Suchergebnisse

In present article internal factors influencing Lithuanian foreign policy iden- tity are analysed: the image of Russia and the United States in the context of Lithuanian foreign policy identity, constructed by two important Lithuanian institutions (President and mass media of Lithuania) is researched. The arti- cle aims to compare Russia's and the U.S. image, constructed on two different levels: in the official rhetorics of Lithuanian president and in Lithuanian mass media. The comparison is made on the basis of following criteria: perception of Russia and the U.S. as "Other" of Lithuanian foreign policy identity; per- ception of mutual interests, perception of interests that differ.

In present article internal factors influencing Lithuanian foreign policy iden- tity are analysed: the image of Russia and the United States in the context of Lithuanian foreign policy identity, constructed by two important Lithuanian institutions (President and mass media of Lithuania) is researched. The arti- cle aims to compare Russia's and the U.S. image, constructed on two different levels: in the official rhetorics of Lithuanian president and in Lithuanian mass media. The comparison is made on the basis of following criteria: perception of Russia and the U.S. as "Other" of Lithuanian foreign policy identity; per- ception of mutual interests, perception of interests that differ.

US-Russian relations have always been mutable and attracting attention of international community: US hostile foreign policy towards Russia was accompanied by periods of warming, and vice versa. When the presidency of B. Obama began, not always positive US rhetoric towards Russia (that was typical feature of G. W. Bush administration) was changed into the stressing the need to engage Russia into cooperation – ie engagement strategy. Therefore, experts of international relations started talking about a new phase in US-Russian relations. However, it would be incorrect to say that Russia's engagement strategy is the invention of B. Obama's administration. So the purpose of the article is to analyse Russia's engagement strategy in US foreign policy not only during the presidency of B. Obama and to compare its implementation during the presidency of different US presidents. In article there are given the theoretical basics of engagement strategy, there is introduced implementation of Russia's engagement strategy during the presidency of B. Clinton, G. W. Bush and B. Obama stressing the main instruments of engagement strategy, there is compared strategy's place in US foreign policy and its instruments during the presidency of B. Clinton, G. W. Bush and B. Obama.

US-Russian relations have always been mutable and attracting attention of international community: US hostile foreign policy towards Russia was accompanied by periods of warming, and vice versa. When the presidency of B. Obama began, not always positive US rhetoric towards Russia (that was typical feature of G. W. Bush administration) was changed into the stressing the need to engage Russia into cooperation – ie engagement strategy. Therefore, experts of international relations started talking about a new phase in US-Russian relations. However, it would be incorrect to say that Russia's engagement strategy is the invention of B. Obama's administration. So the purpose of the article is to analyse Russia's engagement strategy in US foreign policy not only during the presidency of B. Obama and to compare its implementation during the presidency of different US presidents. In article there are given the theoretical basics of engagement strategy, there is introduced implementation of Russia's engagement strategy during the presidency of B. Clinton, G. W. Bush and B. Obama stressing the main instruments of engagement strategy, there is compared strategy's place in US foreign policy and its instruments during the presidency of B. Clinton, G. W. Bush and B. Obama.

US-Russian relations have always been mutable and attracting attention of international community: US hostile foreign policy towards Russia was accompanied by periods of warming, and vice versa. When the presidency of B. Obama began, not always positive US rhetoric towards Russia (that was typical feature of G. W. Bush administration) was changed into the stressing the need to engage Russia into cooperation – ie engagement strategy. Therefore, experts of international relations started talking about a new phase in US-Russian relations. However, it would be incorrect to say that Russia's engagement strategy is the invention of B. Obama's administration. So the purpose of the article is to analyse Russia's engagement strategy in US foreign policy not only during the presidency of B. Obama and to compare its implementation during the presidency of different US presidents. In article there are given the theoretical basics of engagement strategy, there is introduced implementation of Russia's engagement strategy during the presidency of B. Clinton, G. W. Bush and B. Obama stressing the main instruments of engagement strategy, there is compared strategy's place in US foreign policy and its instruments during the presidency of B. Clinton, G. W. Bush and B. Obama.

Containment strategy is the strategy that aims to prevent the spread of enemies' influence. This strategy dominated the US foreign policy for the long time: framed by George F. Kennan after the WW II containment strategy was the most important mean of US foreign policy towards Soviet Union up till the end of the Cold war. After the collapse of Soviet Union strategic enemy of US was gone. However, it seems that Russia being the most powerful descendant of Soviet Union has ambitions to regain its lost power. Therefore the question arises how important is containment strategy in the contemporary foreign policy of US. The purpose of this article is to analyze Russia's containment strategy in the contemporary foreign policy of US. Russia's containment strategy is an important mean of US contemporary foreign policy but exists only on the practical level of US foreign policy – the official documents of US do not declare that US is employing Russia's containment strategy. Though, in the practice of US foreign policy many features of Russia's containment strategy can be noticed: the expansion of NATO, arms limitation treaties, the expansion of US influence in post-soviet space, initiative to build missile defence shield in Europe. It can be said that the employment of Russia's containment strategy in US policy depends on Russia's foreign policy: the more aggressive Russia's foreign policy is the more active US is employing Russia's containment strategy.

Containment strategy is the strategy that aims to prevent the spread of enemies' influence. This strategy dominated the US foreign policy for the long time: framed by George F. Kennan after the WW II containment strategy was the most important mean of US foreign policy towards Soviet Union up till the end of the Cold war. After the collapse of Soviet Union strategic enemy of US was gone. However, it seems that Russia being the most powerful descendant of Soviet Union has ambitions to regain its lost power. Therefore the question arises how important is containment strategy in the contemporary foreign policy of US. The purpose of this article is to analyze Russia's containment strategy in the contemporary foreign policy of US. Russia's containment strategy is an important mean of US contemporary foreign policy but exists only on the practical level of US foreign policy – the official documents of US do not declare that US is employing Russia's containment strategy. Though, in the practice of US foreign policy many features of Russia's containment strategy can be noticed: the expansion of NATO, arms limitation treaties, the expansion of US influence in post-soviet space, initiative to build missile defence shield in Europe. It can be said that the employment of Russia's containment strategy in US policy depends on Russia's foreign policy: the more aggressive Russia's foreign policy is the more active US is employing Russia's containment strategy.

In the 21st century security situation has changed – international community has faced with a new kind of threats: terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. A progress of science and technology has become the two-edged sword in hand of terrorists and rogue states. In this context deterrence no longer could ensure security. Therefore attention was called to the other means of defense – preventive and preemptive strikes. Preventive strike is a military strike initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater risk. Preemptive strike is an attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent. Several states have expressed intention to use preemptive strikes: USA, Russia, Australia, Italy, United Kingdom, but for the meantime only USA has implemented this strategy. The question is whether the other states will follow USA's example. In this article the subject of preemptive strikes is considered in aspect of probability to use this means of policy. The object of analysis in this article is the probability of USA and Russia to use preemptive strikes. The purpose of the article is to compare the probability of USA and Russia to use preemptive strikes. Several factors were chosen to define the probability of USA and Russia to use preemptive strikes. They are: state's attitude towards preemptive strikes, military capabilities, state's self-perception in the international stage, the attitude of international community towards preemptive strikes. The probability of USA and Russia to use preemptive strikes is analysed employing several methods of analysis: analysis of documents, description and comparative method.[.].

In the 21st century security situation has changed – international community has faced with a new kind of threats: terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. A progress of science and technology has become the two-edged sword in hand of terrorists and rogue states. In this context deterrence no longer could ensure security. Therefore attention was called to the other means of defense – preventive and preemptive strikes. Preventive strike is a military strike initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater risk. Preemptive strike is an attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent. Several states have expressed intention to use preemptive strikes: USA, Russia, Australia, Italy, United Kingdom, but for the meantime only USA has implemented this strategy. The question is whether the other states will follow USA's example. In this article the subject of preemptive strikes is considered in aspect of probability to use this means of policy. The object of analysis in this article is the probability of USA and Russia to use preemptive strikes. The purpose of the article is to compare the probability of USA and Russia to use preemptive strikes. Several factors were chosen to define the probability of USA and Russia to use preemptive strikes. They are: state's attitude towards preemptive strikes, military capabilities, state's self-perception in the international stage, the attitude of international community towards preemptive strikes. The probability of USA and Russia to use preemptive strikes is analysed employing several methods of analysis: analysis of documents, description and comparative method.[.].

In the 21st century security situation has changed – international community has faced with a new kind of threats: terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. A progress of science and technology has become the two-edged sword in hand of terrorists and rogue states. In this context deterrence no longer could ensure security. Therefore attention was called to the other means of defense – preventive and preemptive strikes. Preventive strike is a military strike initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater risk. Preemptive strike is an attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent. Several states have expressed intention to use preemptive strikes: USA, Russia, Australia, Italy, United Kingdom, but for the meantime only USA has implemented this strategy. The question is whether the other states will follow USA's example. In this article the subject of preemptive strikes is considered in aspect of probability to use this means of policy. The object of analysis in this article is the probability of USA and Russia to use preemptive strikes. The purpose of the article is to compare the probability of USA and Russia to use preemptive strikes. Several factors were chosen to define the probability of USA and Russia to use preemptive strikes. They are: state's attitude towards preemptive strikes, military capabilities, state's self-perception in the international stage, the attitude of international community towards preemptive strikes. The probability of USA and Russia to use preemptive strikes is analysed employing several methods of analysis: analysis of documents, description and comparative method.[.].

Research on status-seeking in international politics offers valuable insights into why countries of various sizes may and sometimes do act in unexpected and apparently irrational ways. This article applies a status-seeking theoretical framework, that of Social Identity Theory, to explain a small, materially weak state's unconventional foreign policy choices. Our case study focuses on Lithuania's ambitious engagement in the EU's Eastern Partnership programme, targeting Ukraine and Georgia. We find that a status-focused analysis helps to better comprehend several 'unusual' foreign policy initiatives launched by Lithuanian policymakers since the 2000s, the ultimate purpose of which, we argue, is the pursuit of higher status.

Research on status-seeking in international politics offers valuable insights into why countries of various sizes may and sometimes do act in unexpected and apparently irrational ways. This article applies a status-seeking theoretical framework, that of Social Identity Theory, to explain a small, materially weak state's unconventional foreign policy choices. Our case study focuses on Lithuania's ambitious engagement in the EU's Eastern Partnership programme, targeting Ukraine and Georgia. We find that a status-focused analysis helps to better comprehend several 'unusual' foreign policy initiatives launched by Lithuanian policymakers since the 2000s, the ultimate purpose of which, we argue, is the pursuit of higher status.

The Activity Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania for 2017 declares that Lithuania's foreign policy is effective and claims that public opinion is the most important criteria for measuring its effectiveness. The article analyses Lithuania's foreign public policy cycle, with the focus on its formation and evaluation peculiarities. It argues that the cycle of Lithuanian foreign public policy is stagnating since its evaluation stage lacks efficiency and misses critical evaluations. The lack of strategic documents does not allow defining core foreign policy goals and in this matter to evaluate their achievement. The ambiguous goals in lower level documents prevent critical evaluation because of political interests. Lithuanian foreign policy is the outcome of close cooperation between President's Office and Ministry of Foreign Affairs which limits criticism between institutions. The Seimas provides greater criticism only when initiative is showed by the opposition. Foreign policy remains the sphere of responsibility of the political elite which has broad consensus and has differences in their views on a tactical level. Media and experts, for the most part, avoid critical evaluations of foreign policy as they want to remain in the dominating discourse and keep close contacts with state institutions. The current evaluation environment and tools are not sufficient to make changes at the agenda-setting stage of foreign policy. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5755/j01.ppaa.18.1.23125