Suchergebnisse

Multistakeholder partnerships are characterized by institutional elements such as informality, voluntarism, and corporate partnerships which some commentators, like Nick Buxton, consider the "default mode of global decision-making." The rapid expansion and influence of multi-stakeholder partnerships have led some activists to argue that we are witnessing "The Great Takeover," in which elites promote multistakeholderism as a replacement for traditional intergovernmental multilateralism.
But how did multistakeholderism emerge within global governance? And is the future of multistakeholder global governance so certain?
In a recent article in the Review of International Political Economy, we approach this question historically by exploring the origins, development, and future of multi-stakeholderism in global governance.
The post Norms in a Post-Hegemonic World Order appeared first on Progress in Political Economy (PPE).

To what extent is neoliberal global economic governance transforming in a world where states play greater roles as promoters, supervisors and owners of capital? Do these transformations signal a potential paradigm shift? To answer these questions, we focus on global financial governance and the trade and investment regime. We analyse recent policy documents from the IMF, World Bank and WTO – the 'Unholy Trinity' of neoliberal global governance. Our analysis reveals a growing acceptance of state interventionism within and across these organizations. Although this accommodation is significant, we argue that it constitutes a limited transformation. We observe attempts to incorporate emerging state interventionist practices and state-owned entities into established governance arrangements in order to discipline, curtail and control them. We argue that this does not signify a shift towards post-neoliberal plurality within Western-dominated global economic governance, but rather a defensive, 'mutating neoliberalism' which seeks to incorporate depoliticized and commercially oriented state ownership into its mainframe.

AbstractThe proliferation of state and non‐state actors, along with increasing institutional complexity, has led to a qualitative shift in Global Development Governance (GDG) towards what we term 'GDG 2.0'. Realising accountability in this context presents challenges due to growing actor diversity, institutional plurality and a lack of formalised accountability structures. Building on the introduction to this special section, we explore the potential of 'forward‐looking' approaches to accountability, notably collective deliberation, learning and competition. Despite the importance of these mechanisms for GDG processes, conceptualising them as accountability tools may have limited gains and indeed reinforce the preferences of established actors, dilute useful monitoring approaches and divert attention from longstanding agendas. We argue that prioritising enabling environments for more circumscribed 'backward‐looking' accountability—with a focus on standard‐setting and monitoring—may be more feasible and effective towards holding decision‐makers to account within the GDG 2.0 context.