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The peace operations literature suffers from a narrow focus on battlefield deterrence. It ignores the need to deter actors beyond the battlefield from supporting the combatants using force, and analyses the use of military threats and force in peace operations in a vacuum without taking into account the other instruments that deterring actors employ simultaneously to influence the combatants, combatant allies, combatant supporters and bystanders that undermine deterrence in peace operations. Since most peace operation forces lack the capacity and willingness to threaten and use force in accordance with the requirements stipulated by rational deterrence theory, influencing actors beyond the battlefield is more important with respect to deterring violence than the military efforts undertaken by peace operation forces to deter combatants from using force or to compel them to stop doing so. Accordingly, this chapter develops a new analytical framework that will enable peace operation theorists and practitioners to target all the actors that undermine deterrence on the battlefield and beyond with all the tools at their disposal---persuasion, inducement and coercion. The framework will improve both theory and practice by providing a better understanding of the conditions under which peace operations can contribute to deterring and, if need be, compelling combatants from using force as well as identifying the tools that practitioners can employ to this end. It highlights that peace operations merely constitute the top of the deterrence iceberg, and that peace operation forces must be supported by other actors and tools to succeed with respect to deterring violence and facilitating conflict resolution. ; The peace operations literature suffers from a narrow focus on battlefield deterrence. It ignores the need to deter actors beyond the battlefield from supporting the combatants using force, and analyses the use of military threats and force in peace operations in a vacuum without taking into account the other instruments that deterring actors employ simultaneously to influence the combatants, combatant allies, combatant supporters and bystanders that undermine deterrence in peace operations. Since most peace operation forces lack the capacity and willingness to threaten and use force in accordance with the requirements stipulated by rational deterrence theory, influencing actors beyond the battlefield is more important with respect to deterring violence than the military efforts undertaken by peace operation forces to deter combatants from using force or to compel them to stop doing so. Accordingly, this chapter develops a new analytical framework that will enable peace operation theorists and practitioners to target all the actors that undermine deterrence on the battlefield and beyond with all the tools at their disposal—persuasion, inducement and coercion. The framework will improve both theory and practice by providing a better understanding of the conditions under which peace operations can contribute to deterring and, if need be, compelling combatants from using force as well as identifying the tools that practitioners can employ to this end. It highlights that peace operations merely constitute the top of the deterrence iceberg, and that peace operation forces must be supported by other actors and tools to succeed with respect to deterring violence and facilitating conflict resolution.

The peace operations literature suffers from a narrow focus on battlefield deterrence. It ignores the need to deter actors beyond the battlefield from supporting the combatants using force, and analyses the use of military threats and force in peace operations in a vacuum without taking into account the other instruments that deterring actors employ simultaneously to influence the combatants, combatant allies, combatant supporters and bystanders that undermine deterrence in peace operations. Since most peace operation forces lack the capacity and willingness to threaten and use force in accordance with the requirements stipulated by rational deterrence theory, influencing actors beyond the battlefield is more important with respect to deterring violence than the military efforts undertaken by peace operation forces to deter combatants from using force or to compel them to stop doing so. Accordingly, this chapter develops a new analytical framework that will enable peace operation theorists and practitioners to targets all the actors that undermine deterrence on the battlefield and beyond with all the tools at their disposal – persuasion, inducement and coercion. The framework will improve both theory and practice by providing a better understanding of the conditions under which peace operations can contribute to deterring and, if need be, compelling combatants from using force as well as identifying the tools that practitioners can employ to this end. It highlights that peace operations merely merely constitute the top of the deterrence iceberg, and that peace operation forces must be supported by other actors and tools to succeed with respect to deterring violence and facilitating conflict resolution. ; The peace operations literature suffers from a narrow focus on battlefield deterrence. It ignores the need to deter actors beyond the battlefield from supporting the combatants using force, and analyses the use of military threats and force in peace operations in a vacuum without taking into account the other instruments that deterring actors employ simultaneously to influence the combatants, combatant allies, combatant supporters and bystanders that undermine deterrence in peace operations. Since most peace operation forces lack the capacity and willingness to threaten and use force in accordance with the requirements stipulated by rational deterrence theory, influencing actors beyond the battlefield is more important with respect to deterring violence than the military efforts undertaken by peace operation forces to deter combatants from using force or to compel them to stop doing so. Accordingly, this chapter develops a new analytical framework that will enable peace operation theorists and practitioners to target all the actors that undermine deterrence on the battlefield and beyond with all the tools at their disposal—persuasion, inducement and coercion. The framework will improve both theory and practice by providing a better understanding of the conditions under which peace operations can contribute to deterring and, if need be, compelling combatants from using force as well as identifying the tools that practitioners can employ to this end. It highlights that peace operations merely constitute the top of the deterrence iceberg, and that peace operation forces must be supported by other actors and tools to succeed with respect to deterring violence and facilitating conflict resolution.

This article identifies the institutional mechanisms that have created and sustained the surprisingly high level of political support that has characterized the two flagships of the activist Danish foreign policy for nearly 60 years: international military operations and development assistance. The high support results from two policy communities involving the key actors and using standard- and crisis-management procedures in the form of white papers, commissions, multi-year budget agreements, consultation, political agreements and strategies to build compromises within the two policy-areas. The high level of political support is underpinned by public disinterest in the two areas and the need to establish an international reputation as a reliable partner. The key to understanding the future of Denmark's activist foreign policy consequently does not lie abroad or in opinion polls as it is generally assumed. It lies in the Danish parliament and the ministries involved in the two policy-areas.

Artiklen identificerer de institutionelle mekanismer, som har skabt og vedligeholdt den overraskende høje politiske opbakning, som har kendetegnet den aktivistiske udenrigspolitiks to flagskibe i næsten 60 år: de internationale militære operationer og udviklingsbistanden. Den høje og konstante opbakning skyldes to policy-fællesskaber, der inddrager de centrale aktører og anvender standard- og krisestyringsprocedurer i form af ekspertudredninger, kommissioner, flerårige budgetaftaler, konsultationer, politiske forlig og strategier til at skabe kompromiser på de to policy-områder. Den høje politiske opbakning understøttes af manglende folkelig interesse for de to områder og behovet for at fremstå som en troværdig international samarbejdspartner. Nøglen til at forstå den udenrigspolitiske aktivismes fremtidige udvikling ligger derfor ikke i udlandet eller i meningsmålingerne, som det normalt antages. Den ligger på Slotsholmen.

This article identifies the institutional mechanisms that have created and sustained the surprisingly high level of political support that has characterized the two flagships of the activist Danish foreign policy for nearly 60 years: international military operations and development assistance. The high support results from two policy communities involving the key actors and using standard- and crisis-management procedures in the form of white papers, commissions, multi-year budget agreements, consultation, political agreements and strategies to build compromises within the two policy-areas. The high level of political support is underpinned by public disinterest in the two areas and the need to establish an international reputation as a reliable partner. The key to understanding the future of Denmark's activist foreign policy consequently does not lie abroad or in opinion polls as it is generally assumed. It lies in the Danish parliament and the ministries involved in the two policy-areas.

This chapter takes issue with this view arguing that the American willingness to stay engaged first and foremost will depend upon the ability of the US President to craft a strategic narrative that can convince most members of Congress that it is necessary to stay engaged, that it is the right thing to do, and that the United States, Afghanistan and the world will benefit from it. In addition, the President must promise success at an acceptable price and deliver it by demonstrating that progress is being made on a continuous basis. My argument has three parts. Part one explains why elite consensus is the key to sustain the US engagement in Afghanistan beyond 2017, and why a successful strategic narrative is required to create it. It provides an analytic framework specifying the requirements for success that a strategic narrative must meet in order to convince its intended audience. Part two shows how President Obama's Afghanistan narrative met all these requirements for success and maintained US elite consensus for his 2009-2015 Afghanistan strategy. By equating success with the drawdown of US troops Obama was able to present the steady stream of soldiers returning home as incontrovertible proof to Congress and the American people that his strategy was working. Part three discusses the implications of these findings for sustaining the American engagement in Afghanistan beyond 2017. They suggest it possible to do so provided that the US President can craft a new strategic narrative that promises and delivers success in clear and compelling way to the US Congress and the American people. The main findings of the analysis are summed up in a conclusion at the end.