Suchergebnisse

The natural resource sector has been subject to various nationalistic interventions by governments around the world, especially during the global commodity boom from the 2000s. Such interventions have taken different forms, ranging from reforms of mining tax regimes, the renegotiation of mining and of oil and gas contracts deemed unfavorable to the state, and the creation of new state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the revival of old ones, as well as mandatory state shareholdings. Focusing on the coal sector, the thesis examines Tanzania's puzzling return to a state-led development and resource nationalism through its revival of SOEs in its attempts to reverse the trajectory of several decades of neoliberalism and domination by foreign multinationals in the mining sector. Specifically, the thesis draws on qualitative fieldwork and analytical insights from political economy to analyse: 1) how the state's engagement in the mining sector and resource nationalism has evolved over time; 2) the role of the re-emergence of resource nationalism in shaping the state's capacity and engagement in the coal sector; and 3) how re-emerging resource nationalism and the changing role of revived SOEs are affecting relations between the state and local populations. The thesis find that state's engagement in the mineral sector over the years has been shaped by three cross-cutting factors, namely changing ideas on mining governance among the ruling elites; the power relations between the state and transnational actors, particularly the power of private capital by foreign mining companies; intensifying electoral competition, which has fueled resource-nationalist sentiments among Tanzanians, and the fact that successive governments have combined both liberal incentives and state-centric approaches to ensure effective state engagement in the mining sector. Despite much rhetoric about increasing state control of the coal sector by involving revived SOEs, the revival of SOEs and the re-emerging of resource nationalism in Tanzania's coal sector was achieved by increasing the ties with and dependence on foreign mining companies. Despite policy and regulatory reforms and the participation of revived SOEs, the Tanzanian state's ability to translate resource-nationalist sentiments in the coal sector into viable policies and strategies has been hindered by Tanzania's historical dependence on foreign capital and SOEs' limited financial and technical capacity. At the sub-national level, the thesis shows how claims to resource nationalism and the state's direct involvement in coal extraction through revived SOEs poses conflicts over the double role of the state. Statist intervention in the coal sector relied on a resource nationalist ideology and framing of coal extraction as a project of national importance, thereby fast-tracking consultation and limiting the participation of the local population, resulting in conflicts between the state and local populations. The thesis contributes to scholarship on resource nationalism in Africa, which has so far been dominated by studies from Latin America. The thesis also explores the implications of the findings and the future of SOEs and resource nationalism beyond the Tanzanian case.

This paper focuses on how the re-emergence of the state in Tanzania's coal sector is affecting relations between investors and local populations. Recent research on large-scale investments in natural resources has mainly focused on the state as an investment facilitator. Its duty to protect local rights has also been emphasised. The role of the state as an investor in its own right, which is currently on the increase due to growing resource nationalism, has received much less attention. The paper adopts the political economy of land and natural resource investments as an analytical framework to examine community–investor relations in Tanzania's coal sector, which has recently seen the re-emergence of SOEs as shareholders in mining investments. The paper makes two contributions. First, it reviews the historical relationship between the state and local populations over the years and shows how it is influencing present-day relations between them. Secondly, it documents expressions and instances of local dissent towards investors and analyses empirical changes in contemporary investment dynamics in the context of remerging SOEs, showing how local deals change over time, as SOEs learn from changes in local-level politics and from their foreign partners. It finds that, in respect of investments in the coal sector involving SOEs, securing community consent is not the main priority for investors at the start of the investment cycle, where investments are framed as national projects. Efforts to reach a 'local exchange deal' are more likely to be made when resource extraction is already taking place and conflicts have arisen that have to be resolved. By incorporating the state as an investor, the paper offers lessons for SOEs in re-thinking their strategies as they approach new projects at a time when revived SOEs are increasingly being tasked with ambitious extraction projects. ; This paper focuses on how the re-emergence of the state in Tanzania's coal sector is affecting relations between investors and local populations. Recent research on large-scale investments in natural resources has mainly focused on the state as an investment facilitator. Its duty to protect local rights has also been emphasised. The role of the state as an investor in its own right, which is currently on the increase due to growing resource nationalism, has received much less attention. The paper adopts the political economy of land and natural resource investments as an analytical framework to examine community–investor relations in Tanzania's coal sector, which has recently seen the re-emergence of SOEs as shareholders in mining investments. The paper makes two contributions. First, it reviews the historical relationship between the state and local populations over the years and shows how it is influencing present-day relations between them. Secondly, it documents expressions and instances of local dissent towards investors and analyses empirical changes in contemporary investment dynamics in the context of remerging SOEs, showing how local deals change over time, as SOEs learn from changes in local-level politics and from their foreign partners. It finds that, in respect of investments in the coal sector involving SOEs, securing community consent is not the main priority for investors at the start of the investment cycle, where investments are framed as national projects. Efforts to reach a 'local exchange deal' are more likely to be made when resource extraction is already taking place and conflicts have arisen that have to be resolved. By incorporating the state as an investor, the paper offers lessons for SOEs in re-thinking their strategies as they approach new projects at a time when revived SOEs are increasingly being tasked with ambitious extraction projects.

This paper analyses the introduction and expansion of health insurance schemes in Tanzania. Health insurances were introduced around year 2000 as part of a more general health reform process aimed at improving access to health services. The paper argues that the health insurances were driven by a policy coalition of bureaucrats and transnational actors, who, inspired by international trends, framed reforms as a way for the ruling party to live up to one of its core priorities since independence, namely, improved and, eventually, universal access to health services. The introduction of insurances was expected to help mobilise funds and improve the working of the health care system for this purpose. However, judged by their modest design and slow implementation, the ruling political elite remained ambigous about health insurances. Politically, a fast rollout was perceived to be risky. Similar political considerations may explain the reluctance to expand health insurance coverage through a mandatory scheme that bureaucrats and development partners have propagated recently. The rejection of the initial design for such a scheme came as a surprise to the policy coalition, which did not enjoy the same access to key decisionmakers as in the past. Concurrently, and driven by increased electoral competition, the ruling party has increasingly focused on improving access through the expansion of physical health infrastructure. This has the additional advantage of being highly visible among the rural majority of the population, who overwhelmingly vote Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). This is our second paper on social protection in Tanzania. ; This paper analyses the introduction and expansion of health insurance schemes in Tanzania. Health insurances were introduced around year 2000 as part of a more general health reform process aimed at improving access to health services. The paper argues that the health insurances were driven by a policy coalition of bureaucrats and transnational actors, who, inspired by international trends, framed reforms as a way for the ruling party to live up to one of its core priorities since independence, namely, improved and, eventually, universal access to health services. The introduction of insurances was expected to help mobilise funds and improve the working of the health care system for this purpose. However, judged by their modest design and slow implementation, the ruling political elite remained ambigous about health insurances. Politically, a fast rollout was perceived to be risky. Similar political considerations may explain the reluctance to expand health insurance coverage through a mandatory scheme that bureaucrats and development partners have propagated recently. The rejection of the initial design for such a scheme came as a surprise to the policy coalition, which did not enjoy the same access to key decisionmakers as in the past. Concurrently, and driven by increased electoral competition, the ruling party has increasingly focused on improving access through the expansion of physical health infrastructure. This has the additional advantage of being highly visible among the rural majority of the population, who overwhelmingly vote Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). This is our second paper on social protection in Tanzania.

In many tropical developing countries such as Tanzania, modern forest management has been characterized by top-down state-centric governance. But the growth of participatory management forms, with multiple stakeholders is leading to a plethora of changes to laws and organizational structures and more complex interplay between international interests and local decision making. Participatory management is generally thought to be more sustainable in terms of both local livelihoods and environmental outcomes. But research here is limited. This background paper provides the contextual background required for the New Partnerships for Sustainability (NEPSUS) project's work on new partnerships in forestry. The background paper examines the historical trajectory in Tanzania as well as at the international context that has led to the current makeup of forest management systems in Tanzania. ; In many tropical developing countries such as Tanzania, modern forest management has been characterized by top-down state-centric governance. But the growth of participatory management forms, with multiple stakeholders is leading to a plethora of changes to laws and organizational structures and more complex interplay between international interests and local decision making. Participatory management is generally thought to be more sustainable in terms of both local livelihoods and environmental outcomes. But research here is limited. This background paper provides the contextual background required for the New Partnerships for Sustainability (NEPSUS) project's work on new partnerships in forestry. The background paper examines the historical trajectory in Tanzania as well as at the international context that has led to the current makeup of forest management systems in Tanzania.

A great deal of attention has been paid to the distributional aspects of resource nationalism in countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, but less is known about its effects on the state's capacity. By unpacking the relations between resource nationalism, legal and institutional reform, broader political dynamics and capacity in mainland Tanzania, this paper argues that the effect of resource nationalism is ambivalent, in that it may both enable and hinder the development of capacity. We identify two phases of resource nationalism: a soft economic one in the early years of the oil price boom; and a more radical one in more recent years, with different impacts on state agencies. Whereas Tanzania's national oil company, the Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC), and its Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority (EWURA) initially developed into pockets of effectiveness aimed at re-regulating and controlling the rents under the private sector, they were increasingly being undermined as radical resource nationalism aimed at re-asserting sovereignty, reshaping ownership and increasing state control. We argue that these changes were decisively influenced by shifting ideas in the country's ruling party on the role of the state in the economy, partly driven by intensified electoral competition. Although the radicalisation of resource nationalism was under way before the ascent to power of President Magufuli in 2015, his insecure power base led to decision-making being increasingly centralised, which undermined organisational autonomy and therefore capacity. These factors point to the importance of key decision-makers in supporting capacity, while also suggesting that direct political interference is likely to undermine capacity.

The extractive industries are becoming more important for Tanzania's economy. Mining and gas production contribute to generating jobs and revenues. However, investments may also pose a threat to existing rights to land, not least because it is the state that owns the sub-soil resources. Generally, it prioritises extraction over the protection of surface land rights. Based on reviews of the extractive sector legislation, the extractive sector literature, and the literature on mainland Tanzania's economic development models, this paper focused on how the rights of different stakeholders have changed over time. It focuses on three different groups of actors, namely smallholders, investors and state actors. It argues that the role of the state in governing investments in the extractive sectors have gradually been strengthened, but that its direct involvement as an investor has waxed and waned. Recently, it has been on its way back in again through state co-ownership in joint-venture operations. This is documented in a second paper, Rights to land and natural resources in Tanzania (2/2): The return of the state.

Under recent policy reforms in Tanzania's extractive sectors, the state is taking centre stage in the governance and regulation of minerals and oil/gas/petroleum resources. Through state-owned companies it is also re-emerging as a more direct investor in these sectors. This affects the rights of other stakeholders, not least the multinational companies. This paper analyses the key features of contemporary mining and petroleum legislation and their implications for smallholders, investors and state actors. It argues that recent return of the state signifies a major shift in bargaining power between the state and other actors, especially multinational companies. At the same time, while smallholders saw a gradual strengthening of their rights, rights to land in extractive investments are still precarious. For local communities, although local content and CSR provisions have been strengthened, local content is often reinterpreted to mean national content. This may potentially disfavour communities that bear burdens of extraction at the sub-national levels.