Revaluation of the role of Central Asian resources in China's modern energy strategy
In: Problemy Dalnego Vostoka, Heft 4, S. 55-67
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In: Problemy Dalnego Vostoka, Heft 4, S. 55-67
In: The Bulletin of Irkutsk State University. Series Political Science and Religion Studies, Band 34, S. 8-17
April 16, 2020 marked the 6th anniversary of the Sewol ferry disaster. The tragic event roused South Korean civilians and gave rise to numerous rumors and propaganda myths, which formed the basis for the so-called "candle revolution". They included both a conspiracy theory about the disaster, and the thesis that the main cause of the death of children was the criminal inaction of the corrupted Park Geun-hye administration and the ex-President herself. The examination of the remains of the ferry raised in 2017 after the impeachment of Park drew a thick line under the conspiracy theories (explosion on board, collision with a US submarine, etc.). Nevertheless, the question "what went wrong?" remains unanswered despite politically committed investigations. Meanwhile, most of the rumors circulating after the tragedy that brought people to the streets were never proven. Moreover, Park Geun-hye was acquitted by the Court of the charges related to the Sewol. The facts show that the blame for a great number of victims is not on the Blue house, but on the local authorities, who were unable to effectively conduct rescue operations, and later openly practiced window-dressing and misinformed their superiors. The President therefore did not receive timely information that would require a rapid response on her part. As the case involved the province of Jeolla (a regional stronghold of the Democrats), the opposition expressing storm of abuse had the advantage of shifting the blame from them to the Central government and it succeeded in doing this. The information campaign of Park Geun-hye's opponents contributed to her wilt and the formation in the mass consciousness of the former President's image that played its role in the later developments.
In: The Bulletin of Irkutsk State University. Series Political Science and Religion Studies, Band 34, S. 67-74
The UN Security Council imposed tough economic sanctions against the DPRK in response to Pyongyang's nuclear and missile tests in 2016-2017. They placed considerable strain on economic relations with North Korea. Prior to the introduction of the new international restrictions, economic relations between the Russian Federation and the DPRK had been mainly represented by trade, the Hasan-Rajin joint transport and logistics project, temporary labor migration of North Korean citizens to work in Russia, and humanitarian assistance from the Russian Federation. New investment cooperation projects had also been discussed (for example, in infrastructure and energy spheres), as well as the construction of an motor-way bridge between the two countries. The article evaluates the consequences of the UN Security Council sanctions against the DPRK for the main areas of Russian-North Korean economic relations. Moscow managed to exclude the Khasan-Rajin railway project from the UN Security Council resolutions as the Russian side had invested more than $ 250 million in it. Since 2018 the joint venture, however, has faced serious problems in ensuring the necessary volume of freight to handle. Due to the UNSC sanctions, mutually beneficial cooperation in attracting workers from the DPRK to Russia had to be terminated by the end of 2019. At the same time, bilateral trade, which cut in half in 2018, showed a yoy growth of more than 40 % in 2019, primarily due to an increase in Russian exports. The supply of the Russian humanitarian aid also continued.
In: Vestnik Tomskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta: naučnyj žurnal = Tomsk State University journal of economics. Ėkonomika, Heft 40, S. 5-14
ISSN: 2311-3227
In: The Bulletin of Irkutsk State University. Series Political Science and Religion Studies, Band 38, S. 46-50
The article examines main directions of the Russian-North Korean cooperation in the context of the coronavirus pandemic in 2020–2021. The summit of the Russian and North Korean leaders in 2019 created expectations for expanded bilateral cooperation in the areas not prohibited by the UN Security Council resolutions. Due to the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, however, the DPRK has severely limited contacts with the outside world since January 2020. Transport links with other countries were suspended, foreigners were prohibited from entering the country, and export and import operations were broken off. By April 2021 most of the foreign diplomats and all foreign employees of international humanitarian organizations had left the DPRK. Nevertheless, Russia retained its presence in North Korea and continued to provide humanitarian assistance to that country. Petroleum products supplies from Russia continued until August 2020. Bilateral trade in 2020 decreased by 11% compared to 2019. The mutual exchange of delegations in 2020 was frozen, however, regular contacts of diplomats with the local authorities continued both in Pyongyang and in Moscow. A new educational project was launched in 2021. During online sessions researches from leading Russian universities deliver lectures to teachers and researchers from the North Korean institutes. Thus, the two countries are trying to maintain contacts and develop cooperation even in the current tough conditions.
In: The Bulletin of Irkutsk State University. Series Political Science and Religion Studies, Band 34, S. 18-25
After the establishment of diplomatic relations, Russia and South Korea have passed a difficult way of developing mutual understanding and a certain degree of mutual trust and practical actions. Their relationships have evolved from great optimism to pragmatic and balanced development and the current state characterized in the anniversary year by the slogan "Be friends. Trust. Act". The republic of Korea has achieved almost all the goals set during the normalization of relations and received huge profits from the cooperation with Russia. Conversely, Russia has not achieved most of the goals and objectives set 30 years ago.
In: Problemy Dalnego Vostoka, Heft 1, S. 13-21
In: Problemy Dalnego Vostoka, Heft 6, S. 4-41
In: Problemy Dalnego Vostoka, Heft 5, S. 57-69
In: Problemy Dalnego Vostoka, Heft 4, S. 23-30
In: RUSSIA AND THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD, Heft 3, S. 114-131