Suchergebnisse

Front Matter -- Half Title Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- INTRODUCTION -- Content -- PART 1: Conceptual and Historical Background -- Are Security Regimes Possible? Historical Cases and Modern Issues -- Security Regimes: Mediating Between War and Peace in the Arab-Israeli Conflict -- PART 2: The External Actors -- The American Role in a Regional Security Regime -- The United Nations and Security Regimes: The Unfulfilled Vision -- PART 3: Regional Interactions -- The Damascus Declaration: An Arab Attempt At Regional Security -- The Israel-Jordan Tacit Security Regime -- Syria and Israel: Toward a Change? -- Arms Control in the Middle East: Global Regimes vs. Regional Dynamics -- PART 4: Nonmilitary Aspects -- An Observation on Arab Culture and Deterrence: Metaphors and Misgivings -- The Politics of Water in the Middle East: The Current Situation, Imaginary and Practical Solutions -- From Boycott to Limited Scientific and Technological Cooperation -- PART 5: From Deterrenceto Security Regimes -- The Arab-Israeli Relationship: From Deterrence to Security Regime -- Back Matter -- CONTRIBUTORS -- INDEX -- Back Matter.

1. Democratization processes in the Middle East and the Arab world / Gabriel Ben-Dor -- 2. The emerging Middle East balance of power / Hillel Frisch -- 3. The United States and the Arab Spring / Eytan Gilboa -- 4. The Arab Spring and Palestinian apathy / Alexander Bligh -- 5. The challenge of terrorism / Boaz Ganor -- 6. The economic implications of the Arab Spring / Gil Feiler -- 7. The Arab Spring and the linkage between Israel's domestic and foreign policies / Shmuel Sandler -- 8. The strategic implications for Israel / Efraim Inbar.

This volume analyzes the political, economic and strategic dimensions of the recent upheavals in the Middle East known as the Arab Spring. Mass demonstrations in many Arab states challenged the political status quo and the existing political and cultural system in the region. While it is too early to offer a definitive analysis of the impact of the widespread discontent in the Arab world, the trajectory of the events indicates regime change in several states, containment of political unrest in most states, increase in Islamic tendencies, centrifugal tendencies in a number of political ...

"Tensions between Ankara and Jerusalem have escalated since Turkey harshly criticized Israel following its invasion of the Gaza Strip in December 2008 (Operation Cast Lead). The operation aimed to halt continuous missile attacks on Israel's civilian population by Hamas. Soon after, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's outburst at Israeli President Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2009 indicated further cooling between the two powers. Additionally, in October 2009 Turkey abruptly canceled Israel's participation in the multinational "Anatolian Eagle" air exercise. This was followed by Turkish political leaders' severe criticism of Israeli policies. Subsequently, an inflammatory anti-Israeli drama series on Turkey's state-controlled television station depicting IDF soldiers as cold-blooded murderers and rapists only exacerbated tensions. Since the fall of 2009, hardly a week has passed without Erdogan slamming Israel. Finally, Israeli military action to prevent the "Gaza flotilla" from breaking the blockade on the Hamas-ruled Strip in June 2010, which ended with nine Turkish Islamists dead on board one of the ships, provided Erdogan's government another opportunity for hostility toward Israel as it championed the cause of Hamas. The deterioration in the Ankara-Jerusalem relationship is part of a reorientation in Turkish foreign policy, characterized by moving away from the West and by a desire for better relations with Muslim states, including radical actors such as Iran, Hamas and Hizballah. The first section of this article reviews the rationale for the Israeli-Turkish strategic partnership in the 1990s and the early years of this century. The second part documents the deviations in Turkish foreign policy from Western patterns. The third section explains how changes in Turkey's strategic environment, as well as in its domestic arena, in the twenty-first century have led to a reorientation of Turkish foreign policy and to current tensions in bilateral relations. The fourth part offers an assessment of the potential impact of the changes in Turkish foreign policy on the Greater Middle East and global politics."--P. [1]-2

PART 1. THE AFTERMATH OF THE 1973 YOM KIPPUR WAR: 1. Israeli strategic thinking after 1973 ; 2. The American arms transfer to Israel -- PART 2. LIMITED WARS: 3. Israel's small war: The military response to the Intifada ; 4. The 'No Choice War' debate in Israel -- PART 3. THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD: 5. Israel and the Gulf War ; 6. Contours of Israel's new strategic thinking ; 7. Israel's Strategic Environment in the 1990s -- PART 4. THE PEACE PROCESS: 8. Israeli negotiations with Syria ; 9. Islamic extremism and the peace process ; 10. Arab-Israeli coexistence: Causes, achievements and limitations -- PART 5. THE NEW STRATEGIC PARTNERS: 11. Israel's new strategic partner: Turkey ; 12. The Indian-Israeli entente -- PART 6. THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CHALLENGES: 13. Israel's Palestinian challenge ; 14. The need to block a nuclear Iran ; 15. Israel's strategic mistakes in the 2006 Lebanon War.

"This volume presents a comprehensive analysis of Israel's security challenges since the 1973 October War. Efraim Inbar takes the reader on a historical journey through Israel's relations in the Middle East that begins with an analysis of Israel's strategic thinking after 1973 and ends with an important look at the recent Second Lebanese War and the Iranian nuclear challenge. Israel's National Security delves not only into Israel's responses, but also its relationships in the international community, providing a complete picture of how Israel's strategic environment has evolved over time. This important study will be of interest to students and researchers of Security Studies, Middle East and Israeli Politics."--Jacket

Annotation

Abstract
This article reviews the ascendance of Iran in Middle East politics, the Iranian nuclear program, and the strategic implications of Iranian aspirations, which all increase the likelihood of direct armed conflict between Israel and Iran. It concludes that Iran's nuclear and hegemonic ambitions remain uncurbed. Whatever efforts at "regime change" were made were unsuccessful, and Iran remains undeterred. Therefore, the likelihood of direct armed conflict between Israel and Iran is great.

Zusammenfassung
Dieser Aufsatz befasst sich mit dem wachsenden Einfluss Irans in der Politik des Nahen Ostens, dem iranischen Atomprogramm und den strategischen Konsequenzen der iranischen Ambitionen, die allesamt die Wahrscheinlichkeit eines direkten bewaffneten Konflikts zwischen Israel und Iran erhöhen. Er gelangt zu dem Schluss, dass Iran seine nuklearen und hegemonialen Ambitionen unvermindert fortsetzt. Etwaige Bemühungen, einen "Regimewechsel" herbeizuführen, blieben erfolglos, und Iran macht unbeirrt weiter. Daher besteht eine hohe Wahrscheinlichkeit für einen direkten bewaffneten Konflikt zwischen Israel und Iran.

On 13 April 1988 the Israeli cabinet approved the modernization program proposed by the general staff of the Israel Defense Force Navy (ID FN). 1 The proposed program included the acquisition of four 1300-ton missile corvettes of the new Saar 5 type and three 1200-ton Dolphin-class submarines. The estimated cost for this ten-year project was $1.5 billion. The government, however, limited procurement to three Saar 5s and two new submarines. 2 This rather controversial decision was reached after eight years of deliberations in the defense establishment. Although opponents of the program continued their efforts to prevent its realization, in February 1989 the Israeli Ministry of Defense finally signed a contract with the U.S. Ingalls Company for the building of the Saar 5s.

As long as the Palestinians do not transform their goals, the conflict will not be resolved, only managed. Israel will continue to live by the sword and to mow the grass as needed. In Operation Protective Edge, Jerusalem set out once again to destroy Hamas's military capabilities with the understanding that it is engaged in an intractable, protracted conflict requiring a strategy of attrition. Ultimately, this objective was achieved. One third of Hamas's rocket and missile stockpile and most of its rocket-manufacturing infrastructure were destroyed. Most of its thirty-two attack tunnels were likely destroyed, and about 1,000 Hamas combatants, including some high-level leaders, were killed. It could be that more targeted killings and an earlier relaxing of the restraints on airpower could have expedited the acceptance of the ceasefire by Hamas and thus avoided much of the destruction in the Strip. Nevertheless, it is clear that Hamas lost this campaign. Adapted from the source document.