Suchergebnisse

This contribution distinguishes two kinds of responsibility: the basic (or 'metaphysical') kind that we all inescapably have as functioning human beings; and the assignable (or 'political') kind that connects each of us with some particular tasks, and not with others. Having explored some differences between the two, and in particular the role of law's authority in connection with each, the discussion turns to the negligence standard, especially but not only as it figures in tort law. Recently, several philosophers have attempted to find a role for the negligence standard in the metaphysics of basic responsibility. This contribution resists that development and stands up for the traditional lawyer's view that the negligence standard belongs to the pliable politics of assignable responsibility. Basic responsibility, it is argued, is fundamentally strict.

Even though they are immersed in sex-saturated society, millions of teens are pledging to remain virgins until their wedding night. How are evangelical Christians persuading young people to wait until marriage? Christine J. Gardner looks closely at the language of the chastity movement and discovers a savvy campaign that uses sex to "sell" abstinence. Drawing from interviews with evangelical leaders and teenagers, she examines the strategy to shift from a negative "just say no" approach to a positive one: "just say yes" to great sex within marriage. Making chastity sexy sheds new light on an a ...

AbstractLitigation by private parties is authorized by dozens of federal statutes, resulting in thousands of lawsuits every year. Recent scholarship has suggested that Congress authorizes litigation by private parties to enforce federal law in order to limit the ability of the president to influence enforcement. I argue, however, that the apparent influence of presidential partisanship on adoption of private enforcement regimes is spurious, resulting from the increased use of this enforcement mechanism beginning in the 1960s. Further, I show that presidents meaningfully influence the rate of private litigation. Specifically, for statutes with liberal policy goals, litigation rates are substantially higher when a Democratic president is in office and when agencies are more politicized. Therefore, if Congress desires to insulate policy from the president, private enforcement regimes are unlikely to be a useful policy tool.