Suchergebnisse

In 2004 the European Union and NATO each added ten new member states, most from the post-communist countries of Eastern and Central Europe. In order to prepare for membership, these countries had to make many thousands of institutional and legal adjustments. Indeed, they often tried to modernize in just a few years, implementing practices that evolved over many decades in Western Europe. This book emphasizes the way that policy elites in Central and Eastern Europe often 'ordered from the menu' of established Western practices. When did this emulation of Western practices succeed and when did it result in a fiasco? Professor Jacoby examines empirical cases in agriculture, regional policy, consumer protection, health care, civilian control of the military, and military professionalism from Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Bulgaria, and the Ukraine. The book addresses debates in institutionalist theory, including conditionality, Europeanization, and external influences on democratic and market transitions.

Are 'grand coalitions' – coalitions that include the two largest parties in a parliamentary system – good or bad for democracy? This article analyses that question in light of the recent rise of populist parties that large mainstream parties may try to exclude from government by forming grand coalitions with other large mainstream parties. I call this the 'sterilization' logic and note that mainstream parties' ability to do this varies widely. Where parties have previously used grand coalitions primarily according to a 'clientelistic' logic – for example, Austria – mainstream parties may well be unable to rally the party system against insurgent populist challengers. Where mainstream parties have used grand coalitions exceptionally and for major institutional 'renovations' – for example, Germany – the grand coalition remains a viable option for responding to insurgent challenges, though this strategy is also quite risky. This article considers the implications for democracy by tracing recent developments in the context of the euro crisis and the European refugee situation. The major empirical referents are Austria and Germany – two countries with extensive experience and literature about grand coalitions – but the article draws out the implications of the analysis for other European parliamentary contexts.

This article offers a corrective to the notion that German ordoliberal ideology is the key to understanding German policy behavior during the Eurocrisis and, by extension, to the contours of the electoral debate in fall 2013. First, it shows that ordoliberal thought underdetermines policy choices. That is, different actors clearly influenced by ordoliberal thinking and often stressing different aspects of the broader ordoliberal cannon are arguing for more or less diametrically opposed policy solutions. Second, the article provides evidence that this deep divide inside the ordoliberal policy community has contributed additional incentives to the tentative and inconclusive policy choices of the government throughout much of the Eurocrisis. Third, the article extends the analysis of this very cautious policymaking into the campaign phase and the subsequent coalition agreement. It explains why the two major German parties—including an SPD with a much thinner attachment than the CDU to ordoliberalism—sought to play down the Eurocrisis in their campaigns and in their subsequent coalition agreement. One implication is the low probability of German policy change despite ideological differences.

This article describes the EU's impact on economic performance in the new Member States since the advent of membership. It first deals with the EU's role in promoting the economic boom that marked the region up to 2007, emphasizing the role of the single market and of the EU in anchoring and encouraging economic policy liberalization. The second section investigates the EU role in buffering the bust that occurred after 2007, looking at structural fund spending and financial sector instruments to enhance liquidity. I argue the EU had a (mostly unintentional) pro-cyclical effect that fuelled the boom and contributed to setting up the region for a very hard fall during the bust. I also show the EU efforts to buffer the hard times were far quicker in the area of structural fund spending compared to very slow and limited innovation in liquidity provision, especially for non-eurozone states. Adapted from the source document.

There has been a recent explosion of interest in the external influences on the political and economic transformations of postcommunist states. This article consolidates several analytical advances in this literature and distills three main functions of external actors, namely, to lengthen the time horizons ofpostcommunist politicians, to expand the circle of interested reformers, and t o deter opponents of reform. The article argues that a focus on external influences is a growth area for good conceptual work only if it addresses the union of foreign and domestic influences, rather than treating them as stylized alternative explanations. The central point is that outside actors should be considered as striving to influence the choices of existing domestic actors with whom they can be seen to form a kind of informal coalition. At bottom, outsiders do best through a combination of strategies: strengthening domestic actors already committed to their approach, winning over new domestic actors to their priorities, and preventing the unconvinced from obstructing reforms.