Web and internet economics: 9th International Workshop, WINE 2013, Cambridge, MA, USA, December 11-14, 2013 ; proceedings
In: Lecture notes in computer science 8289
In: Advanced research in computing and software science
16 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Lecture notes in computer science 8289
In: Advanced research in computing and software science
SSRN
Working paper
We study auctions for carbon licenses, a policy tool used to control the social cost of pollution. Each identical license grants the right to produce a unit of pollution. Each buyer (i.e., firm that pollutes during the manufacturing process) enjoys a decreasing marginal value for licenses, but society suffers an increasing marginal cost for each license distributed. The seller (i.e., the government) can choose a number of licenses to put up for auction, and wishes to maximize the societal welfare: the total economic value of the buyers minus the social cost. Motivated by emission license markets deployed in practice, we focus on uniform price auctions with a price floor and/or price ceiling. The seller has distributional information about the market, and their goal is to tune the auction parameters to maximize expected welfare. The target benchmark is the maximum expected welfare achievable by any such auction under truth-telling behavior. Unfortunately, the uniform price auction is not truthful, and strategic behavior can significantly reduce (even below zero) the welfare of a given auction configuration. We describe a subclass of "safe-price" auctions for which the welfare at any Bayes-Nash equilibrium will approximate the welfare under truth-telling behavior. We then show that the better of a safe-price auction, or a truthful auction that allocates licenses to only a single buyer, will approximate the target benchmark. In particular, we show how to choose a number of licenses and a price floor so that the worst-case welfare, at any equilibrium, is a constant approximation to the best achievable welfare under truth-telling after excluding the welfare contribution of a single buyer.
BASE
In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Internet and Network Economics, S. 172-183
SSRN
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
Written by more than fifty top researchers from economics, OR, and algorithm design, this text comprehensively covers a major inter-disciplinary field and its important applications from the basics to state of the art. Key chapters discuss efficiency, fairness and incentives, and market design and its relation to social choice theory.
SSRN
In: Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 20-39
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
Working paper