Suchergebnisse

The paper begins with an overview of contemporary liberal-egalitarian theories in order to show the diversity among different understandings of justice. Then, the paper draws a borderline between luck egalitarianism (Arneson, G. A. Cohen, Roemer) and a pro-democratic, relational egalitarianism (Rawls, J. Cohen, Anderson, Barry) that focuses on the society's structure, i.e. the production of its inner relations. The following part introduces the idea of reflective equilibrium and its theoretical benefits in terms of 'de-metaphysised' ethics. Furthermore, this part elaborates Dworkin's liberal principle of justice as the basis of his liberal moral doctrine. Finally, the paper shows that a 'de-metaphysised' ethics could not be equated with the conception of justice as mutual advantage, and neither is it lost in an Archimedean skepticism. By referring to Barry's work, the paper elaborates the idea of justice as impartiality through the debate between moral objectivism and skepticism. The paper ends with synthesising a conclusion of the previous three parts. Also, it defines justice as implied by Rawls' liberal egalitarianism. Ultimately, the paper identifies the need for further research of the topic that would elaborate and answer the questions highlighted by this paper. Adapted from the source document.