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Despite the growing academic attention to the problem of interference in internal affairs, rhetorical techniques the state uses to legitimize interventions in the eyes of foreign counterparties, remain somewhat understudied in the Russian IR studies. In this regard, the case of the Monroe Doctrine, a landmark ideological construct in the history of international relations and US foreign policy, provides a unique framework for an in-depth study of the practices of legitimization and stigmatization of interventions. The paper examines the role of the doctrine in denouncing the interference of European powers in the domestic affairs of Latin American countries and justifying US actions in the region. The author outlines a set of issues related to legitimizing, both externally and internally, the actions of the state in the international arena. It is shown that the appeal to national interests suitable for solving the problems of domestic political legitimization, turns out to be ineffective in justifying interventions in the eyes of the international community and therefore gives way to references to established traditions and historical narratives. The paper examines the historical background of the 1823 presidential address and the ways how the US foreign policy establishment appealed to it later on, both to promote the idea of the inadmissibility of European interference in the affairs of the countries of the Western Hemisphere, and, subsequently, to justify American interventionism. Special attention is paid to the so-called Roosevelt Corollary, since it allows one to better understand the specifics of the US leaders' perception of the Monroe Doctrine and to separate them from the distortions and stereotypes formed during the ensuing public debates and uncritically replicated in many academic studies. The author concludes that, though the Monroe Doctrine is regarded as a cornerstone of US foreign policy, in fact it played a limited role in both diplomatic justification and stigmatization of interventions. In this regard, it is more appropriate to consider it as a rhetorical asset rather than a strict guiding principle. In general, the case of the Monroe Doctrine reveals the situational conditionality of the practices legitimizing interventions, resulting in their limited persuasiveness. The latter seems to be almost inevitable given the constitutive importance of the institution of sovereignty for the maintenance of international society.

Academic literature is largely skeptical regarding the role of military deterrence in addressing low-level coercion. The stability-instability paradox suggests that increasing destructiveness of the armed forces (especially with the emergence of nuclear weapons) diminishes their utility in response to limited wars, proxy conflicts or economic sanctions. Recent debates often extend the same logic to foreign interference in internal affairs, as they position it as a supplement for forcible rivalries. This article seeks to advance understanding of the linkage between military deterrence and foreign interference in internal politics by exploring the record of the early Cold War starting from 1948 to the mid-1950s. The analysis attests that concern over the Soviet military capabilities had a major restraining effect on Washington. As a result, the US pursued more cautious activities against the Soviet Union in comparison to the campaigns targeting less capable states. This historical record reveals that interference is more amenable to military deterrence than other types of low-level coercion. It differs from them, as covert operations produce an existential danger to the political leaders of a target state, inciting overreaction on their behalf. Therefore, they create escalation risks when threatening a great power. Interference exacerbates confrontation even between adversaries that perceived each other as malign beforehand. Apart from signaling hostile intentions, it aggravates a sense of urgency on finding a response. Although military capabilities do not provide a direct solution to political threats, they serve as a repellent against potential subversive activities. These conclusions do not depend on the specific type of interference pursued by external agents. The findings of the article demonstrate that cross-domain deterrence is more prevalent than stability-instability paradox envisages.

Abstract
Foreign interference poses an increasing threat in the current tensions among major powers, given pervasive expectations regarding its strategic effects and low costs. Transborder operations seeking to undermine a government or reinforce it against opposition emerge as a safer alternative to forcible coercion. Such operations incorporate assistance to political groups and individuals within a target state aiming to reorient its foreign policy, weaken its capabilities or promote one's ideology. However, this article exposes their deficiencies. It indicates the low chances of proxies to establish their rule, the difficulties in converting such accomplishments into benefits for an interfering state, and the emotional grievances from unfulfilled expectations. By delegating responsibilities, an interfering state loosens its operational control. The article strongly warns against targeting major powers as they are hard to subvert and supply proxies with opportunities to defect. The record of Soviet assistance to the Chinese Communists reveals the negative repercussions of the seemingly successful interference. It is a rare instance where interference targeting a major power produced a change in its government. For several years the People's Republic of China remained a military ally and ideological disciple to Moscow, but these accomplishments were unsustainable. Soviet leverage dissipated as the Chinese Communists consolidated their rule, while disagreements over standing and past wrongs precipitated the breakdown of cooperation. Although the recent debates on interference emphasize anxiety over the technological transformations, this article focuses on fundamental political limitations, ensuring applicability of its lessons in spite of potential changes in means employed by interfering states.

The rise of international tensions revitalizes discussions on potential scenarios of military struggle. The related literature focuses primarily on the evolution in the armed forces and suggests contradictory conclusions on possible developments. One approach focuses on the rising costs for generating a modern force, which encourages states to be cautious regarding its deployment. The other concentrates on the growing lethality and precision of long-range weapons, increasing the tempo of operations. The article seeks to place these competing claims in the context of political aims of the adversaries. It also highlights the role of negotiations with local elites in consolidating gains on the battlefield, underappreciated in recent debates. Using the qualitative comparative analysis, the article reviews the record of military campaigns conducted by Russia and the U.S. since the Cold War. It seeks to acquire lessons from these past engagements for potential armed standoffs in the future. The analysis demonstrates that common expectations of rapid military is applicable only to the instance of confrontation pursuing limited political aims. In many cases, states engage in warfare with decisive political aims. Outcomes on such conflicts critically depend on the ability of the winning side to legitimize its rule through deals with powerbrokers on the ground. Meanwhile, the technical dominance plays limited role in defining military and political success. It is often compensated through asymmetric means available even to backward actors. The record of recent decades also emphasizes the growing role of city guerilla, used by a weaker side to shift fortunes in confrontation.

Since the second half of the 20th century, military alliance ceased to play an essential role in ensuring the security of major powers. Meanwhile, asymmetric alliances, in which a major power remained an incontestable leader surrounded by weak parties, proliferated across international system. The literature explains these relationships in terms of an exchange in dissimilar benefits between states, following the formula "security for autonomy". This explanation seems generally plausible, but it does not reveal exact benefits for a major power from establishing control over the weak states. This article intends to deepen our theoretical understanding of why states resort to asymmetric alliances and to test the significance of suggested propositions through an in-depth analysis of the Russian record of alliances. Russia built allied relations with several neighbors but does not extend similar mechanisms to partners in other geographic areas. This policy is puzzling, since it comes into dissonance with the foreign policy stance that international security and global order should be built on the principle of the indivisibility of security and inclusive international institutions. In its foreign policy discourse Russia strongly condemns closed formats with limited participation. The study solves two interrelated problems. First, it helps to deepen understanding of Russian foreign policy strategy and the role of various instruments of military-political cooperation in ensuring national interests. Secondly, it allows to test the provisions of the theory of asymmetric alliances, assessing its applicability to a hard case. The article reveals Russia's sensitivity to direct and opportunity costs as well as to potential risks of binding security commitments. However, it relies on asymmetric alliances with neighboring countries to reap the benefits of increasing power projection opportunities, legitimizing its foreign policy initiatives, limiting freedom of maneuver for its competitors, and stabilizing its strategic surrounding. The Russian experience of building relations with allies differs significantly from the American one, which, due to the scale of the US alliance network, is often presented as a model one. Nevertheless, it is quite consistent with the provisions of the theory of asymmetric alliances.

The article examines the impact of technological changes on the risks of military clashes between states. Currently, experts express increasing concerns about the destabilizing effect of new weapons (including anti-missile and anti-satellite weapons, hypersonic missiles, autonomous lethal systems, and artificial intelligence). These assessments are rarely based on solid theoretical foundations. The author seeks to fill this gap, arguing that the emergence of new weapons has a negative impact on international stability, and this effect is weakly related to the specific characteristics of underline technologies. The theory of technological uncertainty offers an alternative to the offense-defense balance theory. The latter developed since the 1970s, but its validity is questionable. The theory of technological uncertainty attributes the destabilizing effect of weapons to the divergence of states' perceptions of the balance of powers, to the hyped expectations regarding the ability to compensate quantitative limitations with qualitative superiority, to the alarmistic sense of closing windows of opportunities and growing vulnerabilities. The article tests the theory against the historical record of military clashes in Europe from the end of the 18th to the middle of the 20th centuries, as well as the crises between superpowers during the Cold War. The empirical cases are selected in order to cover the period marked by the intensification of qualitative arms races between states. In addition, it is also the period most often used to substantiate the offense-defense balance theory. The history of the last two and a half centuries provides a solid foundation for the theory of technological uncertainty. All instances of large-scale military clashes were preceded by significant technological changes, while peace fell on periods of technological stagnation. The author addresses the policy implications of the theory for the discussions on emerging weapons in the 2010s and 2020s. The study confirms that concerns regarding their destabilizing effect are justified, but for the different reasons from those put forward by most analysts. A somewhat optimistic caveat to its conclusions is the fact that currently emerging weapons are at various stages of development. The greatest likelihood of military clashes corresponds to the overlap of several technological uncertainties. Therefore, an increase in the time lag between introduction of various arms can mitigate destabilizing effect.

The article aims to assess current trends in the evolution of Russian, Chinese and American standing in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). This body as the most representative international body with wide thematical mandate enables to assess correlation in voting patterns of major powers and other participants of international community. Therefore, commonality of positions could be used as an indicator of positive recognition of national policy by UN Member-States. Such recognition could become a source of international legitimation for a strategy of a major power in global politics. The article starts with representing the key trend towards greater rivalry among major powers since the early 2010s. It claims that this competition to a large extent is exercised in institutionalized forums. It then examines an institutional mandate and operational dynamics of UNGA. After that it engages in descriptive statistical analysis of voting record in this body from its 60th to 71st sessions.The study demonstrates the rise of unfavorable trends for Russia and China in UNGA. Their positions receive lower levels of overall support from the whole population of UN Member-States. The same trends could be observed within BRICS and among their respective regional partners. The United States, on the contrary, improved their positions in the UNGA throughout the 2010s. This task was simplified by an extremely low base level of correlation in voting between Washington and other states. The administration of Barack Obama was especially successful in consolidation of major developed countries around the United States. However, due to the widespread skepticism towards the UN in the American political elite, there are no guarantees that the United States will be able to preserve increased level of convergence of political positions with other states in future.

The article draws a comparison between Russian official and expert foreign policy discourses, focusing on representations of the power balance and relations between major states as the defining features of international system. The author attempts to identify actual and potential contribution of academics in the Russian foreign policy thinking. Conceptual documents and programme statements of national leadership elevate the notion of 'polycentric world' as a value in itself, which guides national actions on international arena. Although, until the late 2000s its rise was perceived as a welcome, but remote prospect, since the U.S. failures in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as global financial crisis expectations regarding it construction increased. They are accompanied, however, by a more critical appraisal of the concept. The mainstream Russian expert community shares normative appreciation of the polycentric global system as an intrinsic good. It also nourishes expectations of its emergence with almost inevitable certainty. Most of the time, it does not take into account concerns incorporated in the Western IR theories, regarding destabilizing effect of competition between multiple centers of power. The article demonstrates that both Russian political leadership and expert community perceive polycentric system as an international 'great power concert', which is just one and relatively rare form of it. It requires not only virtual parity in capabilities of several players, but also the lack of serious disputes among them. Meanwhile, in the Russia academic community there is a place for a critical tradition, which associates current decentralization of the international system with its chaotization and weakening governance. In recent years this approach gains additional prominence. However, the Russian debates on global order lacks more elaborated discussion regarding sources of power in international system as well as explanation of the binding ties, which would facilitate creation of concert rather than competition among emerging powers.