Information, social networks and interest-based voting: consequences for distributive politics
In: Welfare Societies working paper 6
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In: Welfare Societies working paper 6
In: Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
World Affairs Online
In: Cambridge studies in comparative politics
In: Cambridge studies in comparative politics
In: Discussion papers 96-315
In: Beyond Varieties of Capitalism, S. 278-302
In: Social Democracy in Neoliberal Times, S. 253-275
In: The New Politics of the Welfare State, S. 45-79
In: Public choice, Band 99, Heft 3-4, S. 237
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: International organization, Band 53, Heft 3, S. 629-629
ISSN: 1531-5088
In: International organization, Band 53, Heft 3, S. 629
ISSN: 0020-8183
In: Public choice, Band 99, Heft 3, S. 237-258
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Public choice, Band 101, Heft 3, S. 285-306
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: British journal of political science, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 31-61
ISSN: 0007-1234
The political and economic couplings between wage bargaining institutions and macro-economic policy regimes are explored in this article. It is argued that in advanced industrialized democracies with well-organized unions and employers' associations, macro-economic performance (especially unemployment) is the outcome of an interaction between the centralization of the wage bargaining system and the monetary policy regime. Thus, a decentralized bargaining system in which the government is credibly committed to a non-accommodating monetary policy rule poses an institutional alternative to a centralized mode of wage regulation where the government enjoys macro-economic policy flexibility. Based on time-series data from ten highly organized market economies, I show that both of these institutional 'equilibria' produce superior employment performance, but also that the two systems are associated with very different distributional outcomes, and that they are supported by different coalitions of organized interests. In addition to predicting economic outcomes, the proposed model provides a theoretical framework for analysing institutional change in wage bargaining systems and in macro-economic policy regimes. (British Journal of Political Research / FUB)
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In: International organization, Band 52, Heft 3, S. 469-504
ISSN: 0020-8183
Der Artikel beschäftigt sich theoretisch und empirisch mit den Auswirkungen der Geldpolitik auf die Arbeitslosigkeit in Abhängigkeit der verschiedenen nationalen Tarifsysteme. der Autor konstatiert einen generellen Beschäftigungseffekt geldpolitischer Maßnahmen, von Ländern mit stark dezentralisierter Lohnverhandlungsstruktur einmal abgesehen. Tarifsysteme mit mittlerer Zentralisationsstruktur weisen beieiner regelgebundenen Geldpolitik die höchsten Beschäftigungseffekte auf, bei stark zentralisierten Systemen hat eine restrektive Geldpolitik nur geringe Beschäftigungswirkungen. Das Modell, das der Autor entwirft, gibt Hinweise auf die optimale Ausgestaltung von Zentralbanken und Tarifsystemen. (swp-clv)
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