Suchergebnisse

A defence of the rationality and rigour of the late Schelling's visionary philosophy of religionA major new effort to organise and evaluate Schelling's arguments for a Philosophy of Revelation and to demonstrate their importance for contemporary debates Finds in largely unexamined texts of the late Schelling new resources for critiquing rationalism, reductive naturalism, and posthumanism Will appeal to the many scholars in various fields working on political eschatology in the works of Benjamin, Taubes, Rosenzweig, Derrida, Žižek, Moltmann and Levinas Schelling's positive philosophy has long been recognised as the historical root of Marxism, existentialism, and other central trends in continental philosophy, but its main argument has never been fully elaborated as a tenable philosophical strategy for thinking Christianity forward into its future. According to McGrath, Schelling's late turn to speculative theological realism (the positive) is neither fideistic nor arbitrary, but rather the consequence of the free decision of the philosopher who has soberly assessed the results of logic, nature-philosophy and historical-critical and systematic theology

"The Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy is a major interpretive study of Heidegger's complex relationship to medieval philosophy. S.J. McGrath's contribution is historical and biographical as well as philosophical, examining how the enthusiastic defender of the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition became the great destroyer of metaphysical theology. This book provides an informative and comprehensive examination of Heidegger's changing approach to medieval sources - from the seminary studies of Bonaventure to the famous phenomenological destructions of medieval ontology."--Jacket

Annotation

AbstractHow do state legislatures use statutory language to control policy implementation by state agencies? In this article, I consider—in a specific policy area and time period—the extent to which this decision is affected by legislative anticipation of the likely actions of state courts. Previous literature has argued that the legislative use of statutory language to control bureaucrats varies with the availability of nonstatutory methods of control, but it does not explicitly consider the potential role of courts. My expectations are derived from a simple formal model of executive–legislative relations and are supported when I test them using data on the number of words added to a state's Medicaid laws from 1995 to 1996. In particular, I find that state legislatures write longer, more constraining, statutes when the likelihood that state courts intervene on their behalf is neither very high nor very low.

Oversight hearings should be an important congressional tool for controlling recalcitrant agencies, but it is not clear that this should always be equally true. The logic of principal‐agent models of legislative policy control implies that oversight might sometimes, but not always, be superfluous to said control. Here, I reintroduce oversight hearings to theories of policy control and argue that congressional committees conduct oversight hearings primarily as a response to the extent to which agencies have different policy preferences from them and as a function of their capacity to conduct hearings cheaply. I test these hypotheses using committee hearings data (PolicyAgendasProject) from both theU.S.House ofRepresentatives and theSenate from 1947 to 2006 and provide support for theoretical arguments about the institutional nature of legislative policymaking strategies and ultimately help clarify the role of oversight in legislative‐executive relations.

Initiated by a 1996 Georgia statute, "radical" civil service reform quickly swept the United States. This article explains the wax and eventual wane of state efforts to increase the number of at‐will employees at the expense of the population of fully protected merit system employees. Using an event history approach to explain this policy diffusion with state‐level variables, the author shows that electoral competition and gubernatorial powers are the most significant determinants of this kind of policy diffusion. Whereas previous literature concluded that these reforms ceased spreading because the new programs were failing to create the promised governmental efficiency, this article argues that the institutional conditions for these human resource management policies have been less propitious in recent years. The article signifies an important contribution in that it brings civil service reform back into the scope of policy diffusion literature and identifies political insights into a perpetually important question.