Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Content -- Challenges in health care financing and provision -- Ageing populations: More care or just later care? -- Comment on Christiansen, Lauridsen and Bech: Ageing populations: More care or just later care? -- Lifestyle, health and costs - what does available evidence suggest? -- Comment on Bolin: Lifestyle, health and costs - What does available evidence suggest? -- The economics of long-term care: A survey -- Comment on Cremer, Pestieau and Ponthiere: The economics of long-term care: A survey -- The role of primary health care in controlling the cost of specialist health care* -- Comment on Beales and Smith: The role of primary health care in controlling the cost of specialist health care -- Payments in support of effective primary care for chronic conditions -- Comment on Ellis and Ash: Payment in support of effective primary care for chronic conditions -- An economic assessment of price rationing versus non-price rationing of health care* -- Comment on Siciliani: An economic assessment of price rationing versus non-price rationing of health care -- Should pharmaceutical costs be curbed? -- Comment on Brekke, Dalen and Strøm: Should pharmaceutical costs be curbed? -- Productivity differences in Nordic hospitals: Can we learn from Finland? -- Comment on Rehnberg and Häkkinen: Productivity differences in Nordic hospitals: Can we learn from Finland?.

Genetic insurance can deal with the negative effects of genetic testing on insurance coverage and income distribution when the insurer has access to information about test status. Hence, efficient testing is promoted. When information about prevention and test status is private, two types of social inefficiencies may occur; genetic testing may not be done when it is socially efficient and genetic testing may be done although it is socially inefficient. The first type of inefficiency is shown to be likely for consumers with compulsory insurance only, while the second type of inefficiency is more likely for those who have supplemented the compulsory insurance with substantial voluntary insurance. This second type of inefficiency is more important the less effective prevention is. It is therefore a puzzle that many countries have imposed strict regulation on the genetic information insurers have access to. A reason may be that genetic insurance is not yet a political issue, and the advantage of shared genetic information is therefore not transparent.

AbstractIn Norway, municipalities have economic incentives for choosing residential care in nursing homes for high‐income clients and home‐based care for low‐income clients. Using a three‐year panel, 2007‐2009, on 427 municipalities we provide an analysis of the effect of the Norwegian long‐term care (LTC) financing system on the composition of LTC services at the municipality level. Our main result is that the composition of service is determined by local government revenue and local need for LTC services. We cannot identify an effect of average income among older people in a municipality regarding the balance between home‐based care and nursing home care. Hence, the results do not provide evidence of a service distortion.

Background: General practice systems in the Nordic countries share certain common features. The sector is based on the Nordic model of a tax-financed supply of services with a political objective of equal access for all. The countries also share the challenges of increased political expectations to deliver primary prevention and increased workload as patients from hospital care are discharged earlier. However, within this common framework, primary care is organized differently. This is particularly in relation to the private-public mix, remuneration systems and the use of financial and non-financial incentives. Objective: The objective of this paper is to compare the differences and similarities in primary care among the Nordic countries, to create a mapping of the future plans and reforms linked to remuneration and incentives schemes, and to discuss the pros and cons for these plans with reference to the literature. An additional objective is to identify gaps in the literature and future research opportunities. Results/Conclusions: Despite the many similarities within the Nordic health care systems, the primary care sectors function under highly different arrangements. Most important are the differences in the gate-keeping function, private versus salaried practices, possibilities for corporate ownership, skill-mix and the organisational structure. Current reforms and political agendas appear to focus on the side effects of the individual countries' specific systems. For example, countries with salaried systems with geographical responsibility are introducing incentives for private practice and more choices for patients. Countries with systems largely based on private practice are introducing more monitoring and public regulation to control budgets. We also see that new governments tends to bring different views on the future organisation of primary care, which provide considerable political tension but few actual changes. Interestingly, Sweden appears to be the most innovative in relation to introducing new incentive schemes, perhaps because decisions are made at a more decentralised level.Published: April 2016.

This Volume focuses on human capital and health behavior. Content is based on an International symposium on Human Capital and Health Behavior, held by The Centre for Health Economics at the University of Gothenburg. Content will cover both theoretical and empirical aspects of the topic.

Human capital is embodied in human beings. It embraces the individual's capacity to perform and enjoy activities that provide money and/or psychic income. Health behaviour affects human capital and is itself affected by the individual's human capital. This volume consists of original theoretical and empirical contributions to our knowledge of the interdependence between Human Capital and Health Behaviour.