Suchergebnisse

Two polar viewpoints dominate discourses around Armenia's foreign policy. One is that the Velvet Revolution should have led to a U-turn in a pro-Western and anti-Russian direction. The other is that there is no alternative to Armenia's pro-Russian stand. Disappointingly for many, the post-revolutionary authorities of Armenia appear to have moved from the first to the second in a matter of months. This article argues that the polarity is exaggerated: while a power rotation could not change Armenia's foreign policy priorities, dictated as they are by Armenia's surroundings, the existence of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the sealed borders with Turkey, some change is possible and inevitable as a new generation of elites accedes to power. Unlike their predecessors who grew up and came of age in the USSR, the new elites were raised in independent Armenia and operate within new geopolitical and geocultural paradigms.

Nach dem Zusammenbruch der UdSSR entstanden auf dem Territorium des Südkaukasus mit Georgien, Armenien und Aserbaidschan drei international anerkannte Staaten, zwischen denen zwar erhebliche Konflikte bestehen, die sich aber dennoch als Teile einer einheitlichen Region wahrnehmen. Der Aufbau staatlicher Strukturen in diesen Ländern ist noch nicht abgeschlossen und sie sind noch auf der Suche nach einer politischen Identität. Im Prozess des Nation Building haben ethno-politische Konflikte eine bedeutende Rolle gespielt. Die Konflikte um Berg-Karabach, Abchasien und Südossetien sind typische postsowjetische Konflikte. Diese "eingefrorenen" Konflikte sind für die drei Staaten ein wichtiger Bestandteil ihrer politischen Identität. In den drei Konfliktzonen ist es den sowjetischen, russischen, aserbaidschanischen, armenischen und georgischen sowie den lokalen Führungen nicht gelungen, die ethno-nationalen Konflikte hinsichtlich des Territoriums und des Status der unterschiedlichen staatlichen Gebilde beizulegen. (ICE2)

Introducing this special issue of Caucasus Survey on the unrecognized politics of de facto states in the post-Soviet space, this article discusses some of the key problems involved in the study of these entities. It relates the origins of the articles contained in this collection and briefly introduces the main themes they deal with: the definition, representational politics, resourcing and engagement of de facto states.

In January 2020, the Russian-language bimonthly "Russia in Global Affairs" published an article on "memory politics" and related conflicts, following a roundtable hosted by the magazine (Rossiya, 2020). To our amazement, the discussion caused a very keen reaction, especially in Europe. Our modest publication was immediately dubbed as nearly a forge of Kremlin ideas regarding "memory wars," which, of course, is flattering, but, alas, is not true. In general, the willingness to see behind everything a conspiracy of dark forces and the belief that everything happens for a reason, well-known to us from our own history, have now spectacularly become commonplace. So, since the topic triggered such a powerful response, we decided to take it further by asking members of the academic community in different countries how they assess the current state of affairs in "memory politics." They came up with a very broad range of opinions, which we gladly share with our readers.