vote. We prove the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the subgame, where the election of the president is known. Moreover, this equilibrium can be obtained by the process of iterated elimination of dominated strategies. We then solve the whole game by backward induction. Furthermore, the policy outcome at equilibrium of the two-stage game is the same of the simultaneous game, where voters simultaneously choose the two branches. The results suggest a moderate behavior of the voters, basically due to the will to balance the policy outcome.

Using the spatial theory of voting, this paper describes an institutional structure where there are two branches of the government: the executive, elected by plurality rule, and the legislative elected by proportional rule. The resulting policy outcome is described through a compromise between these two branches. The parties announce their position on a policy issue and then voters vote. We prove the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the subgame, where the election of the president is known. Moreover, this equilibrium can be obtained by the process of iterated elimination of dominated strategies. We then solve the whole game by backward induction. Furthermore, the policy outcome at equilibrium of the two-stage game is the same of the simultaneous game, where voters simultaneously choose the two branches. The results suggest a moderate behavior of the voters, basically due to the will to balance the policy outcome.

In this paper we show that in a simple spatial model where the government is chosen under strict proportional rule, if the outcome function is a linear combination of parties' positions, with coefficients equal to their share of seats, only a two-party voting equilibrium basically exists. The two parties taking a positive number of votes are the two extremist ones. Applications of this result include an extension of the well-known Alesina and Rosenthal's model of divided government as well as a modified version of Besley and Coate's model of representative democracy. This result cannot be extended to a general outcome function but, however, when the policy is determined by the two leading parties, in pure strategies, only two-party equilibria can emerge. Analogous result holds for coalitions of parties.

In this paper we show that in a simple spatial model where the government is chosen under strict proportional rule, if the outcome function is a linear combination of parties' positions, with coefficients equal to their share of seats, only a two-party voting equilibrium basically exists. The two parties taking a positive number of votes are the two extremist ones. Applications of this result include an extension of the well-known Alesina and Rosenthal's model of divided government as well as a modified version of Besley and Coate's model of representative democracy. This result cannot be extended to a general outcome function but, however, when the policy is determined by the two leading parties, in pure strategies, only two-party equilibria can emerge. Analogous result holds for coalitions of parties.

Constitutional structures shape politicians' behaviour and hence policy outcomes through the different incentives schemes that they generate. In this paper we analyse these mechanisms in parliamentary and presidential systems. The comparison is carried out by analysing how the two systems may select the efficient policy in the presence of asymmetric information. Presidential and parliamentary systems differ in that the policy proposed by the executive in the parliamentary system is confidence‐dependent and observable. The main findings suggest that the parliament responds better to the incentive scheme in the presidential system due to the lower uncertainty faced by legislators over their term limit. However, the parliamentary system generates a more efficient behaviour of the executive due to selection and disciplining effects.

In this paper we experimentally investigate the consequences of electoral fraud on voter turnout. The experiment is based on a strategic binary voting model where voters decide whether to cast a costly vote in favour of their preferred candidate or to abstain. The minority candidate can illicitly influence the electoral process by applying ballot-box stuffing. In the experiment we implement two different framings: we compare voter turnout in a neutral environment and with framed instructions to explicitly replicate elections. This approach enables to both test the model's predictions and to estimate the framing effects of voting and fraud. Comparison of experimental results with theoretical predictions reveals over-voting, which is exacerbated when fraud occurs. Turnout increases as predicted with moderate level of fraud while, with higher electoral fraud, voters fail to recognize that the existence of a relatively larger number of "agents" voting with certainty considerably decreases the benefits of voting. Importantly, framing matters, as revealed by the higher turnout of those in the majority group, against which the fraud is applied.

In this paper we experimentally investigate the consequences of electoral fraud on voter turnout. The experiment is based on a strategic binary voting model where voters decide whether to cast a costly vote in favour of their preferred candidate or to abstain. The minority candidate can illicitly influence the electoral process by applying ballot-box stuffing. In the experiment we implement two different framings: we compare voter turnout in a neutral environment and with framed instructions to explicitly replicate elections. This approach enables to both test the model's predictions and to estimate the framing effects of voting and fraud. Comparison of experimental results with theoretical predictions reveals over-voting, which is exacerbated when fraud occurs. Turnout increases as predicted with moderate level of fraud while, with higher electoral fraud, voters fail to recognize that the existence of a relatively larger number of "agents" voting with certainty considerably decreases the benefits of voting. Importantly, framing matters, as revealed by the higher turnout of those in the majority group, against which the fraud is applied.