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"The Ethics of Voting" published on by Oxford University Press.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- A Debate in Dire Need of Rescue -- Markets, Morals, Mischaracterizations, and Mute Inglorious Miltons -- Positive Contributions to the Debates -- A Map of the Cat -- PART I: How the Debates Over the Moral Limits of Markets Became Derailed -- 1. The Magical Asymmetry Thesis -- Introduction -- Sandel and Satz Do Not Endorse the Asymmetry Thesis -- Sandel and the Asymmetry Thesis -- Satz and the Asymmetry Thesis -- Anderson: Sex, Surrogacy-and Symmetry -- Sex and Sphere Differentiation -- Surrogacy and Symmetry -- Walzer and Archard Are Not Anticommodification Theorists, Either -- Walzer on Markets and Justice -- Archard on Blood -- Conclusion -- 2. Semiotic Objections to Markets -- Introduction -- Brennan and Jaworski's Critique of Semiotic Objections to Commodification -- Essentialist Semiotics -- Contingent Semiotics -- Conclusion -- 3. Sandel, Semiotics, and Money-Based Exchange -- Introduction -- Sandel's Putative Semiotic Objections to Markets -- Markets in Children and Information Markets in Terrorism and Death -- Inappropriate Gifts? Gift Certificates and Cash -- Money and the Norms of Friendship -- Intrinsic Value, Instrumental Value, and Yosemite -- Conclusion -- 4. Sex, Surrogacy, Semiotics, and Spheres: Anderson on Market Exchange -- Introduction -- Brennan and Jaworski Attribute Essentialist Semiotic Objections to Anderson -- Anderson Rejects Semiotic Essentialism -- Anderson Supports Revising Costly Norms -- Anderson Does Not Offer Semiotic Arguments Against Commodified Sex or Surrogacy -- Conclusion -- 5. Walzer, Satz, Archard, and Semiotics -- Introduction -- Michael Walzer's Spheres of Justice -- Debra Satz and Stanford's Student Newspaper -- Satz and the Meaning of Friendship, Love, and Prizes.

"This is the first book to argue in favor of paying people for their blood plasma. It does not merely argue that offering compensation to plasma donors is morally permissible. It argues that prohibiting donor compensation is morally wrong-and that it is morally wrong for all of the reasons that are offered against allowing donor compensation. Opponents of donor compensation claim that it will reduce the amount and quality of plasma obtained, exploit and coerce donors, and undermine social cohesion. James Stacey Taylor argues that empirical evidence demonstrates that compensating plasma donors greatly increases the amount of plasma obtained with no adverse effects on the quality of the pharmaceutical products that are manufactured from it. Prohibiting compensation thus harms patients by reducing their access to the medicines they need. He also argues that it is the prohibition of compensation-not its offer-that exploits donors, fails to respect the moral need to secure a person's authoritative consent to her treatment, and prevents donors from giving their informed consent to donate. Prohibiting compensation thus not only harms patients-it wrongs donors. Bloody Bioethics will appeal to researchers, advanced students, and medical professionals interested in bioethics, moral philosophy, and the moral limits of markets"--

Introduction1. Compensating Plasma Donors is Safe and Effective2. Donor Compensation and Informed Consent3. Coercion, Force, Autonomy, and Consent4. Exploitation5. Donor Exploitation6. Social Cohesion and Donor Approbation7. Contamination, Cohesion, and Imagined CommunityConclusion

chapter 1 The Problem - and Some Proposed Solutions -- chapter 2 Dworkin on Autonomy, Fear and Kidney Sales -- chapter 3 Is the Typical Kidney Vendor Forced to Sell? -- chapter 4 Constraining Options and Kidney Markets -- chapter 5 A Moral Case for Market Regulation -- chapter 6 Kidney Sales and Dangerous Employment -- chapter 7 Human Dignity and the Fear of Commodification -- chapter 8 Commodification, Altruism and Kidney Procurement -- chapter 9 Conclusion.

Introduction -- A theory of autonomy -- The many faces of autonomy? -- Identification and autonomy : a tale of two concepts -- Decisive identification -- Autonomy and normativity -- Autonomy and choice -- Autonomy and constraint -- Autonomy, privacy, and patient confidentiality -- Autonomy and informed consent -- The value of autonomy in bioethics.

Autonomy has recently become one of the central concepts in contemporary moral philosophy and has generated much debate over its nature and value. This 2005 volume brings together essays that address the theoretical foundations of the concept of autonomy, as well as essays that investigate the relationship between autonomy and moral responsibility, freedom, political philosophy, and medical ethics. Written by some of the most prominent philosophers working in these areas, this book represents research on the nature and value of autonomy that will be essential reading for a broad swathe of philosophers as well as many psychologists

Book review.

Abstract
Jason Brennan and Peter Jaworski have recently developed an increasingly influential argument against semiotic objections to commodification. A semiotic argument is one that holds that the commodification of certain goods or services is morally wrong, either because it violates the social meaning of those goods or services, or because the market exchange of them would communicate something wrongful. Brennan and Jaworski focus much of their attention on showing that Michael Sandel's deployment of such arguments fails. However, their argument does not undermine Sandel's position because they have fundamentally misunderstood his view. But this misunderstanding is productive, for it can be used both to clarify the nature of the debates over the moral limits of markets and to gain a better understanding of an underexplored criticism of money-based exchange.

Abstract
It is usual in debates over the appropriate limits of markets to note that there are some goods—such as Nobel Prizes, academic grades, military medals, friendship, and love—that cannot be bought and sold. But while it is common to hold that the nature of certain goods precludes their monetary transfer, there has been no systematic account of why this is so. This paper will remedy this omission by identifying the properties that preclude the possibility of the monetary alienability of the goods that possess them. And while this will identify some goods that money cannot buy, many other goods that are believed to be beyond the reach of the market will turn out to be monetarily alienable—including all of those mentioned above.

After outlining her rights-based theory of justice in Whose Body is it Anyway? Cécile Fabre argues that as a matter of justice needy people have a right to be rescued provided that this would not impose unreasonable costs upon their would-be rescuers, and that this right should be enshrined in law. Fabre then argues that the enforcement of such a duty to rescue extends not only to the state being able to conscript persons into a civilian service, but that it should also be able to conscript cadaveric organs for transplant into those who need them —; and even that it should be able to conscript organs for transplant from live persons if needed. Fabre then goes on to argue that persons should be allowed to sell goods and services that are typically held to be market inalienable —; including their non-essential organs and their sexual and reproductive services. While she agrees that there should be markets in cadaveric organs, in Black Markets Michele Goodwin argues that the conscription of organs from either cadavers or living persons is ethically and legally problematic. In this review article I argue that while Fabre's arguments are more persuasive than Goodwin's, they do not support Fabre's more radical conclusions. I also argue that Fabre's conclusions concerning cadaveric organ conscription could be strengthened by drawing upon current philosophical arguments concerning the possibility of posthumous harm, and by clarifying her account of rights. I conclude by noting that just as Fabre's arguments would benefit from considering the empirical data that Goodwin offers, so too would Goodwin's views benefit from a greater engagement with the type of philosophical arguments offered by Fabre.

Argues that not only is the State morally permitted to place citizens under constant surveillance, but that a situation of constant surveillance is morally preferable to the opposite pole. Demonstrated is that a system of constant surveillance will decrease crime, better serve justice, and impose fewer costs on witnesses. Four objections to such a system are rejected.