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Examining American foreign policy towards the Horn of Africa between 1945 and 1991, this book uses Ethiopia and Somalia as case studies to offer an evaluation of the decision-making process during the Cold War, and consider the impact that these decisions had upon subsequent developments both within the Horn of Africa and in the wider international context. The decision-making process is studied, including the role of the president, the input of his advisers and lower level officials within agencies such as the State Department and National Security Council, and the parts played by Congress, bureaucracies, public opinion, and other actors within the international environment, especially the Soviet Union, Ethiopia and Somalia. Jackson examines the extent to which influences exerted by forces other than the president affected foreign policy, and provides the first comprehensive analysis of American foreign policy towards Ethiopia and Somalia throughout the Cold War. This book offers a fresh perspective on issues such as globalism, regionalism, proxy wars, American aid programmes, anti-communism and human rights. It will be of great interest to students and academics in various fields, including American foreign policy, American Studies and Politics, the history of the Cold War, and the history of the Horn of Africa during the modern era.

Introduction: Cold War battleground -- The coming of the Cold War -- The United Nations and the Horn of Africa -- Forging the "special relationship" -- Self-determination and the New Frontier -- In the shadow of Vietnam -- Vital and peripheral interests -- Revolution in Ethiopia -- The era of the Vietnam syndrome -- The Ogaden War and the demise of détente -- Realignment and Reagan -- The end of the Cold War -- Somalia: from colonialism to terrorism

"This analysis of President Carter's foreign policy in the Horn of Africa demonstrates Carter's consistent approach to foreign affairs throughout his administration. It discusses the ways in which this policy dealt with such issues as human rights abuses, Cold War concerns including a strong Communist bloc presence, and the violation of international law"--Provided by publisher

"This analysis of President Carter's foreign policy in the Horn of Africa demonstrates Carter's consistent approach to foreign affairs throughout his administration. It discusses the ways in which this policy dealt with such issues as human rights abuses, Cold War concerns including a strong Communist bloc presence, and the violation of international law"--Provided by publisher

The failure of détente has been a popular theme among historians of American foreign policy, with opinions divided as to where the responsibility for this failure lies. A commonality among all points of view, however, is the importance of events in the third world, particularly in the "Arc of Crisis." One such event—the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia— prompted Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security advisor, to comment that détente was "buried" in the Ogaden. His point was that Carter's new approach to the cold war was put to the test during the Ogaden War, and there the policy's untenability was proven. The policy's failure, in turn, encouraged Soviet adventurism, which further alienated the American public from Carter's attempt to fight the cold war. Carter's policy eventually led to the withdrawal of the SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) Treaty and, as Brzezinski claimed, the collapse of détente. This article discusses Carter's foreign policy toward the Ogaden War, considers the accuracy of Brzezinski's claim, and reaches conclusions regarding the role of the Carter administration in the demise of détente.

The failure of detente has been a popular theme among historians of American foreign policy, with opinions divided as to where the responsibility for this failure lies. A commonality among all points of view, however, is the importance of events in the third world, particularly in the 'Arc of Crisis.' One such event-the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia- prompted Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security advisor, to comment that detente was 'buried' in the Ogaden. His point was that Carter's new approach to the cold war was put to the test during the Ogaden War, and there the policy's untenability was proven. The policy's failure, in turn, encouraged Soviet adventurism, which further alienated the American public from Carter's attempt to fight the cold war. Carter's policy eventually led to the withdrawal of the SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) Treaty and, as Brzezinski claimed, the collapse of detente. This article discusses Carter's foreign policy toward the Ogaden War, considers the accuracy of Brzezinski's claim, and reaches conclusions regarding the role of the Carter administration in the demise of detente. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright The American Academy of Political and Social Science.]

Successful rhetoric, it has been argued, comes from an effective fusion of ethos, pathos and logos, combined with style and delivery (Foss: 2012). While Jimmy Carter may be respected for his post-presidential career, he is not renowned as a great president and this chapter will consider the extent to which his perceived failures can be attributed to his rhetorical style. In particular, we will focus upon three major speeches delivered by Carter during his administration: his inaugural address of January 1977, the Crisis of Confidence speech of 1979, and the State of the Union Address in 1980. Although the content of each speech accurately reflected the relevant context, the response of the American public was markedly different due to rhetoric. The pathos apparent in Carter's inaugural address, delivered with his genuine, personal and informal style, resonated with a nation traumatised by the tragedies and scandals associated with Vietnam and Watergate. However, as the context changed, Carter's informality and personal appeal no longer captivated public attention in the way that it once had. The content of Carter's speeches reflected the tougher approach to both the economy and foreign policy that the public demanded, but he was unable to deliver his message convincingly. Unable to adapt his style and delivery to the changing times, Carter's pathos appeared inappropriate and ethos and logos ineffective by the final year of his administration. Ultimately, Carter proved that successful rhetoric requires a combination of context, content and style, and his inability to consistently produce that fusion contributed to subsequent negative evaluations of his presidency.