Suchergebnisse

This book investigates the options, the debates and the ensuing policies of the fledgling Russian government. It examines the evolution of policy from the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 until the Presidential elections in June 1996.Analysing Russia's actions in the context of contemporary foreign policy theory, Nicole J. Jackson discusses and compares three key conflicts: the separatist war between Moldova and Transdniestria; the separatist war between Georgia and Abkhazia and the civil war in Tajikistan. It will be of interest to students and researchers of international re.

This paper analyses the Canadian government's foreign and security policy responses to Russian disinformation in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian war. It asks whether, how, and why the government has securitised the "crisis of Russian disinformation." The paper first briefly reviews literature on the Copenhagen's School's "securitisation" theory and how it has been used to explain responses to other crises. It then adopts the framework to contextualise the Canadian federal government's official rhetoric, and then to categorise government policies and actions. The sources consulted include government actors' reports and stated intentions and policies from 2022 to 2024. Adopting a securitisation framework reveals that Russian disinformation has been rhetorically securitised by government actors as an existential threat to national security and democratic integrity which requires urgent action. Within a context of cascading risks, the government has taken a range of distinct yet reinforcing policies and actions, some more comprehensive than others. The paper argues that together this "pervasive rhetorical securitisation" and "ad hoc practical securitisation" comprise the Canadian government's ongoing process of partial securitisation. This process is legitimising different methods of governance: security and warfare communications (to address threats to national defence and security), democratic resilience (to address threats to democracy), and, most controversially, blocking and sanctioning (to signal discontent to the Russian regime). The analysis further reveals that each approach has different benefits and limits. The paper concludes that the securitisation process is incomplete compared to the government's rhetoric, with no over-arching organisation or strategy. It outlines implications for future research.

In recent years, governments have considered how to respond to "disinformation." However, there is little academic literature on Canada's response in the area of security and foreign policy. This paper addresses this gap by analyzing how and why Canadian government foreign and security actors have "securitized" foreign disinformation. It argues that, since 2014, they have increased awareness about disinformation and transformed it into a matter of "security" through rhetoric and discursive framing, as well as stated policy intentions and actions. This has occurred in response to perceived threats, but without coherent policy. The findings suggest that challenges are linked to persistent difficulties in defining and understanding disinformation. The result has been fragmented actions, some of which may legitimate actions that deviate from "normal political processes." The implications are that definitional challenges need to be addressed, the role of security actors assessed, and a clearly articulated and holistic strategy drawn.

Today Russia poses significant challenges that require sophisticated responses from both Canada and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), yet more research is needed on almost all aspects of policy development. Academic experts on NATO and Russia could contribute significantly to this process. To this end, collaboration and engagement among those experts with each other's literature would be highly beneficial. Appropriate methodologies must be developed to answer questions about Russia's specific intentions, test the assumptions upon which NATO and Canada's policies are founded, and discover and respond to the root causes of Russia's discontent. Policy options should be based on detailed knowledge of global security dynamics, as well as high-quality analysis about Russia's rhetoric and its varied use of hard, soft, and sharp soft power in regional and global cases. A research network on these topics could help decision-makers respond to these complex developments by approaching them through "the eyes of our adversaries," clarifying the big picture of hybrid warfare and also the micro-level details.

"Drogenhandel und Terrorismus sind zentrale Bedrohungen für Zentralasien. Um sie zu bekämpfen, suchen die Regierungen die Zusammenarbeit in der Schanghaier Organisation für Zusammenarbeit und der Organisation des Vertrags über kollektive Sicherheit. Doch eine effektive Kooperation, die über symbolische Militärmanöver hinausgeht, scheitert daran, dass die Machthaber einander misstrauen, die Bedrohungslage unterschiedlich wahrnehmen und bilateralen Beziehungen den Vorzug geben. Die Staaten sind Teil des Problems: Eine repressive Innenpolitik der Regime schürt islamischen Extremismus und Korruption. Die Unterwanderung durch organisiertes Verbrechen lähmt die staatlichen Behörden." (Autorenreferat)

This article offers a constructive critique of the Copenhagen School's 'securitization' framework by applying it in an analysis of the role of international organizations seeking to counter the trafficking of narcotics and persons in post-Soviet Central Asia. The study discovers common and divergent motivations that explain international attempts and failures to securitize. In the case of human trafficking, significant clashes created obstacles to international efforts. In both cases, international organizations advanced their agendas through the language of security, but also through institutional changes and increased resource allocation. These processes led to the adoption of mostly traditional security strategies. The analysis concludes that although the securitization framework makes significant contributions as an analytical tool, its definition is too vague and it is too narrow in focus. 'Security dichotomies' need to be taken into account in a comprehensive analysis of why international attempts to securitize issues sometimes succeed and sometimes fail. The influence of rhetoric on the development of policy should also be taken into account if the securitization framework is to provide a complete understanding of the issues or be useful for policymakers.