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Unlike for the green party family, no empirically backed scholarly consensus exists about the grievances mobilized by populist right parties in Western Europe. To the contrary, three competing grievance mobilization models can be distinguished in the existing literature. These models focus on grievances arising from economic changes, political elitism and corruption, and immigration. This study discusses these three grievance mobilization models and tests them on comparable cross-sectional survey data for all seven relevant countries using multinomial probit analysis. The study finds that no populist right party performed well in elections around 2002 without mobilizing grievances over immigration. However, it finds several examples of populist right parties experiencing electoral success without mobilizing grievances over economic changes or political elitism and corruption. This study therefore solves a long-standing disagreement in the literature by comprehensively showing that only the appeal on the immigration issue unites all successful populist right parties. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright 2008.]

Unlike for the green party family, no empirically backed scholarly consensus exists about the grievances mobilized by populist right parties in Western Europe. To the contrary, three competing grievance mobilization models can be distinguished in the existing literature. These models focus on grievances arising from economic changes, political elitism and corruption, and immigration. This study discusses these three grievance mobilization models and tests them on comparable cross-sectional survey data for all seven relevant countries using multinomial probit analysis. The study finds that no populist right party performed well in elections around 2002 without mobilizing grievances over immigration. However, it finds several examples of populist right parties experiencing electoral success without mobilizing grievances over economic changes or political elitism and corruption. This study therefore solves a long-standing disagreement in the literature by comprehensively showing that only the appeal on the immigration issue unites all successful populist right parties.

Radical Right Parties: Voters and Parties in the Electoral
Market, Pippa Norris, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005,
pp. 349.Voting Radical Right in Western Europe, Terri E. Givens,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 178The growing importance of immigration politics in Western Europe
during the past two decades and the connected rise of radical right
parties have justifiably received much scholarly attention. While a first
generation of scholars treating this phenomenon were mostly concerned with
the social bases for the growing political influence of such parties,
recent studies have begun to emphasize the importance of purely political
factors, such as institutional frameworks and strategic party competition.
The books on this topic by Norris and Givens are two of the most prominent
accounts in this second generation of studies.

Abstract.  The two occupational groups most likely to vote for populist right parties in Western Europe in the 1990s also disagree the most over issues relating to the economic dimension of politics. The two groups were: blue‐collar workers – who support extensive state intervention in the economy – and owners of small businesses – who are against such state intervention. Proponents of economic realignment theories have held that both groups voted for the populist right because their economic preferences became aligned in recent decades. This article analyzes more detailed comparative data than has previously been available in the two cases held to be most propitious for the realignment hypotheses – France and Denmark – and finds strong evidence against them. The key mechanism for bringing together voters who disagree on state intervention in the economy is the populist right's appeal on issues cross‐cutting the economic dimension, and these voters' willingness to grant such issues pre‐eminence over economic ones. As a result, it is argued, populist right parties in Western Europe are limited by or vulnerable to the salience of the economic dimension.

Radical Right Parties (RRPs) consistently attract more male than female voters. Puzzlingly, there is no equally consistent gender difference in policy preferences on the main issues of these parties – immigration and minority integration policies. Indeed, in some countries, for instance the UK, women have as restrictive immigration policy preferences as men, but are still less likely to vote for RRPs. This article proposes a novel answer to this gender gap puzzle that emphasizes the normative conflicts about prejudice and discrimination that surround RRPs across Europe. It uses representative survey data to show, for the first time, that women are more likely than men to be motivated to control prejudice, and that this difference in motivations has political consequences. More specifically, the study demonstrates that the higher prevalence of internal motivation to control prejudice among women accounts for the gender gap in voting for RRPs that become trapped in conflicts over discrimination and prejudice. Voting patterns for RPPs that have been able to defuse normative concerns about prejudice, such as the Progress Party currently in government in Norway, are different.