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Debate persists on whether voters hold politicians accountable for corruption. Numerous experiments have examined whether informing voters about corrupt acts of politicians decreases their vote share. Meta-analysis demonstrates that corrupt candidates are punished by zero percentage points across field experiments, but approximately 32 points in survey experiments. I argue this discrepancy arises due to methodological differences. Small effects in field experiments may stem partially from weak treatments and noncompliance, and large effects in survey experiments are likely from social desirability bias and the lower and hypothetical nature of costs. Conjoint experiments introduce hypothetical costly trade-offs, but it may be best to interpret results in terms of realistic sets of characteristics rather than marginal effects of particular characteristics. These results suggest that survey experiments may provide point estimates that are not representative of real-world voting behavior. However, field experimental estimates may also not recover the "true" effects due to design decisions and limitations.

Abstract
Political instability is commonly thought to discourage investment and reduce economic growth. We challenge this consensus by showing that instability does not systematically depress investment. Using an event study approach, we examine daily returns of national financial indices in every country that experienced an irregular regime change subject to data availability. Returns following resignations are large and positive (+4 percent), while those following assassinations are negative and smaller in magnitude (−2 percent). The impact of coups tends to be negative (−2 percent), but we show that a pro-business coup results in large positive returns (+10 percent). We also find evidence that authoritarian or anti-business regime changes are more likely to lead to capital flight than democratic or pro-business changes. The immediate impact of political instability on investment is therefore dependent on the type of regime change and its expected impact on future growth.

Under what we call Abenergynomics, Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzō has used energy policy to support the growth objectives of Abenomics, even when the associated policies are publicly unpopular, opposed by utility companies, or harmful to the environment. We show how Abenergynomics has shaped Japanese policy on nuclear power, electricity deregulation, renewable energy, and climate change.

AbstractQuantitative empirical inquiry in international relations often relies on dyadic data. Standard analytic techniques do not account for the fact that dyads are not generally independent of one another. That is, when dyads share a constituent member (e.g., a common country), they may be statistically dependent, or "clustered." Recent work has developed dyadic clustering robust standard errors (DCRSEs) that account for this dependence. Using these DCRSEs, we reanalyzed all empirical articles published in International Organization between January 2014 and January 2020 that feature dyadic data. We find that published standard errors for key explanatory variables are, on average, approximately half as large as DCRSEs, suggesting that dyadic clustering is leading researchers to severely underestimate uncertainty. However, most (67% of) statistically significant findings remain statistically significant when using DCRSEs. We conclude that accounting for dyadic clustering is both important and feasible, and offer software in R and Stata to facilitate use of DCRSEs in future research.

It is well known that regime types affect international conflicts. This article explores political parties as a mechanism through which they do so. Political parties operate in fundamentally different ways in democracies vs. non-democracies, which has consequences for foreign policy. Core supporters of a party in a democracy, if they are hawkish, may be more successful at demanding hawkish behavior from their party representatives than would be their counterparts in an autocracy. The study draws on evidence from paired experiments in democratic Japan and non-democratic China to show that supporters of the ruling party in Japan punish their leaders for discouraging nationalist protests, while ruling party insiders in China are less likely to do so. Under some circumstances, then, non-democratic regimes may be better able to rein in peace-threatening displays of nationalism.

AbstractIt is well known that regime types affect international conflicts. This article explores political parties as a mechanism through which they do so. Political parties operate in fundamentally different ways in democracies vs. non-democracies, which has consequences for foreign policy. Core supporters of a party in a democracy, if they are hawkish, may be more successful at demanding hawkish behavior from their party representatives than would be their counterparts in an autocracy. The study draws on evidence from paired experiments in democratic Japan and non-democratic China to show that supporters of the ruling party in Japan punish their leaders for discouraging nationalist protests, while ruling party insiders in China are less likely to do so. Under some circumstances, then, non-democratic regimes may be better able to rein in peace-threatening displays of nationalism.

ABSTRACTHow can scholars conduct field research when there is limited access to the field? This article first identifies how limited and uncertain field access can affect field research and then provides recommendations to address these challenges. We focus on conducting field research in Japan because of our substantive expertise, but we believe that the problems and solutions outlined in this article are applicable to a broad range of countries. Our hope is that this article contributes to the developing literature on conducting research during times of emergency and to the larger literature on best practices for field research.