Suchergebnisse

This paper primarily examines the Easter Sunday bombing plotted and executed by a group of Sri Lankan Muslims and post-war Sri Lankan conditions among Sri Lankan Muslims, also known as Moors. The article will attempt to argue that (a) the post-war violence and organized Islamophobia among non-Muslim communities in general and the Sinhalese in particular increased fears and distrust among Sri Lankan Muslims in general; and (b) state concessions to Muslim political leaders, who supported successive Sri Lankan ruling classes from independence through the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 2009, have meant an isolation of the community from the other two main ethnic communities. The concessions that the Muslim community has won actively helped the Muslim community to be proactive in its religious practices and thus paved the way for exclusive social and political choices. The rise of Islamic movements and mosques in the post-1977 period galvanized Muslims. In time this isolation has been reinforced by socio-religious revival among Muslims whose ethnic identity has been constructed along the lines of the Islamic faith by Muslim elites. Despite this revival it has been clear that the Muslim community has been reluctant to use Islamic traditions and principles for peace building, which could have helped to ease tensions, brought about by the 30-year-old ethnic conflict. Finally, some pragmatic ways to ease tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims in the greater discipline of conflict resolution are explored using traditions within Islam.

Conflict in Sri Lanka between the Tamils and the Sinhalese brought the Eastern Muslims into the crossfire. Muslim elites and politicians generally cooperate with the Sinhalese ruling class. Such cohabitation irritated the Tamils. Since 1985, relations between the Tamils and the Muslims in the Eastern region have become strained, and Muslims claimed they have some problems to be solved. This study attempts to identify some special problems of the Eastern Muslims. A questionnaire on the special problems of the Eastern Muslims was distributed to the Eastern youth, students, unemployed Muslims and farmers. The population of the target group was selected randomly. More than 150 questionnaires were issued with a 75 percent response rate. Interviews were also conducted on the phone with an educated section of the Eastern Muslims. This study also suggests solutions to the protracted ethno-political conflict based on power sharing.

Since the late-19th century, for political expediency, the Sri Lankan Muslims have used Islam as a marker of identity difference which has suffered due to the tensions of religious and ethnic identity markers. Unlike Tamils and Sinhalese ethnic groups, Sri Lanka Muslim elites did not choose language as their primary identity marker but sought to differentiate themselves based on the practices and traditions of Islamic faith. These tensions have manifested in several ways, however, following the 2019 Easter Sunday attacks, there has been a great strain placed on Muslim representation as questions have been asked as to whether the religious identity has laid the foundations for the radicalization of the Muslims, especially in the wake of global Islamophobia and concerns about security. Therefore, it is important to answer questions related to Islamic identity manifestation in Sri Lanka: What is the role of an Islamic religious identity in radicalizing Sri Lankan Muslims? Why did Sri Lanka become a convenient place for IS' activities? Did religious identity alone cause the radicalization of some Muslims? This article would attempt to answer these questions by (1) revisiting the Muslim community's identity formation before the independence, (2) explaining Islamic identity in the post-independence Sri Lanka and the political representation to win votes and mobilize support during the ethnic civil war between Tamils and Sinhalese, and (3) analyzing factors that contributed to the radicalization of Muslims, and Islam. Drawing mostly on secondary sources, the article attempts to situate Sri Lanka Muslims' identity formation in Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict and reconciliation. Using answers from interviews conducted through Zoom, WeChat, and WhatsApp, the article assesses the behavior of Sri Lanka Muslims in the face of the 2019 terrorist attack by some Muslims. The article finds that religious identity alone is not sufficient to trigger violence, as evidence suggests that underlying socio-economic as well as political grievances produce polarization and radical actions. We argue that long-standing arguments tying radical actions solely to religion may require substantial revision and need to be situated within a wider frame of national reconciliation especially if it does not consider existing contexts.

A new wave of attacks by Sinhala-Buddhist extremist elements against the Muslim community in Sri Lanka started following the brutal end of the ethnic civil war between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sinhala-Buddhist-dominated Sri Lanka security forces in 2009. Easter Sunday terrorist attacks in 2019 by some Muslims polarized Sri Lanka and contributed to the compromise of the country's security. Sri Lankan Muslims often claim they are a peaceful community and thus have no serious interests in violent mobilization. But the evidence would basically contradict Muslims' claim of a peace-loving community. The Easter Sunday terrorist attacks did not take place in any vacuum. This paper will situate some key developments in the violent mobilization of Sri Lanka during the war against the LTTE. The primary goal of such an attempt is to read the growing religious conservative and violent trends among Muslims between 1977 and 2009. In understanding the growing religious conservative trends, an understanding is attempted to situate a later propensity for violence within the community that would manifest itself with the 2019 Easter Sunday attacks. Interviews were conducted with members of the Islamic Dawah organizations and Muslim youth who were formerly associated with violent groups in the Eastern Province to understand the ground reality. The period of 1977–2009 is important as the rise of religious conservatist influences in Sri Lanka mirrors the global transnational influences of Iran and Middle East Petro Dollars, especially Saudi Arabia. The article draws mainly on secondary sources. But to gain a better understanding of the ground reality, we spoke to a few Eastern Muslims between July 2016 and September 2021 at regular intervals.