Suchergebnisse

The 1951 U.S.-Icelandic Defense Agreement paved the way for a permanent US military presence at the Keflavik base in Iceland, an outpost that played a crucial role in US strategy during the Cold War. The article explores two gender-related aspects of the US-Icelandic Cold War relationship: the restrictions on off-base movements of US soldiers, & the secret ban imposed by the Icelandic government on the stationing of black US troops in Iceland. These practices were meant to "protect" Icelandic women & to preserve a homogeneous "national body." Although US officials repeatedly tried to have the restrictions lifted, the Icelandic government refused to modify them until the racial ban was publicly disclosed in late 1959. Even after the practice came to light, it took another several years before the ban was gradually eliminated. Misguided though the Icelandic restrictions may have been, they did, paradoxically, help to defuse domestic opposition to Iceland's pro-American foreign policy course & thus preserved the country's role in the Western alliance. Adapted from the source document.

This article deals with the role of Iceland in East German foreign policy during the Cold War. Because of Iceland's strategic importance, the GDR invested considerable resources in expanding bilateral relations, & in the 1950s became Iceland's fifth largest trading partner. In the 1960s, free market economic reforms in Iceland sharply reduced the barter trade with the GDR & party ideological differences emerged which led to a formal break after the suppression of the Prague Spring. The 1970s & 1980s witnessed the marginalization of East German influence in Iceland. With the discrediting of the East Bloc, in general, & the failure to abrogate the defense treaty, in particular, there was not much rationale for ideological cooperation. The lack of increase in trade relations with Iceland following its recognition of the GDR in 1973 only reinforced this sense of political & economic alienation. Adapted from the source document.

Der Autor untersucht Eisenhowers "geteilte Strategie", das Verhältnis zwischen den offensiven und defensiven Elementen der Strategie, während der Zeit des Kalten Krieges. Dazu konzentriert er sich wesentlich auf die Rolle C.D. Jacksons, der in einem neuen Amt in Zusammenarbeit mit dem State Department, dem CIA und dem Verteidigungsministerium die psychologische Kriegsführung der USA zu leiten hatte.