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AbstractThe recent expansion of the primary electorate by one of Ghana's major parties offers a rare opportunity to assess the effects of franchise extensions in contemporary new democracies. Using an original dataset on candidate entry and nominations, this article shows that expanding the primary electorate opened paths to office for politicians from social groups that were previously excluded, such as women and ethnic groups outside the party's core national coalition. The authors propose that democratizing candidate selection has two consequences in patronage-oriented political systems: vote buying will become a less effective strategy and the electorate will become more diverse. These changes, in turn, affect the types of politicians who seek and win legislative nominations. This suggests that a simple shift in who votes in intraparty primaries can be a key institutional mechanism for improving the descriptive representation of women and other under-represented groups.

Using the Rosenbaum (2002, 2009) approach to observational studies, we show how qualitative information can be incorporated into quantitative analyses to improve causal inference in three ways. First, by including qualitative information on outcomes within matched sets, we can ameliorate the consequences of the difficulty of measuring those outcomes, sometimes reducing p‐values. Second, additional information across matched sets enables the construction of qualitative confidence intervals on effect size. Third, qualitative information on unmeasured confounders within matched sets reduces the conservativeness of Rosenbaum‐style sensitivity analysis. This approach accommodates small to medium sample sizes in a nonparametric framework, and therefore it may be particularly useful for analyses of the effects of policies or institutions in a small number of units. We illustrate these methods by examining the effect of using plurality rules in transitional presidential elections on opposition harassment in 1990s sub‐Saharan Africa.

We delineate the underlying homogeneity assumption, procedural variants, and implications of the comparative method and distinguish this from Mill's method of difference. We demonstrate that additional units can provide "placebo" tests for the comparative method even if the scope of inference is limited to the two units under comparison. Moreover, such tests may be available even when these units are the most similar pair of units on the control variables with differing values of the independent variable. Small- n analyses using this method should therefore, at a minimum, clearly define the dependent, independent, and control variables so they may be measured for additional units, and specify how the control variables are weighted in defining similarity between units. When these tasks are too difficult, process tracing of a single unit may be a more appropriate method. We illustrate these points with applications to two studies.

Theories of instrumental ethnic voting in new democracies propose that voters support co-ethnic politicians because they expect politicians to favor their co-ethnics once in office. But many goods that politicians deliver to voters are locally nonexcludable in rural areas, so the local presence of an ethnic group associated with a politician should affect a rural voter's assessment of how likely she is to benefit from that politician's election. Using geocoded polling-station–level election results alongside survey data from Ghana, we show that otherwise similar voters are less likely to vote for the party of their own ethnic group, and more likely to support a party associated with another group, when the local ethnic geography favors the other group. This result helps account for the imperfect correlation between ethnicity and vote choice in African democracies. More generally, this demonstrates how local community and geographic contexts can modify the information conveyed by ethnicity and influence voter behavior.

In new democracies, why do political party leaders relinquish power over nominations and allow legislative candidates to be selected by primary elections? Where the legislature is weak and politics is clientelistic, democratization of candidate selection is driven by local party members seeking benefits from primary contestants. Analysis of an original dataset on legislative nominations and political interference by party leaders for the 2004 and 2008 elections in Ghana shows that primaries are more common where nominations attract more aspirants and where the party is more likely to win, counter to predictions in the existing literature. Moreover, the analysis shows that party leaders interfere in primaries in a pattern consistent with anticipation of party members' reactions. (British Journal of Political Science/ FUB)