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This study investigates the motivations and activities of some bureaucratic agencies and their managers in the systematic derailing of the decision to unbundle the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and privatize some of its subsidiaries. The study applies the bureaucratic politics model to explain implementation politics as it relates to inter‐agency interests. I find that key officials of bureaucratic agencies in the petroleum sector have worked to enhance their various agencies' sphere of influence and maintain critical tasks, thereby derailing and delaying institutional reforms and reorganization of the petroleum sector in line with the liberalization agenda. The study expands the scope of bureaucratic politics in understanding policy outcomes, contributes to literature on inter‐agency relationships and interests in policy implementation. It suggests consideration of inter‐agency relationships in the design and implementation of policies, the need for clearer definition of agency responsibilities in the establishing law in a developing country environment.Related Articles

Lamb, Charles M., and
Eric M. Wilk. 2009. "." Politics & Policy 37 (): 127‐149. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2008.00164.x/full


Dahill‐Brown, Sara E., and
Lesley Lavery. 2012. "." Politics & Policy 40 (): 557‐592. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2012.00368.x/full


Khodr, Hiba, and
Isabella Ruble. 2013. "." Politics & Policy 41 (): 656‐689. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/polp.12033/full
Related Media
. 2015. "Nigeria's Oil Sector: Improving Governance and Addressing Corruption." https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QAu1XOaHcCM


Eboh, Michael. 2016. "." Vanguard. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/05/petroleum-industry-motion-no-progress/


Nuhu‐Koko, Abubakar A. 2007. "The Restructuring of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC): Some Pertinent Observations." http://www.gamji.com/article6000/NEWS7380.htm

This paper examines the nature of three tier federative structure of Brazil and Nigeria and the reasons for the failure of the model to guarantee local government autonomy as envisaged by the design. It is found that the two countries exhibit divergence in the manner of constitutionalisation, which also provides difference in degree of autonomy enjoyed by the local government- where the constitution provides powers and rights of local government directly or whether it seeks to achieve these through the laws of other governmental levels. In Nigeria the structure has not lifted the local government beyond an embedded system in a dual federal structure in which the states merely deal with local governments as appendages rather than as separate tier of government. In Brazil, the structure provides relative political and fiscal autonomy, but also inhibits smooth fiscal control by Federal government that makes constitutional changes more frequent. In both experience, it is seen that federalization through constitutionalism still has its limits. DOI:10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n15p559

Abstract Nigeria struggles to establish and sustain cooperative, interdependent state-local intergovernmental relations (IGR) by providing for the powers and rights of local governments in the federal constitution. Despite the provisions, the practice of state-local IGR has remained inclusive, hierarchical, dependent and competitive. This paper investigates the extent to which constitutional provisions determine state-local relations as against the macrostructure of intergovernmental relations between the federal government and states. The authors argue that it is difficult to expect a cooperative, interdependent, state-local IGR through constitutional provisions of the powers and rights of local governments, if the federal-state relations, which should be the determining framework of IGR is inclusive, hierarchical and dependent. The paper suggests that the lower forms of IGR in a federation (e.g. the state-local IGR), largely depend on the super-structure, which is that between the federal government and the lower tiers. The implication is that the level of autonomy enjoyed by local governments largely depends on the level of autonomy the states themselves enjoy.

Nigeria struggles to establish and sustain cooperative, interdependent state-local intergovernmental relations (IGR) by providing for the powers and rights of local governments in the federal constitution. Despite the provisions, the practice of state-local IGR has remained inclusive, hierarchical, dependent and competitive. This paper investigates the extent to which constitutional provisions determine state-local relations as against the macrostructure of intergovernmental relations between the federal government and states. The authors argue that it is difficult to expect a cooperative, interdependent, state-local IGR through constitutional provisions of the powers and rights of local governments, if the federal-state relations, which should be the determining framework of IGR is inclusive, hierarchical and dependent. The paper suggests that the lower forms of IGR in a federation (e.g. the state-local IGR), largely depend on the super-structure, which is that between the federal government and the lower tiers. The implication is that the level of autonomy enjoyed by local governments largely depends on the level of autonomy the states themselves enjoy. ; Nigeria tiene dificultades para establecer y mantener relaciones intergubernamentales (RIG), cooperativas e interdependientes entre los gobiernos de sus estados y los gobiernos locales (municipales), según lo dispuesto en su constitución federal, que establece poderes y derechos para estos últimos, llamados consejos de gobiernos locales (LGCs). A pesar de las disposiciones constitucionales, las RIG entre estados y LGCs siguen siendo inclusivas, jerárquicas, dependientes y competitivas. Este artículo discute hasta qué punto las disposiciones constitucionales determinan las relaciones entre esos dos niveles de gobierno en comparación con la macroestructura de RIG entre los gobiernos federal y de los estados. El estudio indica que es difícil esperar RIG cooperativas e independientes entre estados y las LGCs (como resultado de disposiciones constitucionales que otorgan poderes y derechos a los gobiernos locales), si la RIG entre la federación y los estados (que debería servir como estructura modelo) sigue siendo inclusiva, jerárquica y dependiente. Los hallazgos sugieren que las relaciones entre los niveles de gobierno locales y de los estados en una federación dependen en gran medida de cómo se coloca la superestructura, que es la que involucra al gobierno federal en su interacción con los demás niveles. Esta condición muestra que el nivel de autonomía de los gobiernos locales depende, en gran parte, del nivel de autonomía de los estados federados. ; A Nigéria encontra dificuldades em estabelecer e sustentar relações intergovernamentais (RIG), cooperativas e interdependentes, entre governos estaduais e locais, como previsto em sua constituição federal que estabelece poderes e direitos a esses últimos, denominados conselhos de governo local (LGCs). Apesar das disposições constitucionais, as RIG entre estados e LGCs permanecem inclusivas, hierárquicas, dependentes e competitivas. Este artigo discute até que ponto as disposições constitucionais determinam as relações entre esses dois níveis de governo, em comparação com a macroestrutura de RIGs entre governos federal e estaduais. O estudo indica que é difícil esperar RIGs cooperativas e independentes entre estados e LGCs (como resultado de disposições constitucionais que concedem poderes e direitos aos governos locais), se a RIG entre a federação e os estados (que deve servir de estrutura-modelo) segue sendo inclusiva, hierárquica e dependente. As conclusões sugerem que as relações entre os níveis locais e estaduais de governo em uma federação dependem amplamente da forma como se coloca a superestrutura, que é aquela que envolve o governo federal em sua interação com os demais níveis. Essa condição mostra que o nível de autonomia dos governos locais depende, em grande parte, do nível de autonomia dos estados federados.