Reviewing Health Security Capacities in Nigeria Using the Updated WHO Joint External Evaluation and WHO Benchmarks Tool: Experience from a Country-Led Self-Assessment Exercise
In: Health security, Band 20, Heft 1, S. 74-86
ISSN: 2326-5108
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In: Health security, Band 20, Heft 1, S. 74-86
ISSN: 2326-5108
Across the world, the level of pandemic preparedness varies and no country is fully prepared to respond to all public health events. The International Health Regulations 2005 require state parties to develop core capacities to prevent, detect, and respond to public health events of international concern. In addition to annual self-assessment, these capacities are peer reviewed once every 5 years through the voluntary Joint External Evaluation (JEE). In this article, we share Nigeria's experience of conducting a country-led midterm self-assessment using a slightly modified application of the second edition of the World Health Organization (WHO) JEE and the new WHO benchmarks tool. Despite more stringent scoring criteria in the revised JEE tool, average scoring showed modest capacity improvements in 2019 compared with 2017. Of the 19 technical areas assessed, 11 improved, 5 did not change, and 3 had lower scores. No technical area attained the highest-level scoring of 5. Understanding the level of, and gaps in, pandemic preparedness enables state parties to develop plans to improve health security; the outcome of the assessment included the development of a 12-month operational plan. Countries need to intentionally invest in preparedness by using existing frameworks (eg, JEE) to better understand the status of their preparedness. This will ensure ownership of developed plans with shared responsibilities by all key stakeholders across all levels of government.
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BACKGROUND: Electronic reporting of integrated disease surveillance and response (eIDSR) was implemented in Adamawa and Yobe states, Northeastern Nigeria, as an innovative strategy to improve disease reporting. Its objectives were to improve the timeliness and completeness of IDSR reporting by health facilities, prompt identification of public health events, timely information sharing, and public health action. We evaluated the project to determine whether it met its set objectives. METHOD: We conducted a cross-sectional study to assess and document the lessons learned from the project. We reviewed the performance of the local government areas (LGAs) on timeliness and completeness of reporting, rumors identification, and reporting on the eIDSR and the traditional paper-based system using a checklist. Respondents were interviewed online on the relevance, efficiency, sustainability, project progress and effectiveness, the effectiveness of management, and potential impact and scalability of the strategy using structured questionnaires. Data were cleaned, analyzed, and presented as proportions using an MS Excel spreadsheet. Responses were also presented as direct quotes. RESULTS: The number of health facilities reporting IDSR increased from 103 to 228 (117%) before and after implementation of the eIDSR respectively. The timeliness of reporting was 43% in the LGA compared to 73% in health facilities implementing eIDSR. The completeness of IDSR reports in the last 6 months before the evaluation was ≥85%. Of the 201 rumors identified and verified, 161 (80%) were from the eIDSR pilot sites. The majority of the stakeholders interviewed believed that eIDSR met its predetermined objectives for public health surveillance. The benefits of eIDSR included timely reporting and response to alerts and disease outbreaks, improved timeliness, and completeness of reporting, and supportive supervision to the operational levels. The strategy helped stakeholders to appreciate their roles in public health surveillance. CONCLUSION: The ...
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BACKGROUND: Infection prevention and control (IPC) activities play a large role in preventing the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in healthcare settings. This study describes the state of IPC preparedness within health facilities in Nigeria during the early phase of coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. METHODS: We carried out a cross sectional study of health facilities across Nigeria using a COVID-19 IPC checklist adapted from the U.S Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The IPC aspects assessed were the existence of IPC committee and teams with terms of reference and workplans, IPC training, availability of personal protective equipment and having systems in place for screening, isolation and notification of COVID-19 patients. Existence of the assessed aspects was regarded as preparedness in that aspect. RESULTS: In total, 461 health facilities comprising, 350 (75.9%) private and 111 (24.1%) public health facilities participated. Only 19 (4.1%) health facilities were COVID-19 treatment centres with 68% of these being public health facilities. Public health facilities were better prepared in the areas of IPC programme with 69.7% of them having an IPC focal point versus 32.3% of private facilities. More public facilities (59.6%) had an IPC workplan versus 26.8% of private facilities. Neither the public nor the private facilities were adequately prepared for triaging, screening, and notifying suspected cases, as well as having trained staff and equipment to implement triaging. CONCLUSIONS: The results highlight the need for government, organisations and policymakers to establish conducive IPC structures to reduce the risk of COVID-19 transmission in healthcare settings.
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OBJECTIVES: The success of National Public Health Institutes (NPHIs) in low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs) is critical to countries' ability to deliver public health services to their populations and effectively respond to public health emergencies. However, empirical data are limited on factors that promote or are barriers to the sustainability of NPHIs. This evaluation explored stakeholders' perceptions about enabling factors and barriers to the success and sustainability of NPHIs in seven countries where the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has supported NPHI development and strengthening. DESIGN: Qualitative study. SETTING: Cambodia, Colombia, Liberia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda and Zambia. PARTICIPANTS: NPHI staff, non-NPHI government staff, and non-governmental and international organisation staff. METHODS: We conducted semistructured, in-person interviews at a location chosen by the participants in the seven countries. We analysed data using a directed content analysis approach. RESULTS: We interviewed 43 NPHI staff, 29 non-NPHI government staff and 24 staff from non-governmental and international organisations. Participants identified five enabling factors critical to the success and sustainability of NPHIs: (1) strong leadership, (2) financial autonomy, (3) political commitment and country ownership, (4) strengthening capacity of NPHI staff and (5) forming strategic partnerships. Three themes emerged related to major barriers or threats to the sustainability of NPHIs: (1) reliance on partner funding to maintain key activities, (2) changes in NPHI leadership and (3) staff attrition and turnover. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings contribute to the scant literature on sustainability of NPHIs in LMICs by identifying essential components of sustainability and types of support needed from various stakeholders. Integrating these components into each step of NPHI development and ensuring sufficient support will be critical to strengthening public health systems and safeguarding their ...
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In: Health security, Band 19, Heft 5, S. 498-507
ISSN: 2326-5108
In: Health security, Band 18, Heft S1, S. S-105-S-112
ISSN: 2326-5108
Monkeypox (MPX) is a viral zoonosis with lesions like smallpox. Though rare in Nigeria, sporadic outbreaks have been reported in 17 states since September 2017. Unfortunately, the COVID-19 pandemic has further reduced surveillance and reporting of MPX disease. This study seeks to assess the effect of an enhanced surveillance approach to detect MPX cases and measure the cumulative incidence of MPX in priority states in Nigeria. We identified three priority states (Rivers, Delta and Bayelsa) and their Local Government Areas (LGAs) based on previous disease incidence. We also identified, trained, and incentivized community volunteers to conduct active case searches over three months (January to March 2021). We supported case investigation of suspected cases and followed up on cases in addition to routine active surveillance for MPX in health facilities and communities. Weekly and monthly follow-up was carried out during the same period. Out of the three states, 30 hotspots LGAs out of the 56 LGAs (54%) were engaged for enhanced surveillance. We trained three state supervisors, 30 LGA surveillance facilitators and 600 Community informants across the three priority states. Overall, twenty-five (25) suspected cases of MPX were identified. Out of these, three (12%) were confirmed as positive. Enhanced surveillance improved reporting of MPX diseases in hotspots LGAs across the priority states. Extension of this surveillance approach alongside tailored technical support is critical intra and post-pandemic.
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Globally, effective emergency response to disease outbreaks is usually affected by weak coordination. However, coordination using an incident management system (IMS) in line with a One Health approach involving human, environment, and animal health with collaborations between government and non-governmental agencies result in improved response outcome for zoonotic diseases such as Lassa fever (LF). We provide an overview of the 2019 LF outbreak response in Nigeria using the IMS and One Health approach. The response was coordinated via ten Emergency Operation Centre (EOC) response pillars. Cardinal response activities included activation of EOC, development of an incident action plan, deployment of One Health rapid response teams to support affected states, mid-outbreak review and after-action review meetings. Between 1st January and 29th December 2019, of the 5057 people tested for LF, 833 were confirmed positive from 23 States, across 86 Local Government Areas. Of the 833 confirmed cases, 650 (78%) were from hotspot States of Edo (36%), Ondo (26%) and Ebonyi (16%). Those in the age-group 21-40 years (47%) were mostly affected, with a male to female ratio of 1:1. Twenty healthcare workers were affected. Two LF naïve states Kebbi and Zamfara, reported confirmed cases for the first time during this period. The outbreak peaked earlier in the year compared to previous years, and the emergency phase of the outbreak was declared over by epidemiological week 17 based on low national threshold composite indicators over a period of six consecutive weeks. Multisectoral and multidisciplinary strategic One Health EOC coordination at all levels facilitated the swift containment of Nigeria's large LF outbreak in 2019. It is therefore imperative to embrace One Health approach embedded within the EOC to holistically address the increasing LF incidence in Nigeria.
BASE
Globally, effective emergency response to disease outbreaks is usually affected by weak coordination. However, coordination using an incident management system (IMS) in line with a One Health approach involving human, environment, and animal health with collaborations between government and non-governmental agencies result in improved response outcome for zoonotic diseases such as Lassa fever (LF). We provide an overview of the 2019 LF outbreak response in Nigeria using the IMS and One Health approach. The response was coordinated via ten Emergency Operation Centre (EOC) response pillars. Cardinal response activities included activation of EOC, development of an incident action plan, deployment of One Health rapid response teams to support affected states, mid-outbreak review and after-action review meetings. Between 1st January and 29th December 2019, of the 5057 people tested for LF, 833 were confirmed positive from 23 States, across 86 Local Government Areas. Of the 833 confirmed cases, 650 (78%) were from hotspot States of Edo (36%), Ondo (26%) and Ebonyi (16%). Those in the age-group 21–40 years (47%) were mostly affected, with a male to female ratio of 1:1. Twenty healthcare workers were affected. Two LF naïve states Kebbi and Zamfara, reported confirmed cases for the first time during this period. The outbreak peaked earlier in the year compared to previous years, and the emergency phase of the outbreak was declared over by epidemiological week 17 based on low national threshold composite indicators over a period of six consecutive weeks. Multisectoral and multidisciplinary strategic One Health EOC coordination at all levels facilitated the swift containment of Nigeria's large LF outbreak in 2019. It is therefore imperative to embrace One Health approach embedded within the EOC to holistically address the increasing LF incidence in Nigeria.
BASE
Globally, effective emergency response to disease outbreaks is usually affected by weak coordination. However, coordination using an incident management system (IMS) in line with a One Health approach involving human, environment, and animal health with collaborations between government and non-governmental agencies result in improved response outcome for zoonotic diseases such as Lassa fever (LF). We provide an overview of the 2019 LF outbreak response in Nigeria using the IMS and One Health approach. The response was coordinated via ten Emergency Operation Centre (EOC) response pillars. Cardinal response activities included activation of EOC, development of an incident action plan, deployment of One Health rapid response teams to support affected states, mid-outbreak review and after-action review meetings. Between 1st January and 29th December 2019, of the 5057 people tested for LF, 833 were confirmed positive from 23 States, across 86 Local Government Areas. Of the 833 confirmed cases, 650 (78%) were from hotspot States of Edo (36%), Ondo (26%) and Ebonyi (16%). Those in the age-group 21-40 years (47%) were mostly affected, with a male to female ratio of 1:1. Twenty healthcare workers were affected. Two LF naïve states Kebbi and Zamfara, reported confirmed cases for the first time during this period. The outbreak peaked earlier in the year compared to previous years, and the emergency phase of the outbreak was declared over by epidemiological week 17 based on low national threshold composite indicators over a period of six consecutive weeks. Multisectoral and multidisciplinary strategic One Health EOC coordination at all levels facilitated the swift containment of Nigeria's large LF outbreak in 2019. It is therefore imperative to embrace One Health approach embedded within the EOC to holistically address the increasing LF incidence in Nigeria. ; https://doi.org/10.1016/j.onehlt.2021.100346
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