Suchergebnisse

This paper studies an enforcement game between a regulator and firms that can cause harmful accidents. The distribution of potential accident damage is private information to the firms, and realized damage can be observed only at the cost of going to court. Under conditions described in the paper, an optimal policy involves the separate assessment of regulatory/settlement fines and court liability. In this optimum, injurers self‐select by appealing (or not) to the court process; liability takes a 'threshold' form, assessing maximal liability when damages are high and zero liability otherwise; and, vis‐à‐vis a first‐best, some firms are over‐deterred—and others under‐deterred—from having accidents.

Recent education reforms informed by learning science support the effectiveness of collaborative learning strategies such as problem-based learning groups. However, the efficacy of these methods depends on the authenticity of the problem context and the quality of the dialog established. Communication within groups must be dialogic, and students must address problems using relevant concepts and deep principles. Although dialogic communication is rare and difficult to facilitate, if it is achieved, students will construct useful knowledge that can be applied beyond the classroom.