Suchergebnisse

The Current State of Public Sector Economics -- P.M.Jackson Taxation, Public Choice and Public Spending -- P.M.Jackson Income Taxation, Income Support Policies and Work Incentives in the UK -- I.Walker The Economics of Taxpayer Compliance -- D.J.Pyle Preference Revelation and Public Goods -- R.R.Barnett Public Choice: An Introductory Survey -- V.Borooah Issues in Multi Level Government -- D.King Public Finance in Developing Countries -- R.Bird The Distribution and Redistribution of Income -- P.J.Lambert Asymmetry of Information in Public Finance -- R.Levaggi.

This paper takes stock of our understanding of the "architecture" of public sector resource allocation mechanisms. It is a speculative venture & provides a framework for thinking about issues rather than a completed theoretical model. The concept of architecture is borrowed from the design sciences & is used to explore the conditions of performativity within networks of relational contracts. The age-old question of markets vs hierarchy is too simplistic. Instead, the search is for optimal complex network relationships that are based on cooperation & participation rather than competition & control. Within these networks the public sector, it is argued, has a new role of acting as a broker in the creation of value. Judging the public sector's relative effectiveness in the creation of value also requires closer attention to be given to the context within which public sector managers take decisions. In particularj, it is necessary to acknowledge that they confront the "wicked" problems of society that the electorate demand to be solved, which gives renewed interest in the notion of market failure. 1 Table, 1 Figure, 80 References. Adapted from the source document.