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Students of the history of ethics sometimes find themselves tempted by moderate or extreme versions of an approach that might roughly be called 'historicist'. This temptation may result from the difficulties of approaching historical texts from a 'narrowly philosophical' point of view. We may begin, for instance, by wanting to know what Aristotle has to say about 'the problems of ethics', so that we can compare his views with those of (say) Aquinas, Hume, Kant, Sidgwick, and Rawls, and then decide what is true or false in each theorist's position. But this narrowly philosophical attitude soon runs into difficulties, and writers on the history of ethics often warn us against it.

Etymology might encourage us to begin a discussion of Aristotle on philanthropy with a discussion of philanthropia; and it is instructive to see why this is not quite the right place to look. The Greek term initially refers to a generalized attitude of kindness and consideration for a human being. The gods accuse Prometheus of being a 'human-lover', intending the term in an unfavorable sense, when he confers on human beings the benefits that should have been confined to the gods. Aristotle uses the abstract noun only once, to refer to sympathetic fellow-feeling (Rhet. 1390a18–23); and he mentions our feeling of kinship with other human beings to explain our approval of the philanthropos person (Eth. Nic. 1155a16–21). Philanthropia is the attitude of a kind and considerate person, even if she lacks material resources, and it can be displayed without the transfer of material resources.