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Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Stayers, Leavers, and U.S. Overseas Troops -- Chapter 3. Political Realism and Structural Constraints on Retrenchment -- Chapter 4. The System, the Psyche, and the Stayers -- Chapter 5. The Geopolitical Logic of U.S. Overseas Troops -- Chapter 6. U.S. Overseas Troops: Empirical Patterns, 2017-2021. - Chapter 7. Regional Domino Narratives and the Geopolitics of Withdrawal -- Chapter 8. Conclusion: Whither U.S. Overseas Troops?.

"This book is about political risk for multinational companies. It describes and analyzes the complex, conflicting relationships between politics and international business. First, a theoretical framework is meticulously constructed. Second, a new dataset on political risk is presented and analyzed. Third, a statistical investigation of the relationship between risks and the location decisions of multinationals is performed. Eye-catching examples of political risk phenomena - such as kidnappings, nationalizations, and armed conflicts - are presented and commented upon throughout the text. The broad focus and real-world examples will provide valuable lessons for business managers, government officials, political risk analysts, and insurers and, more broadly, all students of global affairs and international business."--Back cover

This article tests what seems to be a reasonably widespread perception, namely, that the last few years have witnessed intensified interstate security competition in several of the world's regions. Specifically, we investigate whether or not states' military budgets tend to change as a function of changes to the armaments levels of neighbouring states, as the security dilemma model would suggest. We perform two empirical analyses. First, we specify a least square dummy variables model, whose results we map using standard geographic information system software. Our 'hot spot' analysis for the period 2008/2009–2014 suggests that action–reaction dynamics are present in the Middle East, Central and Southern Africa, and the South Caucasus. Neither South nor East or South East Asia is ridden by severe security competition. Europe generally forms a 'cold spot' region, indicating a lower-than-expected level of changes in arms spending. Second, our spatial lag model suggests the presence of action–reaction globally for the whole post-Cold War era, although results are still substantially driven by the last few years. Interstate security competition is now, apparently, an important element of international politics – albeit only in some regions. Our findings also reveal the potential for disarmament spirals.

Does the partisan composition of state governments in the. - United States influence the location decisions of foreign multinational. - companies? This article argues that it does. We contend. - that partisan differences over state economic development. - policies still exist. Whereas Republicans tend to prefer an. - investment-driven (supply-side) growth model, Democrats favor a. - consumption-driven (demand-side) path to growth. Both sets of. - policies are of value to foreign direct investment; thus, multinationals. - do not favor one party over the other. A useful blend. - of policy measures is sought by foreign firms, making split state. - government preferable over unified government. Our arguments. - are comprehensively tested in a time-series cross-section analysis. - covering the period 1977-2004, with results supporting our. - claims. (International Interactions (London)/ FUB)