Suchergebnisse

This book is concerned with the commercial exploitation of armed conflict; it is about money, war, atrocities and economic actors, about the connections between them, and about responsibility. It aims to clarify the legal framework that defines these connections and gives rise to criminal or, in some instances, civil responsibility, referring both to mechanisms for international criminal justice, such as the International Criminal Court, and domestic systems. It considers which economic actors among individuals, businesses, governments and States should be held accountable and before which forum. Additionally, it addresses the question of how to recover illegally acquired profits and redirect them to benefit the victims of war. The chapters shine a critical light on the options provided by a network of laws to ensure that the 'great industrialists' of our time, who find economic opportunities in the war-ravaged lives of others, are unable to pursue those opportunities with impunity.

Rules of procedure define the relationship between the needs of effective enforcement of international criminal law—grounded in the interest of combating impunity—and the individual rights of those affected by the process. It has been said that criminal procedure is the "most vulnerable part of a liberal legal system." It is vulnerable in part because it is adaptable. It can be adapted to promote fairness in the interactions between an individual and the state, or it can be manipulated to facilitate abuses by those in power. A fair system charts a course for the discovery of the truth but recognizes that this destination cannot be reached at all costs. For example, confessions obtained under torture are inadmissible under international rules of procedure and evidence.

Legal regulation of the arms trade has been slow to evolve despite the promotion after World War I of the idea that, for the sake of peace, arms exports should be limited and despite the condemnation on moral grounds of private arms traders who helped to rouse conflict. Article 26 of the United Nations Charter tasked the Security Council with initiating plans for the establishment of a system to regulate armaments in order to promote peace and security and to restrict the diversion of the world's resources to military expenditure. The extent of this "diversion" of resources is reflected in the estimate that the total value of the global arms trade in 2013 was at least $85 billion. The United Nations' efforts, which included the public Register of Conventional Arms and a program of action relating to the illicit trade in small arms, culminated in the adoption of the long-awaited Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) on April 2, 2013, which enters into force on December 24, 2014.

Genocide has occurred throughout history and the task of prevention may sometimes appear futile in spite of the clear obligation to prevent in the 1948 Genocide Convention. Taking Raoul Wallenberg's inspiration to the collective consciousness as a backdrop, this article aims to explore the different accountability mechanisms that give strength to the legal obligation to prevent genocide. The situation in Sudan and South Sudan provides a focal point as it tests the international community's resolve to act to prevent future instances of genocide within the parameters of the responsibility to protect. In relation to Darfur, individual responsibility of senior leaders has taken centre-stage, but this should not divert the spotlight from other accountability options focused on the state and international organisations. An attempt is made to connect the different aspects of the legal regime with reference to the goal of ensuring accountability if prevention fails in the context of Sudan and South Sudan.

In its decision on assigned counsel's motion for withdrawal in the Milosevic case, the trial chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) observed "that assignment of counsel against the wishes of the accused is a developing area of the law both in national and international jurisdictions." This area of law witnessed rapid development by international criminal tribunals in the latter half of 2004.

Conventional wisdom holds that a lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a client. Perhaps surprisingly, several of the highest profile accused persons before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have received some form of legal training. Less surprisingly, it is precisely those accused who are asserting a right to self-representation. Slobodan Miloševic, for example, has a degree in law and by the end of his trial will have earned himself several years of advocacy experience. Vojislav Šešelj, a professor of law at Belgrade University, was somewhat affronted by the judge's suggestion that he should request legal assistance and exclaimed in open court, "I have never met a better lawyer dian I am in my whole life." Are these accused fools to want to represent themselves? What about an accused with no legal experience at all who asserts this right in the face of charges of genocide and crimes against humanity? As one accused remarked when clarifying to the court that he did not wish to represent himself, "No. It would be insane if I did that …."