Suchergebnisse

Pt. 1. Administration, organization, and ethics. Mental health in corrections: a model for service delivery. Correctional mental health professionals. Correctional mental health ethics revisited -- Pt. 2. Services and programs. Basic mental health services: services and issues. Substance abuse treatment programs in prisons and jails. Managing and treating mentally disordered offenders in jails and prisons. Managing and treating female offenders. Treating and managing sexual offenders and predators. Identifying juvenile offenders with mental health disorders. Other special offender populations -- Pt. 3. Training and consultation. Staff services and programs. Staff training: multiple roles for mental health professionals. Mental health professionals as institutional consultants and problem solvers. Research-based practice in corrections: a selective review. A viable future for correctional mental health care.

AbstractThis paper develops a theory of the relationship between policy disasters and political institutions. Policy disasters, defined as avoidable, unintended extreme negative policy outcomes, are important political, and historical events above that receive relatively little attention from political scientists and scholars of public policy. Using the predictions of punctuated equilibrium theory, I argue that systems with higher error accumulation will experience more policy disasters. Systems with more veto players and weaker information flows will experience more policy disasters, but information flows will have a stronger impact than veto players. I test this theory using data on financial crises and natural and technological disasters across 70 countries over 60 years. I find strong evidence that systems with weaker information flows and more veto players tend to have greater policy disaster risk.

What is the relationship between the priorities expressed in party platforms before an election and the subsequent legislative agenda? The agenda setting literature often deemphasizes the role of political parties in agenda setting, instead focusing on the importance of problems bubbling up to the surface and demanding attention from policymakers. However, parties will often express different issue priorities during elections, and compete based on those priorities. If those promises are credible, voters should be able to choose between different sets of priorities during elections. The paper utilizes new data from the U.S. Policy Agendas Project and Wolbrecht on policy attention in U.S. party platforms to study the relationship between U.S. parties and legislative activities in Congress. A time-series cross-sectional analysis finds strong evidence to support the proposition that legislative agendas are influenced by the platform of the President's party in the short term, although the relationship differs for different types of agendas and by issue, and fades over time.

AbstractObjectiveIn 2020, for the first time, a VP candidate was a black woman of immigrant parentage. This article asks whether Kamala Harris' vice presidential candidacy may have motivated some white voters and especially those scoring high on racial resentment, anti‐immigrant attitudes, or sexism to vote for Trump instead of Biden.MethodsWe conducted an online priming experiment with non‐Hispanic white voters in August 2020, shortly after Harris was announced as the Democratic vice presidential nominee. Half of the samples were asked about their support for the president–vice presidential tickets, while the other half were asked only about support for a presidential candidate.ResultsOur results show that the Harris' selection may have affected vote choice by pushing many whites, especially among the most racially conservative whites into the Trump column. We find mixed results for anti‐immigrant attitudes and sexism.ConclusionWe conclude that one aspect of Harris' identity—race—dominated the minds of voters relative to other aspects of her identity.

This article examines the relationship between demand for expert information from members of the US Congress and increased issue salience in the public. As problems become salient, policymakers should seek out expert information to define problems and identify effective policy solutions to address those problems. Previous work on elite mass public representation and government problem solving has relied on public actions by elected officials to evaluate this relationship. We rely instead on new data on the policy content of privately requested reports from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) from 1997 to 2017. We find strong evidence that members consult experts when issues become salient, even when controlling for legislative agendas.

This book is well suited to readers dealing with correctional issues in today's complex global society. Given the task of providing adequate mental health care to the burgeoning U.S. prison population, including those thousands with serious mental illnesses who have defaulted from the nation's disjointed mental health systems, the book provides a consideration of approaches and ideas beyond those generated in the domestic academic-practitioner community, including the mental health concerns that transcend borders and national sovereignty. In this category are the treatment and management of te

AbstractWe examine the strategic use of contract and in‐house lobbyists by interest groups in response to shifting policy agendas. The role that lobbyists play in the policy process changes based on the policy agenda. Most of the time, subsystems manage small changes to public policy, rewarding actors with long‐term relationships. Organizations with a deep interest in the issue area maintain permanent lobbying presences, earning some degree of privilege over policymaking. However, when the broader macropolitical agenda lurches toward the issue, new participants become involved. New participants often lack the lobbying expertise of the in‐house lobbyists of established actors. Contract lobbyists play a critical role in providing spare capacity on‐demand, allowing participants not normally involved in subsystems to lobby. They also allow the best‐resourced actors, who may employ a long‐term lobbying presence, to further expand it when necessary. We test this theory using a new dataset of the lobbying content of 1,370,396 bill mentions in U.S. lobbying disclosure reports by 11,842 organizations from 2006 to 2016. We compare their policy agenda to that of the U.S. Congress. We find strong evidence that organizations hire contract lobbyists to respond to brief moments of agenda setting while permanent in‐house lobbyists have a more stable agenda.

Abstract
Passing out federal dollars to specific projects in particular districts had been a popular way for congressional leaders to build large bipartisan majorities for major bills since the very first meeting of Congress. By matching projects to districts, scholars have been able to systematically analyze which members were successful in getting their project funded. But for one year, though, the requests members submitted were never known. Using earmark requests data during the 111th Congress, we can know both the requests and the awards. Knowing the former changes our understanding of the latter. We find that the request process is largely driven by ideology, rather than electoral vulnerability. More moderate Republicans tended to seek more earmarks than their more conservative copartisans; some of whom completely opted out of the process. The effect was the opposite for Democrats, whose moderates requested fewer earmarks. When these requests are taken into consideration, the awarding process appears to be even less partisan than the raw data would suggest, confirming the bipartisan nature of the earmarking process.