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Based on a formalization of the 1981 constitutional negotiation in Canada, this article analyses the impact of procedural constraints on collective decisions. Four procedural constraints are considered: voting procedures, voting rules, decision rules, and the order of presentation of options to the vote. Sincere voting (voting according to a voter's preference scale), complete information, and free communication are assumed in the first part of the analysis. The assumption of sincere voting is relaxed in the second part where strategic voting is considered The analysis shows that (1) a collective decision is determined by some interaction of voters' preferences, procedural constraints, and voting strategies, and (2) procedural constraints can be ordered in terms of their relative impact on the collective decision (in decreasing order: decision rules, voting rules, order of presentation, voting procedures). In the conclusion, a general model of the determination of collective decisions is presented.

The impact of 4 procedural constraints -- voting procedures, voting rules, decision rules, & the order of presentation of options to the vote -- on collective decisions is analyzed, based on a formalization of the Nov 1981 constitutional accord in Canada. Sincere voting (voting according to a voter's preference scale), complete information, & free communication are assumed in the first part of the analysis, & the assumption of sincere voting is relaxed in the second part, which considers strategic voting. Analysis of the voting behavior of the 11 politicians involved in the agreement reveals that (1) a collective decision is determined by some interaction of voters' preferences, procedural constraints, & voting strategies; & (2) procedural constraints can be ordered in terms of their relative impact on the collective decision. A general model of the determination of collective decisions is derived from these findings. 5 Tables, 3 Figures, 2 Appendixes, 21 References. Adapted from the source document.

International aid-giving behavior is conceptualized as based on the notion of bounded rationality & involving the interaction of objective & subjective factors, & four hypotheses are deduced to explain the variation of development aid expenditures as a % of gross national product (GNP) -- instrumental, humanitarian, ideological, & incremental . These hypotheses are tested with statistical data concerning aid allocations of 17 Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development donor nations for 1966, 1971, 1976, & 1981, using a regression model. Results show that the model explains 85%-96% of the variance in the dependent variable. Tests of individual hypotheses show that the instrumental explanation is the best predictor of aid as a % of GNP, if a lagged value of the dependent variable is used on the right-hand side of the equation. When the lagged value of the dependent variable is dropped from the equation, the best predictor is the ideological explanation. The contribution of the humanitarian explanation to the explained variance is negligible. 7 Tables, 6 Figures, 38 References. Modified HA

Abstract. A conceptualization of international aid‐giving behaviour, based on the notion of bounded rationality and involving the interaction of objective and subjective factors, is developed. From this conceptualization, four hypotheses are deduced to explain the variation of development aid expenditures as a percentage of GNP: the instrumental hypothesis, the humanitarian hypothesis, the ideological hypothesis, and the incremental hypothesis. These hypotheses are tested on data concerning aid allocations of 17 OECD donors for four points in time (1966, 1971, 1976, and 1981), through the use of a regression model. Results show that the model as a whole explains between 85% and 96% of the variance in the dependent variable. Tests of individual hypotheses show that the instrumental explanation is the best predictor of aid as a percentage of GNP if a lagged value of the dependent variable is used on the right‐hand side of the equation. When the lagged value of the dependent variable is dropped from the equations, the best predictor is the ideological explanation. The contribution of the humanitarian explanation to the explained variance is negligible.

"L'équivalent de plus du quart du PIB mondial est dépensé chaque année par les divers paliers de gouvernement. Cela représente plus de 20 000 milliards de dollars qui font l'objet de budgets annuels planifiés, débattus, adoptés et exécutés dans plusieurs milliers d'administrations publiques sur le globe. Un tel niveau de dépenses exige d'examiner le contenu des budgets et de surveiller les gens qui les administrent. Dans cet ouvrage, nous décrivons les institutions de contrôle budgétaire dans les Parlements de la Francophonie. Nous procédons ensuite à l'élaboration de trois indices de capacité de contrôle (selon les statuts, les pratiques et les ressources) permettant de comparer 23 pays de la Francophonie, 23 pays du Commonwealth et 9 pays non-membres de ces organisations, en vue de répondre à la question suivante: les Parlements du Commonwealth ont-ils une plus grande capacité de contrôle que ceux de la Francophonie et ont-ils le même niveau d'efficacité (ou d'inefficacité) pour contrer la corruption?"--Publisher

"L'équivalent de plus du quart du PIB mondial est dépensé chaque année par les divers paliers de gouvernement. Cela représente plus de 20 000 milliards de dollars qui font l'objet de budgets annuels planifiés, débattus, adoptés et exécutés dans plusieurs milliers d'administrations publiques sur le globe. Un tel niveau de dépenses exige d'examiner le contenu des budgets et de surveiller les gens qui les administrent. Dans cet ouvrage, nous décrivons les institutions de contrôle budgétaire dans les Parlements de la Francophonie. Nous procédons ensuite à l'élaboration de trois indices de capacité de contrôle (selon les statuts, les pratiques et les ressources) permettant de comparer 23 pays de la Francophonie, 23 pays du Commonwealth et 9 pays non-membres de ces organisations, en vue de répondre à la question suivante: les Parlements du Commonwealth ont-ils une plus grande capacité de contrôle que ceux de la Francophonie et ont-ils le même niveau d'efficacité (ou d'inefficacité) pour contrer la corruption?"--Publisher.